Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A school district (District) obtained an in rem delinquent property tax judgment against an oil and gas lease that Respondent owned and operated. Respondent did not appeal, and the District foreclosed its judgment lien on the leasehold, taking ownership. The Railroad Commission ordered Respondent to plug a well on the lease. Respondent did not comply, and the Commission plugged the well and brought an enforcement action in court to recover the costs of the operation and the penalty. Respondent and the Commission settled. Respondent then sued the District, alleging in part that the District's actions had resulted in a taking of his property requiring compensation. The trial court dismissed Respondent's action for want of jurisdiction, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded with respect to the takings claim. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding that the trial court correctly dismissed Respondent's case, as Respondent did not assert on appeal that the District took his property without compensation. View "W. Hardin County Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Poole" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice Community Justice Assistance Division (TDCJ) brought this interlocutory appeal from the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction as to claims for damages related to actions of two county substance abuse treatment facility officers. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the claims against TDCJ for want of jurisdiction, holding (1) the claims against TDCJ based on the use of tangible property involved intent to accomplish intentional torts, and its plea to the jurisdiction as to those claims should have been granted; and (2) TDCJ's plea as to the remaining claims also should have been granted because there was no allegation that those claims resulted from the use of tangible property. View "Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Campos" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit in superior court claiming that she and her son entered into an oral that granted her a life estate in certain property. Petitioner sought to enforce the oral agreement or, in the alternative, recover of a theory of quantum meruit. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The appeals court remanded for proceedings as to whether Petitioner should recover under a theory of quantum meruit. While the case was pending on remand, Petitioner filed a petition in the county court against the judge assigned to the matter, in both his individual and official capacities, and against the Commonwealth. Petitioner raised a number of claims concerning the judge's rulings and conduct, including an assertion that he had acted in an unlawful and biased manner. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner's claims of judicial bias and declaratory judgment claims should have been addressed through the ordinary trial and appellate process; (2) the judge was absolutely immune from Petitioner's request for monetary damages; and (3) Petitioner's allegations of conspiracy were insufficient to overcome the judge's absolute immunity. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This action arose from modifications resulting from landfill activity made to real property that was adjacent to the property of Respondents. Respondents filed a complaint against the Town of Pratt and others, alleging that the modifications allegedly caused a change in the normal water flow on Respondents' property and resulted in property damage. The Town filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment, asserting it was entitled to be dismissed based on sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the Town's motion as premature, finding that the parties should conduct discovery prior to the court making a determination regarding the Town's immunity arguments. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order denying the Town's motion and granted the Town's requested writ of prohibition, finding that the Town's immunity was purely a question of law and ripe for summary disposition at the circuit court level through a motion to dismiss. View "State ex rel. Town of Pratt v. Circuit Court (Stucky)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an application for a 119-lot subdivision, which the Board of Missoula County Commissioners denied. Plaintiff petitioned for judicial review of the Board's action and alternatively claimed that the Board's actions constituted a regulatory taking that entitled him to just compensation. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all of Richard's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing Plaintiff to conduct further discovery before ruling on the summary judgment motion; (2) the district court properly granted summary judgment to the County on the Board's decision to deny the subdivision; and (3) the County was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's regulatory taking claim. View "Richards v. County of Missoula" on Justia Law

In this construction defect case, defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff then filed a "motion for reconsideration" of the summary judgment ruling. The court meanwhile entered judgment, and plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. When the trial court later denied the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff did not file a new notice of appeal. The question in this case was whether plaintiff needed to do so. Defendant argued that, because a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for new trial, its filing rendered plaintiff's earlier notice of appeal premature and, as a consequence, a nullity. Plaintiff argued that the motion for reconsideration did not constitute a motion for a new trial and thus had no effect on the filing of the notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that, under "Carter v. U.S. National Bank," (747 P2d 980 (1987)), a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for a new trial. Nevertheless, the court held that the filing of the motion did not have the effect of rendering the appeal a nullity. Consequently, the court concluded that plaintiff was not required to file a new notice of appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Carter" and earlier decisions declaring that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment constitutes a motion for a new trial were incorrectly decided. In this case, plaintiff's filing of the motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment did not render the filing of the notice of appeal premature. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Assoc. Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condo v. Warren" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the court of appeal erred in holding the district court erred in finding that a governmental entity proved a sufficient public necessity for expropriating property. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that court of appeal did not properly apply the manifest error standard of review. As such, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstated the judgment of the district court. View "Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Gov't v. Person" on Justia Law

In 1996, CP sued the United States, claiming that CP owned minerals underlying Louisiana property (Groups A, B, and C mineral servitudes), and that between 1943 and 1978, the government imposed a drilling and operations moratorium while the surface was used for bombing and artillery practice. It alleged that starting in 1992, the government, claiming ownership, has granted oil and gas leases covering the property. The district court granted the government summary judgment with regard to Groups A and B because the prescription period was not suspended by the moratoriums. Concerning Group C, the court granted CP summary judgment, finding that servitude imprescriptible. The Fifth Circuit affirmed; certiorari was denied. In1998, CP filed another complaint in the Claims Court, alleging taking without just compensation, as an alternative to its district court action. In 2004, the Claims Court dismissed the Groups A and B claims and limited the C claim to post-1992 action. The court found that the government’s issuance of leases after 1997 constituted a compensable temporary taking, but subsequently dismissed, finding that the facts alleged in the district court complaint were nearly identical. The complaints were “for or in respect to” the same claim and 28 U.S.C. 1500 precluded jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Cent. Pines Land Co., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to decide whether a mortgage lienholder has standing to an agreed judgment between the property owner and the purchaser of the property owner's delinquent property tax liens. The court of appeals determined that the mortgage lienholder in this case (Appellee, Commonwealth Bank & Trust Company) did have standing to contest the agreed judgment between the property owner (Appellee, Teretha Murphy) and the owner of the owner's delinquent property tax liens (Appellant, Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Commonwealth Bank had standing to contest the monetary amount awarded in the agreed judgment. View "Tax Ease Lien Invs. 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust" on Justia Law

This case was before the Supreme Court on a property appraiser's appeal of the court of appeal's decision affirming a circuit court's grant of an ad valorem homestead tax exemption to David and Ana Andonie (the taxpayers) and declaration that a portion of Fla. Stat. 196.031(1) was invalid and unenforceable because the statutory provision limited the class of property owners otherwise eligible for ad valorem tax relief under Fla. Const. art. VII, 6(a). The Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal to the extent it was consistent with its holding here, holding (1) the plain language of article VII, section 6(a) permits every owner of Florida real property to apply for and receive ad valorem tax relief where it is sufficiently demonstrated that the owner has maintained on that property the permanent residence of another legally or naturally dependent on the owner; and (2) the property appraiser here failed to sufficiently preserve for appellate review any argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence introduced in the circuit court below, and the record sufficiently demonstrated that the taxpayers maintained on their property the permanent residence of their minor children, each of whom was legally and naturally dependent on the taxpayers. View "Garcia v. Andonie" on Justia Law