Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC (MAID), which challenged two laws passed by the 2023 Montana Legislature aimed at addressing affordable housing. Senate Bill 323 (SB 323) mandates that duplex housing be allowed in cities with at least 5,000 residents where single-family residences are permitted. Senate Bill 528 (SB 528) requires municipalities to allow at least one accessory dwelling unit on lots with single-family dwellings. MAID, consisting of homeowners from various cities, argued that these laws would negatively impact their property values and quality of life, and filed for declaratory and injunctive relief.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Gallatin County granted MAID a preliminary injunction, temporarily halting the implementation of the laws. The court found that MAID had standing and had demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable harm, success on the merits, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court cited concerns about potential impacts on property values and neighborhood character, as well as constitutional issues related to public participation and equal protection.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that MAID did not meet the burden of demonstrating all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the court held that MAID's evidence of potential harm was speculative and did not show a likelihood of irreparable injury. The court also noted that the balance of equities and public interest did not favor the injunction, given the legislative intent to address the housing crisis. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC, v. State" on Justia Law

Sandra K. Nieveen owned property in Lincoln, Nebraska, which was free of encumbrances. After failing to pay property taxes, TAX 106 purchased a tax certificate for the delinquent taxes. TAX 106 later transferred its interest to Vintage Management, LLC, which obtained a tax deed for the property. Nieveen alleged that the property was worth significantly more than the tax debt and claimed that the issuance of the tax deed violated her constitutional rights.The District Court for Lancaster County dismissed Nieveen’s constitutional claims for failure to state a claim and later granted summary judgment in favor of the county on her remaining claim. The court found that Nieveen was not entitled to an extended redemption period due to a mental disorder. Nieveen appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court initially affirmed the district court’s decision.The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Nebraska Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Tyler v. Hennepin County, which recognized a plausible takings claim when a property was sold for more than the tax debt. Upon reconsideration, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that Nieveen had alleged a plausible takings claim against Vintage Management, LLC, as the issuance of the tax deed deprived her of property value exceeding her tax debt. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against other defendants and declined to reconsider the Excessive Fines Clause claim, as just compensation under the Takings Clause would provide complete relief.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the takings claim against Vintage Management, LLC. View "Nieveen v. TAX 106" on Justia Law

Kevin L. Fair and his wife owned property in Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, but failed to pay property taxes. The county treasurer sold a tax certificate to Continental Resources for the unpaid taxes. After three years, Continental notified the Fairs that they needed to redeem the property by paying the total amount due, which they did not. Consequently, Continental requested and received a tax deed from the county treasurer, transferring title to the property free of any encumbrances.The District Court for Scotts Bluff County granted summary judgment in favor of Continental Resources, rejecting Fair’s constitutional claims, including those under the Takings Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. Fair argued that the issuance of the tax deed constituted a taking without just compensation. The district court found no merit in Fair’s claims and ruled in favor of Continental. Fair appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court initially affirmed the district court’s decision.The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Nebraska Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Tyler v. Hennepin County. Upon reconsideration, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Continental on Fair’s takings claim. The court found that Fair had a protected property interest in the value of his property exceeding the tax debt and that Continental’s acquisition of the tax deed constituted a taking without just compensation. The court determined that Continental, as a state actor, could be liable for the taking.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects but reversed the summary judgment in favor of Continental on the takings claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Continental Resources v. Fair" on Justia Law

SCS Carbon Transport, LLC (SCS) plans to develop a pipeline network to transport carbon dioxide (CO2) through South Dakota. Several landowners (Landowners) along the proposed route refused to allow SCS pre-condemnation survey access, which SCS claims is authorized by SDCL 21-35-31. Landowners sued in both the Third and Fifth Judicial Circuits, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the surveys. These proceedings resulted in a consolidated appeal from six lawsuits filed by Landowners and one by SCS.The Third Circuit granted SCS summary judgment, determining that SCS was a common carrier and that SDCL 21-35-31 was constitutional. The Fifth Circuit also granted SCS summary judgment, adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning. Landowners appealed, arguing that SCS is not a common carrier, CO2 is not a commodity, and that SDCL 21-35-31 violates the takings and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the circuit courts’ grants of summary judgment on the common carrier issues. The court held that SCS’s ability to conduct pre-condemnation surveys depends on whether it is a common carrier vested with the power of eminent domain. The record did not demonstrate that SCS is holding itself out to the general public as transporting a commodity for hire. The court also found that the circuit courts abused their discretion in denying Landowners’ request for further discovery.The court further held that SDCL 21-35-31 only authorizes limited pre-condemnation standard surveys, which are minimally invasive superficial inspections. The statute, as strictly interpreted, does not violate the federal or state constitutions. The court concluded that any actual damage caused by the surveys must be justly compensated, with the amount determined by a jury. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Strom Trust v. SCS Carbon Transport, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2002, a 208-acre estate in Jessamine County was divided into four parcels. In 2004, the owner of Parcel 2 planned residential development, including a bridge and road extension, which was approved by the Nicholasville Planning Commission (NPC). By 2017, LPW Redevelopment, LLC owned Parcels 2 and 3, sought a zone change, and submitted a development plan, which was approved. Boone Development, LLC purchased Parcel 3 in 2018 and began construction. The NPC required Boone to include the bridge and road extension in a letter of credit, which Boone disputed, leading to this litigation.The Jessamine Circuit Court ruled in favor of Boone, stating the NPC had not made a decision, necessitating a declaratory action. The NPC then issued a Notice of Decision affirming its requirements, which the Board of Adjustment upheld. Boone appealed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding the Board’s actions were within its legislative powers, provided due process, and were supported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, focusing on the constitutionality of the appeal bond requirement in KRS 100.3471. The Court found the statute unconstitutional, referencing its decision in Bluegrass Trust v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government. The Court also addressed the merits of the case, affirming the Jessamine Circuit Court’s decision that Boone was responsible for the bridge and road extension as per the development plan. The Court found no procedural due process violations and determined the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court of Appeals’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was reversed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court’s judgment was affirmed. View "RAZ, INC. V. MERCER COUNTY FISCAL COURT" on Justia Law

The case involves the Commonwealth Building, located in the South Hill Historic District in Lexington, Kentucky. Built in the late 1950s, the building was purchased by The Residences at South Hill, LLC in 2017. The Residences sought approval from the Board of Architectural Review (BOAR) to demolish the building and construct a five-story apartment complex. The BOAR approved the demolition, leading to several appeals. The Historic South Hill Neighborhood Association (HSHNA) and Bluegrass Trust for Historic Preservation (Bluegrass Trust) were among the appellants, with Bluegrass Trust arguing that the building contributed to the historic character of the district and could provide economic return if renovated.The Fayette Circuit Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Planning Commission's decision to uphold the BOAR's approval was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Planning Commission had considered various testimonies and evidence, including expert opinions, and found that the Commonwealth Building did not contribute to the historic character of the district. Bluegrass Trust appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals but did not post the required appeal bond, arguing financial incapacity. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the failure to post the bond and stated in dictum that it would have affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 100.3471, which mandates an appeal bond in zoning and land use disputes, is unconstitutional. The court found that the statute infringes on the constitutional right of Kentuckians to at least one appeal to the next highest court, as guaranteed by Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the appeal but affirmed the circuit court's decision on the merits, upholding the Planning Commission's approval of the demolition. View "BLUEGRASS TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION V. LEXINGTON FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT PLANNING COMMISSION" on Justia Law

In 2002, a 208-acre estate in Jessamine County was divided into four parcels. In 2004, the owner of Parcel 2 planned residential development, including a bridge and road extension, which was approved by the Nicholasville Planning Commission (NPC). However, these were not built. LPW Redevelopment, LLC later acquired Parcels 2 and 3, sought a zone change, and submitted a development plan, which included the bridge and road extension. Boone Development, LLC purchased Parcel 3 in 2018 and began construction. The City of Nicholasville then informed Boone it was responsible for the bridge and road extension, which Boone disputed.Boone filed a declaratory action in Jessamine Circuit Court, which ruled in Boone's favor, instructing the NPC to make a decision. The NPC affirmed its letter of credit requirements, including the bridge and road extension. The Board of Adjustment upheld the NPC's decision. Boone appealed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court affirmed the Board's decision, finding the Board's actions were within its legislative powers, provided procedural due process, and were supported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, focusing on the constitutionality of the appeal bond requirement in KRS 100.3471. The Court held that the statute imposed an unconstitutional burden on the right to appeal, referencing its contemporaneous decision in Bluegrass Trust v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Boone's appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the bond issue. On the merits, the Supreme Court affirmed the Jessamine Circuit Court's decision, finding the NPC's requirements for the bridge and road extension were not clearly unreasonable. View "BOONE DEVELOPMENT, LLC V. NICHOLASVILLE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellants, Dr. Simon and Toby Galapo, placed signs with anti-hate and anti-racist messages on their property after a neighbor, Denise Oberholzer, called Dr. Galapo an anti-Semitic slur. The signs were visible from the Oberholzers' property and other neighbors' homes. The Oberholzers filed a civil complaint seeking to enjoin the signs, claiming they constituted a private nuisance, intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granted a permanent injunction, ordering the Galapos to reposition the signs so they did not face the Oberholzers' property. The court found the signs severely impacted the Oberholzers' well-being and quiet enjoyment of their home. The court also determined the injunction was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction on speech.The Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the injunction, holding that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard. The Superior Court concluded the injunction was content-neutral but remanded the case for the trial court to apply the more rigorous standard from Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., which requires that the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that the injunction constituted an impermissible prior restraint under Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court emphasized that the signs were pure speech on matters of public concern and that the trial court lacked the power to enjoin such speech. The Court also held that the publication of language giving rise to tort claims other than defamation cannot be enjoined under Article I, Section 7. The Court concluded that the signs did not invade the Oberholzers' substantial privacy interests in an essentially intolerable manner. View "Oberholzer v. Galapo" on Justia Law

Gary and Mary Wolfe own property in Muhlenberg Township, which includes a roofing business and several rental homes. Reading Blue Mountain and Northern Railroad Company (RBMN) sought to condemn a portion of the Wolfes' property to reestablish a rail siding to serve Russell Standard, an asphalt company. The Wolfes objected, arguing the taking was for a private benefit rather than a public purpose.The Berks County Court of Common Pleas sustained the Wolfes' objections, finding the condemnation was intended solely to benefit Russell Standard and not the public. The court noted that the rail siding would disrupt the Wolfes' property and existing businesses, and that Russell Standard could use its own property for the rail connection. RBMN's refusal to consider alternative routes further indicated a private benefit.The Commonwealth Court reversed, relying on older case law that generally supported railroad takings for public use. The panel presumed RBMN's taking was for a public purpose, emphasizing the historical importance of railroads in serving public needs.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision. The Court held that the taking did not serve a public purpose as required by the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the public must be the primary and paramount beneficiary of the taking, which was not demonstrated in this case. The evidence showed the taking primarily benefited Russell Standard, with no significant public advantage. The Court remanded the case for reinstatement of the trial court's order dismissing the condemnation action. View "Wolfe v. Reading Blue Mountain" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the sale of surplus state property owned by the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD). The property, located at 3311 West State Street in Boise, was declared surplus after a flood rendered its largest building unusable. The Idaho Department of Administration (DOA) initiated a bidding process, and the petitioners, a group of business entities, submitted the highest bid. Despite negotiating a purchase and sale agreement, the DOA did not finalize the sale due to legislative actions that revoked its authority to dispose of the property and transferred control back to the ITD Board.The petitioners filed an original action in the Idaho Supreme Court seeking writs of prohibition and mandate. They argued that the legislative provisions revoking the DOA's authority were unconstitutional, violating the single-subject rule of the Idaho Constitution. They sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate these provisions and compel the DOA to complete the sale. The Idaho House of Representatives and its Speaker intervened, and the State Board of Examiners disclaimed further participation, having fulfilled its statutory duties.The Idaho Supreme Court held that the petitioners lacked standing to bring the action. The court found that while the petitioners demonstrated a distinct and palpable injury from the halted sale, they failed to show that a favorable decision would redress their injury. The court noted that the petitioners did not have a legally enforceable right to purchase the property, as the DOA had discretion in concluding the sale. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioners did not meet the criteria for relaxed standing, as other parties, such as the DOA and ITD, could potentially bring the constitutional claim. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for writs of prohibition and mandate. View "Hawkins Companies, LLC v. State" on Justia Law