Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
In re ‘Iao Ground Water Management Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit Applications
In June 2004, Petitioners-Appellants Hui O Na Wai 'Eha and Maui Tomorrow Foundation, Inc. (Hui/MTF), through Earthjustice, petitioned Appellee Commission on Water Resource Management to amend the Interim Instream Flow Standards (IIFS) for Na Wai 'Eha, which had been in place since 1988. Around the same time, several parties, including Appellee Maui County Department of Water Supply (MDWS), and Appellees Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company (HC&S) and Wailuku Water Company (WWC), filed Water Use Permit Applications (WUPA) for the same area. The Commission held a combined case hearing to resolve the IIFS and WUPA; in addition to the petitioner and applicants, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) applied to participate in the hearing. The appeal before the Supreme Court sought review of the Commission's resulting Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (FOF/COL), and Decision and Order (D&O), in which the Commission amended the IIFS for two of the four streams, and substantially retained the existing IIFS for the two remaining streams as measured above diversions. The FOF/COL and D&O also resolved several WUPA. Hui/MTF and OHA appealed on related grounds: their primary complaint was that the Commission erred in balancing instream and noninstream uses, and therefore the IIFS does not properly protect traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights, appurtenant water rights, or the public trust. Both parties also contested the Commission’s treatment of diversions, including an alternative source on HC&S’s plantation that could have been used to irrigate HC&S’s cane fields. The parties contested the Commission’s determination that HC&S would not be required to pump the alternate source to its full capacity, a decision that resulted in a higher estimated allowable diversion for HC&S, and lower IIFS for the streams. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. First, in considering the effect of the IIFS on native Hawaiian practices in Na Wai 'Eha, the Commission failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the effect of the amended IIFS on traditional and customary native Hawaiian practices regarding the feasibility of protecting any affected practices. Second, the Commission’s analysis of instream uses was incomplete. Third, the Commission erred in its consideration of alternative water sources and in its calculation of diverting parties’ acreage and reasonable system losses. View "In re 'Iao Ground Water Management Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit Applications" on Justia Law
Allison v. Boeing Laser Technical Service
Plaintiff-Appellant Jimmie Allison’s causes of action arose from conduct on Kirtland Air Force Base, a federal enclave established in 1954. Because Allison’s state law claims were based on legal theories created by common law after that date, they are barred unless federal statutory law allows them to go forward. Because no federal statute authorized state employment and tort claims of the sort underlying this case to be asserted against federal contractors, Plaintiff's suit was barred by the federal enclave doctrine. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's case.
View "Allison v. Boeing Laser Technical Service" on Justia Law
Highlands of Lay, LLC v. Murphree
Highlands of Lay, LLC ("Highlands") appealed a default judgment entered in favor of Edward O. Murphree. Murphree sued Highlands and John J. Miller, who Murphree alleged was a member of Highlands and its authorized agent. Murphree alleged fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and breach of contract, arising out of a real-estate transaction. After he amended his complaint, Murphree was not able to obtain service upon Highlands or Miller, and the trial court granted a motion to serve them by publication. Highlands and Miller answered, and Highlands filed a counterclaim alleging negligence. Murphree then served discovery requests on Highlands. Murphree later sent additional discovery requests to Highlands and Miller; Highlands and Miller did not respond. When Highlands and Miller continued to be unresponsive to the suit, Murphree moved for a default judgment. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court found that some of the issues presented in the then-still pending claim against Miller were the same issues presented in this appeal by Highlands. Highlands argued that the trial court erred in not setting aside the default judgment against it because it had a meritorious defense to Murphree's claims based on Miller's statements or e-mail from Miller and the timing of statements or e-mail to Murphree. "Appellate review in piecemeal fashion is not favored." The Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in certifying the judgment entered against Highlands as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). Highlands' appeal was therefore dismissed. View "Highlands of Lay, LLC v. Murphree " on Justia Law
Deer Lodge v. Chilcott et al.
Sherman Anderson and other concerned residents of the City of Deer Lodge (Anderson) appealed a district court order that denied their petition for a writ of mandamus. The issue in this case arose from the revocation of Zoo Mountain Natural Care, Inc.'s business license. Zoo Mountain contacted the City in 2010 regarding a business license. Zoo Mountain had purchased property in the City limits for the purpose of lawfully growing and selling medical marijuana. The City was not issuing business licenses at that time, however, due to a change from a calendar-year licensing system to a fiscal year licensing system. The City previously had determined that it would waive the business license requirement for new applicants during this transition period. The City accordingly allowed Zoo Mountain to operate lawfully without a business license until July 2010. The City Council convened shortly after Zoo Mountain’s move to Deer Lodge. Anderson expressed concern over Zoo Mountain’s location at this meeting. He specifically disliked the fact that Zoo Mountain was located in a residential neighborhood, and that Zoo Mountain was located near the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Anderson believed that the City’s decision to issue the business license violated Ordinances 130 and 136. Anderson further believed that the City violated the 2009 version of the Medical Marijuana Act when it issued the business license to a corporation, rather than to an individual. Anderson sought a writ of mandamus from the District Court to require the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The court declined to issue the writ. It concluded that the MMA provided no clear legal duty for the City to revoke the business license. It similarly concluded that the City Code, particularly Ordinances 130 and 136, contained no clear legal duty to revoke the business license. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: Anderson has failed to establish any clear legal duty that requires the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The District Court acted accordingly in denying the writ.
View "Deer Lodge v. Chilcott et al." on Justia Law
Wasden v. Board of Land Commissioners
This appeal was a consolidation of two actions relating to residential leases on State endowment lands. In one action, the Attorney General sought a declaratory ruling that I.C. 58-310A, which exempts so-called "cottage site" leases from conflict auctions, was unconstitutional in light of Article IX, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. The district court determined that I.C. 58-310A was constitutional, and thus, dismissed the Attorney General's complaint. The Attorney General appealed that decision. In the other action, Gladys Babcock and several others who lease cottage sites on Payette Lake filed an action against the State Board of Land Commissioners and the Idaho Department of Lands Director. The Payette Lake Lessees alleged that the Board breached their lease agreements when it declined to renew the expiring leases for an additional ten years. The district court granted summary judgment to the Board, finding the Payette Lake Lessees had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Payette Lake Lessees filed a cross-appeal challenging that decision. Upon review of the cases, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling on the Attorney General's claim because I.C. 58-310A was unconstitutional. The Court vacated the district court's holding with respect to the Payette Lake Lessees' claim and remanded both cases for further proceedings. View "Wasden v. Board of Land Commissioners" on Justia Law
Paddison Scenic Properties Family Trust v. Idaho County
This case concerned the ownership status of Coolwater Ridge Road in Idaho County. The predecessors in interest of appellant Paddison Scenic Properties, Family Trust, L.C. granted rights of way to the United States for a road which became Coolwater Ridge Road. In the district court, Paddison sought a declaratory judgment that the rights of way did not constitute a public road or highway under Idaho law. That court held that the rights of way were public because the criteria for common law dedication were met. Upon review, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment because it concluded this case was not ripe for adjudication. View "Paddison Scenic Properties Family Trust v. Idaho County" on Justia Law
Trunnell v. Fergel
Plaintiffs Paul Trunell and Bill Lomu appealed a district court's ruling against them in their request for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged the existence of a public road across Defendant Verna Fergel's property, and that she denied access to the road causing damage to Plaintiffs. The district court held that Defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value, and that she did not have actual or constructive notice of the public nature of the road when she purchased the property. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the "bona fide purchaser for value" defense was not available to Defendant as it would have constituted an abandonment of the road in contravention to Idaho law. The Court therefore reversed the district court's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trunnell v. Fergel" on Justia Law
Town Creek Master Water Mgmt. Dist. of Lee, Pontotoc, Prentiss, and Union Counties v. Webb
Town Creek Water Management District of Lee, Pontotoc, Prentiss, and Union Counties ("Town Creek") appealed a decision of the Lee County Chancery Court that awarded compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest to the Webbs for Town Creek's wrongful taking of the their property. The case was before the trial court on remand from the Supreme Court's reversal of an earlier grant of summary judgment for Town Creek, with an instruction to conduct a trial on all issues. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by limiting the trial to damages alone, rather than holding a trial on all issues. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the Lee County Chancery Court for a trial on all issues. View "Town Creek Master Water Mgmt. Dist. of Lee, Pontotoc, Prentiss, and Union Counties v. Webb" on Justia Law
Idaho Transportation Board v. HI Boise, LLC
This appeal arose from a condemnation action brought by the Idaho Transportation Board (ITB) against HI Boise, LLC. ITB sought to acquire a strip of land as part of a project to improve the I-84/Vista Avenue Interchange in Boise. ITB offered HI Boise the condemned property's appraised value of $38,177, but HI Boise filed a counterclaim for inverse condemnation, claiming damages of $7.5 million for additional lost rights of access and visibility. HI Boise appeals the district court's summary dismissal of those claims. Because the Supreme Court found that neither claim involved a compensable taking, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Transportation Board v. HI Boise, LLC" on Justia Law
Friends of Minidoka v. Jerome County
The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the approval of a permit application for a Livestock Confinement Operation (LCO), also known as a Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO), by the Jerome County Board of County Commissioners. The Board approved the application after a remand by the district court of the Board's decision previously denying the permit. Several individuals and organizations opposed to the LCO because of the potential harms to the neighboring farms and to the Minidoka National Historic Site petitioned the district court for review of the Board's decision. The district court affirmed the Board's approval of the permit, finding in the process that four of the organizations concerned with the effects on the Minidoka National Historic Site lacked standing. Several of the objecting parties appealed the district court's decision, asking the Supreme Court to find that these parties had standing to challenge the permit approval, that the Board's procedure for presenting evidence before the Board violated procedural due process rights, and that the Board failed to follow all of the county's relevant zoning ordinances when it approved the application. The issue central to the Court's opinion pertained to standing of all the appellant-organizations, the Board's procedure for presenting evidence throughout the LCO permit application process, the constitutionality of the "one mile rule" of Idaho Code section 67-6529, and the application of the Jerome County Zoning Ordinances. The Court concluded that the Board properly applied its zoning ordinance to the LCO permit application process, that I.C. 67-6529 was not unconstitutional, and that the public was afforded appropriate due process prior to, and during the LCO permit application hearing. View "Friends of Minidoka v. Jerome County" on Justia Law