Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

HJ Grathol is a California general partnership that owed real estate in Idaho. Grathol purchased a parcel for development. The Idaho Transportation board later sought to condemn sixteen acres of the parcel in order to realign US Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with State Highway 54. Grathol contended that the Board failed to negotiate for the sixteen acres in good faith because the Board's offer did not account for the extension of two roads which were believed to have significantly increased the property's value. Grathol also asserted that the Board failed to file its complaint and order of condemnation in accordance with Idaho law before moving for early possession of the property pursuant to a "quick take" provision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board indeed did negotiate in good faith for the subject property, and filed its complaint and order of condemnation in accordance with the applicable statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision that the "quick take" provision in question was satisfied. View "Idaho Transportation Board V. HJ Grathol" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Robert and Susan Hale appealed a district court summary judgment that dismissed their nuisance and governmental takings claims against Ward County and the City of Minot. The Hales own property on what is otherwise agricultural land approximately one mile southeast of a shooting range used for training Minot area local, state and federal law enforcement officers. Mr. Hale brought suit against Ward County and Minot alleging the law enforcement shooting range was a private and public nuisance and the shooting range devalued his property, resulting in a governmental taking. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. "When viewed in the light most favorable to the Hales, the maps, photographs and additional evidence raise[d] a genuine issue whether the terrain surrounding the shooting range prevents bullets from exiting the shooting range." The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the Hales' public nuisance claim, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Hale v. Ward County" on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs-Appellants in this case challenged the Federal Highway Administration's selection of a route for the proposed South Lawrence Trafficway project in the city of Lawrence, Kansas. Appellants claimed two aspects of the Highway Administration's decision rendered it arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Appellants claimed the environmental impact statement supporting the decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act and Department of Transportation noise analysis regulations. Furthermore, Appellants claimed the Highway Administration's analysis under the section of the Department of Transportation Act that protects historic sites, including property associated with Haskell Indian Nations University, improperly concluded there was no "feasible and prudent alternative" to the selected route. Finding "no fatal flaws" in the environmental impact statement or the prudence analysis, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

Petitioners David F. and Jeannette A. D'Alessandro appealed a superior Court judgment that affirmed a Town of Harpswell Board of Appeals decision. The Board had denied the D'Alessandros' appeal of a permit issued by the code enforcement officer to several subdivision landowners to install a seasonal stairway for shore access over an easement that burdens land the D'Alessandros own in the same subdivision. The D'Alessandros opposed the permit, arguing that the Harpswell Shoreland Zoning Ordinance allowed for only one stairway to the shore in this subdivision and there was an existing stairway providing shore access in another location within the subdivision. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings: The Board's finding that "the location of the proposed stairs is reasonable under the ordinance" did not apply the standard as it is set forth in the ordinance and provided no finding regarding the actual question presented by the ordinance: did a reasonable access alternative exist? Thus, although the Supreme Court reviewed the Board's factual findings under a deferential standard of review, here the Board erred because it failed to make a finding as to whether there was no reasonable access alternative.

Plaintiff Laurel Y. Hazard appealed the grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, East Hills, Inc., declaring that the plaintiff was barred by the doctrine of laches from prosecuting a claim of ownership to an undeveloped eight-acre tract of land in South Kingstown, Rhode Island and finding that the defendant had established ownership of the tract of land by adverse possession and in accordance with the Rhode Island Marketable Record Title Act. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that her claim should not have been barred by the doctrine of laches, that the defendant failed to satisfy the requisite elements of adverse possession of the subject property, and that a 1909 boundary agreement entered into by the defendant's predecessor in interest was defective and was improperly relied upon by the special master as a title transaction for purposes of establishing marketable record title. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no error in the trial justice's conclusion that defendant proved the requisite elements of the complete-defense of laches, and therefore did not reach plaintiff's subsequent issues.

Sneil, LLC sought to quiet title to certain property and to eject Tybe Learning Center, Inc. and Regions Bank from that property. The circuit court found in favor of Tybe and Regions, concluding that Sneil failed to provide adequate notice to Tybe and Regions of their right of redemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a purchaser is authorized to acquire a collector's deed for property purchased at tax sale one year after the sale; (2) accordingly, in order for the purchaser to send timely notice to the owner of that property of the right to redeem said property pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 140.405, the purchaser must send said notice ninety days prior to the one-year anniversary of the tax sale, and the notice must only inform the owner of the right to redeem the property; and (3) because Sneil did not meet these requirements, its notice was untimely pursuant to section 140.405.

Plaintiff-Appellant Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Center ran a residential treatment facility in St. George, Utah for young people with mental and emotional disorders. It wanted to expand its operations with a "step-down" program hereby participants would live in a separate facility with more responsibility and autonomy that other students in preparation for reentry to society. Cinnamon Hills applied to the City for a zoning variance to use the top floor of a hotel it owned for the program, the City denied its request. Cinnamon Hills subsequently sued the City for discrimination against the disabled. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, and Cinnamon Hills appealed. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit found that Cinnamon Hills could not prove by the evidence on record, instances of discrimination as it alleged. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision in dismissing Cinnamon Hills' claims.

Appellant Leonard Small filed suit seeking ejectment and mesne profits after learning that Appellee Alphonso Irving had built a home on a lot located at 4110 Raybun Street in Savannah, which Small had purchased at a tax sale. A special master was appointed and issued an order adopted by the trial court, recommending that Small recover the premises and pay Irving for the value of the improvements. Small appealed, alleging the trial court's adoption of the special master's order was in error because the evidence was insufficient to support it. He argued further that the special master erred in concluding Small could not recover mesne profits because he held only a tax title to the property. The Supreme Court concluded it was not an error for the trial court to adopt the special master's order. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in adopting the special master's conclusion that Small could not recover mesne profits. The Court partly affirmed, and partly reversed the trial court's decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court granted discretionary appeal to Haralson County to review a superior court's grant of the writ of mandamus. In 2008, Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc. sought to purchase a piece of property in a residential area. Before doing so, it wanted confirmation that the property had a permitted nonconforming use, so Taylor Junkyard asked for, and was issued, a letter written by the County Zoning Administrator, which stated that the business operated by Trawick "falls under the grandfather clause." When Taylor Junkyard applied for a business license for the year 2009, Haralson County administratively rejected the application, with the stated reason that the business engaged in on the property had changed from the original nonconforming business of "used automobiles and parts" to "metal recycling and metal fabrication," and thus violated the County's zoning ordinance. Taylor Junkyard appealed to the County Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), which, after a hearing, rejected the application for a business license, based upon found zoning violations. Taylor Junkyard then filed its petition for a writ of mandamus in superior court, which the court granted, finding that there was no evidence to support the ZBA's decision. The County contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court erred in addressing the petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the County Zoning Ordinance provided a means for Taylor Junkyard to file an appeal from the adverse decision of the ZBA, and thus, mandamus was not an available remedy. "When local zoning ordinances do not establish a means by which an aggrieved party may gain judicial review of an adverse decision by a zoning appeal board, a petition to the appropriate superior court for a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy." Accordingly, as no provision of the Haralson County ordinances set forth an available means of judicial review, the superior court did not err in concluding that a petition for a writ of mandamus was the proper avenue for Taylor Junkyard to seek review of the ZBA's decision.

Petitioner Plaid Pantries, Inc. argued before the Supreme Court that the land use final order that Respondent Metro adopted after a remand from the Court did not comply with the applicable statutory standards. Metro and Respondent Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District of Oregon (TriMet) asserted that the land use final order was legally sufficient. The center of the dispute concerned the construction of one part of the South North MAX Light Rail Project. Plain Pantries and other parties challenged the land use final order before the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA). The parties made a number of arguments before LUBA, one of which was that Metro had exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the land use final order because the order purported to approve parts of the project that lay outside the Portland metropolitan urban growth boundary. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Metro neither exceeded its authority not made any decision on the light rail route, associated facilities or highway improvements that was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Court affirmed the land use final order.