Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1974, Amos and Lois Harper purchased property in a subdivision. In 2001, the property was sold at a foreclosure sale to the Bank of New York. Because the property taxes were not paid, the sheriff sold the tax lien on the property in 2007 to Marquis Development. Marquis sold the property to Gavin Smith, who subsequently served an eviction notice on Lois Harper's son, Mike Harper. The Harpers filed this declaratory judgment action against Marquis and Smith, claiming that they were the owners of the subject property. Ultimately, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and declared that Smith was the owner of the subject real estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred to the extent it concluded that Smith was a bona fide purchaser given the fact that he was on notice of a potential defect in the tax deed received by Marquis; but (2) because the Harpers lost title to the property as a result of the foreclosure sale in 2001, the Harpers had no standing to challenge Smith's status as a bona fide purchaser.

At issue in this case was a district court's grant of a motion for voluntary dismissal of a suit filed by Fern Peterson against Cecil and Yu Wen Davis, Kevin and Sherri Murray, David Lawrence and Private Wilderness, LLC (collectively, Private Wilderness). The issues arose from Peterson's attempt to sell property to the Davises, Murray and Lawrence. Private Wilderness asserted an easement over the property. Ultimately the case ended with the dismissal of a third-party complaint filed by Private Wilderness against Robert and Nancy Peterson (the Petersons). In resolving the appeal, the Supreme Court addressed issues raised by Private Wilderness concerning whether the district court erred when it concluded there was no prevailing party when it granted the voluntary dismissal. The Court also addressed the Petersons' cross-appeal, in which they argued that the district court erred in denying their motion for reconsideration of their I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motion to dismiss on the basis that it was moot, and by not addressing their pending summary judgment motion at the time of dismissal. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated in part and remanded, upholding the district court's discretion concluding no prevailing party, but found the court erred by denying the motion for reconsideration.

In 1995, Petitioner John Rhodes, a resident of the Town of Georgia, petitioned his local governing body, the selectboard, to clarify several issues surrounding two roads that bordered his land.  While this case began as a suit over the existence and use of two ancient roads, "it grew over time into a test of constitutional guarantees and a saga about abuse of power."  After almost fifteen years of litigation, including two side trips to federal court, the trial court entered judgment against the Town of Georgia.  The court found that Petitioner's request to access his land over town roads had been repeatedly and maliciously frustrated by the Town selectboard in an ongoing attempt to protect the value of a neighbor's property, a violation of Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution, the Common Benefits Clause.  The court concluded that Article 7 was self-executing and awarded monetary damages for the constitutional violation.  In this consolidated appeal, the Town of Georgia sought to overturn the trial court decision.  Upon careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of liability against the Town: the Court "underscore[d] the unique circumstances" of this case, finding that the "trial court's unchallenged findings describe a deliberate, decades-long course of discriminatory conduct by the Town so malicious and self-serving as to deny Rhodes his fundamental rights to due process and equal treatment under the Vermont Constitution.  Absent such egregious misconduct, and clear proof of the exacting elements necessary for relief, towns and local officials have no cause for concern about the myriad decisions made in the normal exercise of authority.  Failing to recognize a remedy in a case such as this, however, would undermine the constitutional principles that all Vermonters hold dear.  Vermont has consistently sustained its essence as one big small town by affirming and reinforcing the fundamental values that define it.  This decision affirms those values."

In this eminent domain proceeding, Landowner, Manhattan Ice and Cold Storage, initiated district court review of the $3.2 million appraisers' award for the taking of three tracts of land by the condemning authority, the City of Manhattan. The jury returned a verdict of $3.5 million. Landowner appealed, arguing that the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and refusal to instruct on special use prevented it from presenting its theory of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Landowner's challenges to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings lacked merit and/or resulted in no prejudice; and (2) the jury instructions given in this case were legally sound.

The Foggs challenged the issuance of a building permit to 81 Spooner Road, LLC (developer), by the building commissioner for the town of Brookline. At issue was whether a judge in the Land Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Fogg and his mother, on the issue of their standing as "aggrieved" persons under G.L.c. 40A, section 17. The court concluded that the developer failed to rebut the Foggs' presumption of standing. Because the Foggs were deemed to have standing, the judge properly eliminated that issue from the ensuring trial on the merits of the parties' complaints seeking judicial review of the board's decision to rescind the building permit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Respondents the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Banking Department and the New Hampshire Banking Department (collectively, the Department), appealed an order of the Superior Court that permanently enjoined the Department from pursuing an administrative proceeding against Petitioner Jeffrey Frost on the ground that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioners Frost, Chretien/Tillinghast, LLC, and Frost Family, LLC, cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying their request for attorney’s fees. Frost is a member and designated manager of Chretien/Tillinghast, LLC (Chretien), and a member of Frost Family, LLC (Frost Family). Chretien and Frost Family (collectively, the LLCs) are New Hampshire limited liability companies organized for the purpose of real estate acquisition, holding, and development. The underlying dispute arose as the result of two seller-financed real estate transactions, one conducted by Frost Family and the other by Chretien. After both instances of seller-financing, Petitioner submitted a loan originator license application to the Department. At the time the administrative proceedings were initiated, the Department notified Petitioner that he could request a hearing with the Department. Petitioner did not file such a request. Instead, all Petitioners initiated a declaratory judgment proceeding in superior court, which included a request for a temporary restraining order. The petitioners contended that Respondents lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed against Frost and violated the State Constitution's prohibition against retrospective laws by seeking to impose a $25,000 fine for each alleged violation. After a hearing, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction, concluding that "[w]hile the [Department] may have jurisdiction over Frost because he is now a loan originator, it [could] take no action against him based on the September 2008 or the March 2009 transactions." Further, the trial court concluded that since the Department "may not impose any penalties on Frost," it did not need to consider the issue of the retrospective nature of the sanctions. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and affirmed the superior court's judgment.

The City filed a complaint in eminent domain against Zara Thomas, trustee of two revocable trusts, and a motion for an order of immediate possession, seeking to procure a portion of Thomas's property for the purpose of constructing a bike trail. The circuit court granted the City's motion for order of immediate possession, and the City commenced construction on Thomas's property. Thomas appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the order did not conclude the parties' rights as to the subject matter in controversy, and therefore, was not a final and appealable order, as the circuit court had not yet addressed the issue of Thomas's right to just compensation and the amount of damages.

In 1969, the State sued Appellant Yelsen Land Company alleging that the State owned "all tidelands, submerged lands, and waters" adjacent to Morris Island.  Appellant answered and claimed it owned all the tidelands, submerged lands, and marshes adjacent to Morris Island. Appellant also counterclaimed for trespass on those lands by the Corps of Engineers in the form of spoilage dredged from Charleston Harbor, the digging of a ditch, and the erection of a dike. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court held that the legal questions of title to the land should be tried to a jury and that the trial judge erred in denying the State a jury trial. The jury returned a general verdict for the State, having been charged that title to tidelands, submerged lands, and all land below the high water mark on navigable streams were presumptively the State's unless the entity claiming title can show a specific grant from the sovereign that included the words "to the low water mark."  It was also charged that it was to determine title to marshlands and to return damages for appellant if it found the State had trespassed on marshland owned by appellant or if it found a taking. Following the jury verdict, Appellant moved for a judgment non obstante verdicto and a new trial, both of which the trial judge denied in a written order. In 2007, Appellant brought this suit against the State contending that the dredging spoils placed in the tidelands had created new highlands, and that as the adjacent highland owner, it was the owner of the newly “accreted” highlands as well.  The State Ports Authority (SPA) sought to intervene, but in lieu of intervention, Appellant was permitted to amend its complaint to add the SPA. A Master granted the State and the SPA summary judgment, and Appellant appealed.  The Supreme Court affirmed, finding res judicata applied to bar Appellant's attempt to relitigate title to the property.

Chuck Starbird submitted an application for a building permit for the construction of a home on a lot abutting a public easement portion of a road in the Town of Minot. The Town denied the application. The Board of Appeals ultimately granted Starbird's appeal, concluding that the parcel had a private right-of-way because the the term "right-of-way," as used in section 4-501.8 of the Town's Land Use Code, included a public easement. The superior court affirmed but remanded to the Board for further factual findings on whether Starbird's application met all of the factors listed in section 4-501.8(A)-(G). The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court but vacated the portion of the court's judgment remanding the matter, holding (1) the unique circumstances of the matter caused the interlocutory appeal to fall within the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule; and (2) the Board did not err by granting Starbird's appeal of the denial of his application.

Respondents William and Sally Chapin Kiely owned real property in Port Townsend next to property owned by Kenneth and Karen Graves. An alley ran the length of the properties, and as long as anyone could remember, a wire fence ran the length of the two properties. The Graves property adjacent to the disputed alley has remained open space where the Graves have planted fruit trees, berry vines, and garlic. Part of the Kielys' cottage encroached upon the disputed alley. In 2008, the Graves filed a petition with the city to vacate the western half of the alley and merge it into their adjoining lands. The city held a public hearing on the application. In February 2009, the Port Townsend City Council passed an ordinance to vacate the alley and convey the vacated alley to the Graves through a lot line adjustment. The Kielys filed an action alleging ownership of the entire alley through adverse possession on June 10, 2009. The trial court entered a judgment and decree in favor of the Kielys. The Supreme Court granted direct review to decide whether the Kielys could assert adverse possession based on events which preceded vacation of the alley. Upon review, the Court found that Port Townsend held an easement interest in the alley until it was vacated by public hearing. Therefore, RCW 7.28.090 prohibited the Kielys from obtaining title to the alley through adverse possession. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's decision.