Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerned three rivers which flow through Montana and then beyond its borders. At issue was whether discrete, identifiable segments of these rivers in Montana were nonnavigable, as federal law defined that concept for purposes of determining whether the State acquired title to the riverbeds underlying those segments, when the State entered the Union in 1989. Montana contended that the rivers must be found navigable at the disputed locations. The Court held that the Montana Supreme Court's ruling that Montana owned and could charge for use of the riverbeds at issue was based on an infirm legal understanding of the Court's rules of navigability for title under the equal-footing doctrine. The Montana Supreme Court erred in its treatment of the question of river segments and portage and erred as a matter of law in relying on evidence of present-day primarily recreational use of the Madison River. Because this analysis was sufficient to require reversal, the Court declined to decide whether the State Supreme Court also erred as to the burden of proof regarding navigability. Montana's suggestion that denying the State title to the disputed riverbeds would undermine the public trust doctrine underscored its misapprehension of the equal-footing and public trust doctrines. Finally, the reliance by petitioner and its predecessors in title on the State's long failure to assert title to the riverbeds was some evidence supporting the conclusion that the river segments over those beds were nonnavigable for purposes of the equal-footing doctrine. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed.

The Helseths first learned of the underlying foreclosure action and a scheduled auction sale of the property at issue when they were informed by their real estate broker that potential buyers had inquired about the lot. As a result, they moved by order to show cause to stay the sale of the property but Supreme Court declined to sign a temporary restraining order, adjourning the matter to a date after the auction. Consequently, the Helseths appeared at the auction and submitted a winning bid, paying a deposit. However, they failed to remit the remaining balance and the County auctioned the property to another party. At issue was whether the County provided sufficient notice, in accord with constitutional due process, of the release option offered pursuant to Local Law No. 7 of County of Orange. The court concluded that the release option in this appeal was a discretionary, permissive remedy made available to the Helseths after the property was lawfully foreclosed and conveyance to the County did not establish or extend a property right entitled to due process protection as any property interests held by the Helseths were lawfully extinguished as of the expiration of their right to redemption and the entry of the judgment of foreclosure. Rather, the release was simply an option to repurchase property then-owned by the County. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and that branch of respondents' motion, which was to allow them to pay back taxes and interest due for a release with respect to the property, denied.

This appeal arose in the context of a civil forfeiture action instituted by the government after it seized $133,420 found in claimant's car. The currency was seized from claimant's car as proceeds traceable to controlled substances offenses. Claimant asserted that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the government after determining that claimant lacked standing. The court affirmed the judgment because the district court did not err in striking claimant's interrogatory response claiming ownership of the property and because the remaining evidence was inadequate to establish that claimant had standing.

Plaintiff American Dream at Marlboro, L.L.C., is the successor in interest to Beacon Road Associates, L.L.C., an entity that served as the residential developer of a series of lots. In 1994 and 1995, Plaintiff’s predecessor sought the approval of the Marlboro Township Planning Board for "Beacon Woods I." In 1995, the Planning Board granted preliminary major subdivision approval specifically conditioned on the inclusion of a restriction in the deed for a "flag lot" that would preclude its further subdivision. In 1999, Defendant Patricia Cleary entered into a contract with Plaintiff to purchase one of the properties in the originally-approved development. Defendant's lot backed onto the flag lot. The Planning Board approved Plaintiff's application for a new subdivision. The resolution made no reference to the deed restriction. Plaintiff closed on the purchase of the additional land and vacated the easement that had provided that parcel with separate access to a nearby road. In 2002, when Plaintiff entered into an agreement to sell the new subdivision to another developer, Plaintiff realized that it failed to reserve the easement that it needed to cross Defendant's property. When negotiations to secure Defendant's consent to the easement failed, Plaintiff redesigned the roadway so as to obviate the need the easement. In 2006, Plaintiff returned to the Planning Board and requested that it act on its 2003 application for an amendment to the subdivision approval, but the Board rejected it, noting that prior approvals had expired. In April 2003, Plaintiff filed suit for a declaration that its 2003 application had been approved by default. Defendant as intervenor, filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the flag lot was prohibited from being subdivided because of the earlier-imposed deed restriction, along with an order directing Plaintiff to record the deed restriction. The trial court concluded that the Planning Board could not approve the amended application because it lacked jurisdiction to eliminate the deed restriction. The court therefore entered an order declaring that all of the prior approvals for the subdivision were void, and it permitted Plaintiff to amend its complaint to eliminate the deed restriction based on changed circumstances. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification, and after review concluded the trial court misapplied the governing standards for considering the application to eliminate the restriction based on changed circumstances.

This case stemmed from a dispute that arose after a 20 year lease program ended in which Polar Star owned 300 units of family housing located on Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. Polar Star leased the units back to the Air Force but the parties could not agree on the purchase price or the amount of rent payable for an additional year on the lease. The United States first sent notice of a one-year renewal of the lease, then filed a protective eminent domain action to condemn a five-month leasehold in the houses. Polar Star subsequently appealed a number of the district court's rulings. The court held that the district court correctly decided that the government's notice of renewal successfully renewed the Project Lease for one year; the district court's finding that the expiration date of the Ground Lease was the error, and therefore the lease ran for 23 years, was not clearly erroneous; the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the amount of rent due from the Government to Polar Star on the renewal; Polar Star did not file an action in district court, so the only matter before the court was the Government's condemnation action; the district court correctly determined that the condemnation action should be dismissed; Polar Star's entitlement to rent beyond what the Government paid was not asserted on a claim or counterclaim in the district court; and plaintiffs may be entitled to pursue a claim in the Court of Federal Claims. Accordingly, the district court's judgment of dismissal was affirmed.

In two condemnation proceedings, the circuit court entered orders requiring the Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH) to turn over to Defendants, three individuals who owned and leased condemned property, appraisal reports involving several properties condemned by DOH for its South Mineral Wells Project. The DOH filed petitions for writs of prohibition, contending that federal law did not permit the release of appraisal reports from properties not owned or possessed by Defendants. Defendants argued that the court's orders were consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. West Virginia Department of Transportation v. Cookman, which allowed appraisal reports to be discoverable. The Court consolidated the petitions and granted the writs of prohibition, holding (1) the decision in Cookman was expressly overruled in its entirety because it failed to consider controlling federal law; and (2) a real property appraisal report generated in compliance with 42 U.S.C. 4601 and W. Va. Code 54-3-1, et seq., and its accompanying regulations, was not discoverable in a condemnation proceeding by party who did not own or have any legally cognizable possessory interest in such real property.

This was a consolidated appeal of two cases wherein the circuit court dismissed two appeals filed by a corporation, Shenandoah Sales & Services (Shenandoah), disputing the county assessor's valuation of real estate owned by the corporation. The corporation failed to retain a lawyer to prosecute its appeals to the circuit court and instead appeared through its vice-president, David Tabb. The circuit judge ordered the corporation to appear through a lawyer in circuit court and stated that the court would not accept pleadings or motions from the corporation that were not signed by a lawyer. The corporation failed to retain a lawyer and the court dismissed the corporation's appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by ruling that Shenendoah was required to be represented by a lawyer in the circuit court; and (2) W. Va. Code 11-3-25(b) is unconstitutional insofar as the word "agent" allows an applicant's non-lawyer representative to appeal a decision of the board of equalization and review to a circuit court.

This case arose when Conrail sold its Harsimus Embankment in Jersey City to developers. The City, together with others interested in the historic and environmental value of the Embankment, sued Conrail alleging that the sale was unlawful because Conrail failed to obtain authority from the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to abandon the property. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the City enjoyed Article III standing where Conrail's refusal to invoke STB proceedings injured the City by depriving it of the benefits of those proceedings and the City's injury could be redressed by a district court ruling that the Embankment qualified as "railroad line" that Conrail could not abandon without STB approval.

Plaintiffs, the town of Bozrah and the town's zoning enforcement officer, brought an action seeking a temporary and permanent injunction to enjoin Defendants, owners and residents of certain property, from refusing to consent to an inspection of their property for zoning violations. The trial court granted a temporary injunction preventing Defendants from refusing to allow the inspection, concluding that pursuant to Camara v. Municipal Court, the reasonable governmental interest in stabilizing property values and promoting the general welfare justified an inspection in the present action. Defendants appealed, claiming that the trial court's order violated their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a zoning official may inspect a single property pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-12 if the official first obtains an injunction issued upon probable cause by a judicial officer; and (2) because the trial court failed to make a preliminary determination of probable cause to believe that a zoning violation existed on the property, its order permitting a search of Defendants' property violated the Fourth Amendment. Remanded.

The city bought land with the intention of transferring it to an adjoining Catholic high school for an athletic complex. In exchange, the city was to have the right to use the complex at specified times. In response to opposition by residents, the district court granted a preliminary injunction. Rather than appeal, the city moved to modify the injunction to permit it to sell to the school at appraised value. The district court denied on the ground that by not opening bidding the city was sending a message of endorsement of Catholicism. The city then obtained modification to allow it to sell the property to the highest bidder, sold to the high school, and appealed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot and untimely.