Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Incentives under the National Housing Act, to encourage private developers to meet the needs of moderate income families, included below-market 40-year mortgages, with an option to prepay after 20 years. Restrictions, for example, on rent increases, were in effect until the mortgage was paid off. The prepayment option gave developers an opportunity to convert to market rate housing. To avoid a shortage of affordable housing, Congress enacted Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act, 101 Stat. 1877 (1988), and Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act, 104 Stat. 4249 (1990) under which an owner needed HUD approval to prepay or to go through regulatory hoops. In 1996 Congress restored prepayment rights. Plaintiff was prohibited from prepayment for five years, 10 days. The Court of Federal Claims held that the restriction of prepayment rights constituted a taking but did not constitute a breach of contract, because there was no privity between HUD and plaintiff. The Federal Circuit affirmed on the contract claim, but reversed with respect to temporary taking. The evidence did not demonstrate that plaintiff's investment backed expectations were objectively reasonable in light of industry practice,

This case arose out of a dispute between Union Pacific, the owner of mineral rights to three parcels of land, and Linn Farms, the surface rights owner to the parcels who purchased the mineral rights from the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands. Union Pacific was unaware of the forfeiture of the mineral rights due to tax delinquency and leased the mineral rights to Chesapeake Exploration, who then recorded the lease. Discovering the lease, Linn Farms sued to quiet title to the mineral rights. The district court denied Linn Farms' motions for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Union Pacific and Chesapeake Exploration, concluding that the sale of the mineral rights by the state was invalid because the Commissioner failed to provide adequate notice of the impending forfeiture in violation of Union Pacific's due process rights. The court affirmed and held that the notice provided by the Commissioner was inadequate under the circumstances of the case even though it complied with Arkansas law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

This case stemmed from the taking of property in downtown Los Angeles to comply with a federal court order to improve the quality of bus services and involved California's "quick-take" eminent domain procedure, Code of Civil Procedure 1255.010, 1244.410, where a public entity filing a condemnation action could seek immediate possession of the condemned property upon depositing with the court the probable compensation for the property. At issue was Section 1255.260's proper interpretation. The court of appeals in this case held that, under the statute, if a lender holding a lien on condemned property applied to withdraw a portion of the deposit, and the property owner did not object to the application, the lender's withdrawal of a portion of the deposit constituted a waiver of the property owner's claims and defenses, except a claim for greater compensation. The court found the court of appeal's conclusion was inconsistent with the relevant statutory language and framework. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.

This case involved the adoption and implementation of a redevelopment plan in South Wilmington known as the South Walnut Street Urban Renewal Plan (SWURP). Plaintiffs, property owners in the SWURP area, sought a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment finding that the SWURP and ordinances adopting the 2007 and 2009 amendments to the SWURP were legally invalid, and prohibiting their application. The City of Wilmington argued as a preliminary matter that there was no justiciable controversy, and moreover, even if there was a justiciable controversy, the SWURP was amended in 2009 and did not impose unlawful overlay zoning. The court concluded that, assuming that a justiciable controversy existed, the SWURP did not impose unlawful overlay zoning. Therefore, summary judgment was granted in favor of the city and plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without prejudice.

This case was before the court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal. In its decision, the Fifth District construed provisions of the state and federal constitutions and certified a question which the court rephrased: Did the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article X, Section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution recognize an exactions taking under the holding of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dollan v. City of Tigard, where there was no compelled dedication of any interest in real property to public use and the alleged exaction was a non land-use monetary condition for permit approval which never occurred and no permit was ever issued? The court answered in the negative, quashed the decision of the Fifth District and remanded for further proceedings. The court emphasized that its decision was limited solely to answering the certified question and the court declined to address the other issues raised by the parties.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division sent a certified question to the Supreme Court. While the Court initially accepted the certified question; however upon review, the Court declined to answer it. The Court noted that the certified question was framed in the abstract, with no reference to any specific language in the title-insurance policy at the heart of the case (i.e., as an evidentiary issue with broad application). "The parties, in their briefs to this Court, do not address the construction of the policy at issue and instead refer this Court to various authorities discussing how valuation may be determined in various title-insurance contexts. Additionally, it is not apparent from the materials before us that the district court has had the opportunity to address whether the specific language of the policy would control the determination of the value of the property. Therefore, we see no grounds under Rule 18 [of the Rules of Alabama Civil Procedure] that will allow this Court to answer the question."

This appeal was the second of two appeals involving the same issue, the first of which was Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 407. At issue in the appeal was Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. Appellant Howard Curry appealed a circuit court's order finding that improvements made to his property prior to his sixty-fifth birthday were "substantial improvements" within the meaning of amendment 79 and that Appellees, the Pope County Equalization Board and the county tax assessor, would be allowed to include these improvements in the assessment of Appellant's property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in labeling the changes Appellant made to his property before he turned age sixty-five as substantial improvements, and (2) the assessor did not err in assessing Appellant's property at a higher amount than the assessment value in place when Curry turned age sixty-five due to the timing of the date of assessment value in relation to the date of property owners' birthdays.

Howard Curry's property appraisal increased on two different occasions after his sixty-fifth birthday. After the second assessment, Curry unsuccessfully petitioned the Equalization Board of Pope County to reduce the appraisal on his property. Curry then filed a petition in the county court, stating that the valuation was arbitrary and unreasonable and that the property was incorrectly assessed under Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday, unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. The county court ruled only on the assessment value and did not rule on the amendment 79 issues. Curry appealed and also filed a petition for declaratory relief and an injunction. The two cases were merged for trial. The circuit court ruled on the assessment, which was higher than the assessment in place on Curry's sixty-fifth birthday, and found that the improvements Curry made to his residence before he turned age sixty-five were "substantial improvements" within the language of the amendment. In the first of Curry's two appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed for the reasons stated in the second appeal, Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 408.

Plaintiffs, members of a religious organization, demonstrated around the stadium at which the 2006 "Gay Games" were held, but were prohibited from demonstrating and preaching on the sidewalk. They stopped demonstrating on the sidewalk outside a major tourist attraction (Navy Pier) under threat of arrest. One plaintiff, who refused to move from his spot on a public sidewalk outside one of the game venues, was arrested for disorderly conduct. The district court ruled in favor of the city defendants on claims under the U.S. Constitution, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration, and common law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the First Amendment claim dealing with a policy requiring a permit for even small-group demonstrations outside Navy Pier. The constitutionality of that policy must be evaluated in light of the unique features of the location. The city's legitimate concerns justify its actions with respect to the other locations.

This case stemmed from FEMA's determination that the Holy Cross School was eligible for public assistance funds to construct a new school campus on the site of Cabrini Church and Cabrini School in Gentilly to replace its old campus six miles away in the Lower Ninth Ward. Friends of Cabrini Church filed a complaint against FEMA, alleging that, inter alia, the section 106 review process, which defined the "area of potential effects" (APE), C.F.R. 800.4(a), 800.16(d), was deficient. On appeal, Friends of Cabrini Church subsequently challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of FEMA. The court held that because Friends of Cabrini Church lacked standing to bring its claims, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.