Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, Cecil W. Scott, executed two deeds (the 1996 Deeds) conveying two real properties he owned to his brother Roland fourteen years prior to being adjudicated a disabled person. Subsequently, one of Cecil's sisters filed a complaint on behalf of Cecil seeking to set aside the 1996 conveyances. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Cecil lacked capacity when he executed the 1996 Deeds or that the 1996 Deeds were the product of undue influence by Roland. Accordingly, the court recommended that plaintiff's complaint be denied. View "Scott v. Scott" on Justia Law

The County moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to uphold alleged land use restrictions created by two agreements (collectively, the "Master Plan") that were executed to govern the development of Pike Creek Valley. The Master Plan prevented PCRS from developing any portion of approximately 177 acres that once operated as a golf course. The court concluded that the Master Plan created a restrictive covenant on the golf course that runs with the land; PCRS had not met its burden of demonstrating that mandamus should lie here; and PCRS could not avoid the applicable County approval processes via the presumption statute, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or by claiming violations of constitutional guarantees. Accordingly, the court denied the interested parties' motion to intervene; granted in part the County's motion for summary judgment; granted in part PCRS' motion for summary judgment; and dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "New Castle Cty. v. Pike Creek Recreational Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

After the court concluded that respondent litigated in bad faith and that this matter was unnecessarily prolonged due to petitioners' ambiguously-drafted Petition to Quiet Title, the court directed petitioners to submit a statement of reasonable attorney fees which they believed reflected the cost imposed on them by respondent's purely vexatious legal maneuvers. Petitioners submitted an affidavit for attorney fees but respondent failed to respond. Thus, respondent waived any objection to the statement of fees. The court awarded petitioners $1,250.00 in attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception to the American Rule, to be paid by respondent within thirty days from the date this matter becomes final. View "Branson, et al. v. Branson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs bought a townhouse condominium unit from Defendant. After the sale, repairs of leaks in the other condominium units caused by poor construction required the condominium board to collect special assessments in the amount of $65,000 from each unit holder, including Plaintiffs. Recoupment from the builder offset the sum, but Plaintiffs remained out-of-pocket over $40,000. Plaintiffs sued Defendant, alleging fraud and equitable fraud due to Defendant's allegedly insufficient disclosures made to Plaintiffs before the sale. The Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of Defendant, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to prove Defendant committed common-law fraud because they failed to show Defendant misrepresented or omitted some material fact before the sale of the condominium; and (2) rescission was not warranted under the facts of this case, and therefore, equitable fraud was inappropriate. View "Grzybowski v. Tracy" on Justia Law

This action came before the Court of Chancery on a petition for a decree of distribution in an estate matter. Petitioner and his sister, Respondent, were the intestate heirs of their mother's estate. Ordinarily the estate would be divided evenly between the two of them. Petitioner argued, however, that his sister was not entitled to any additional funds from the estate because (1) she benefited when the estate's property was sold and the proceeds were used to pay off a mortgage she owed on the property, which had the effect of decreasing the amount available in the estate for distribution to the heirs, and (2) Respondent's actions as administratrix depleted the value of the estate. The Court of Chancery ordered that all of the assets in the estate should be distributed to Petitioner, concluding that, after accounting for the benefit Respondent received when the mortgage was paid off, and the loss caused to the estate by the breach of Respondent's fiduciary duties, there were no funds remaining in Respondent's share of the estate. View "In re Riley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking the partition by sale of property owned by her deceased father and distribution of the proceeds to the three cotenants, herself, her sister Claudia, and her brother Benjamin. Claudia filed a counterclaim and cross-claim against Plaintiff, Benjamin, Benjamin's wife, Homeowners Loan Corporation (HLC), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) for, among other things, a declaratory judgment that she had a life estate in the property. The Court of Chancery found in favor of Plaintiff and her request for a partition of the property. Claudia was then evicted from the property by a trustee appointed by the court to oversee the sale of the property. Thereafter, Plaintiff sought reimbursement for several expenses. HLC and MERS sought attorneys' fees and rent payments. The Court of Chancery awarded a total of $12,098 to Plaintiff for attorneys' fees, rent payments, funeral expenses, and trustee's fees. The Court also awarded $2,166 in rent payments to HLC and MERS and requested an itemized list of fees incurred as a result of Claudia's behavior that was found to be vexatious or in bad faith. View "Brown v. Wiltbank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a lease with Defendant containing optional renewal terms. The parties disputed whether the option was properly exercised. Defendant then informed Plaintiff that if it failed to vacate the leasehold, Defendant would pursue legal action. Plaintiff brought this action to forestall that eventuality. At issue in this case was whether the Court of Chancery can exercise jurisdiction over what is essentially a real estate possession action, notwithstanding that the Legislature has vested exclusive jurisdiction over such matters with the Justice of the Peace Courts. The Court of Chancery granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding (1) the Court does not have jurisdiction, under the facts of this case, to enjoin Defendant from seeking relief from the Justice of the Peace Court in this matter where that court has exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) a claim does not exist in equity to nullify Defendant's contractual rights arising from Plaintiffs' purported failure to timely exercise an option. View "Heartland Del. Inc. v. Rehoboth Mall Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

This action involved a dispute between certain members of two Delaware real estate holding companies, Defendant Companies and the Companies' manager, Rubin Schron. Plaintiffs, MICH and SEEVA Entites, originally brought an action against Schron and Schron-affiliated entities in New York (the MICH/SEEVA action) alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and of the Companies' operating agreements. In response, Schron filed an opposing action in New York against the MICH and SEEVA entities' majority owners and controllers, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice. The New York court dismissed the MICH/SEEVA action, holding that the operating agreements required all claims against the Companies to be brought in Delaware. Plaintiffs then filed this action, which Schron moved to stay or dismiss. The Chancery Court granted Defendants' motion to stay this action in favor of Schron's first-filed New York action. Plaintiffs then filed combined motions for reconsideration and certification of an interlocutory appeal. The Chancery Court held that, with the exception of Plaintiffs' claim regarding Defendants' withholding of certain distributions allegedly owed to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' motion should be denied because Plaintiffs did not demonstrate that relief was warranted. View "MICH II Holdings LLC v. Schron" on Justia Law

WenDover, is a Delaware corporation that operates a Wendy franchise in Rehoboth Beach. Defendant RMLP owns the Rehoboth Mall Shopping Center, where the restaurant is located. Heartland leased land from the RMLP and then subleased the land to WenDover. In 2006, the parties disagreed whether Heartland had properly exercised the lease’s second renewal term. To resolve that dispute, Heartland agreed to pay the third renewal term’s rental rate during the second renewal term, and RMLP forgave any noncompliance with the renewal provisions of the lease. RMLP contends that Heartland did not provide notice and exercise the option for the third term, informed Heartland that Heartland was occupying the leasehold under an at-will tenancy and demanded that Heartland vacate. Heartland sought to enjoin RMLP from seeking eviction from the Justice of the Peace Court. The chancellor determined that the court lacked jurisdiction over what “is essentially a real estate possession action,” over which the legislature has vested exclusive jurisdiction over such matters with the Justice of the Peace Courts.View "Heartland DE Inc. v. Rehoboth Mall Ltd P'ship" on Justia Law

When the original developer of Plantations created the subdivision in 1986, it retained a 4.3-acre Recreation Area, including a pool, tennis courts, and a gym. Plantations residents and the general public use the facilities for a fee. The developer failed to reserve an express easement to the public road. Owners of the Recreation Area and customers of the health facility must use land owned by the Associations, which own and maintain Plantations’ common areas, for access. A new owner of the recreation facility was unable to reach agreement with the Associations concerning access and parking and sought to establish that an easement exists in its favor over the roads of the Associations and for use of a parking lot adjacent to the Recreation Area and that it is under no obligation to contribute to the upkeep of the property over which it claims an easement, relying on a Declaration of Covenants. The Declaration is poorly drafted and unclear. The Chancellor held that the owner has established an easement to use the private roadways of Plantations in connection with its business, but failed to demonstrate an easement for parking. The question of maintenance obligations awaits further factual development. View "Sandie, LLC v. The Plantations Owners Ass'n, Inc.,." on Justia Law