Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After agreeing to purchase a new townhouse, the Smiths leased it back to the builder, Ryan Homes, to use for six months as a model home. Ryan Homes converted the garage into a sales office. When the Smiths took possession, they used the converted garage as additional living space. The developer sought a mandatory injunction forcing the Smiths and Ryan Homes to convert the space back to a functional garage. The chancellor ruled in favor of defendants. The recorded subdivision plan and declaration of restrictions do not prohibit conversion of a garage to living space. The partition wall of the garage conversion is not sufficiently visible to the public to trigger an architectural review requirement and fears about parking problems are overly speculative. View "Reybold Venture Grp. XI-A, LLC. v. Smith" on Justia Law

A 2007 conveyance of commercial property in Milton was characterized by mistakes, starting with an error-filled purchase offer, so that the deed ultimately conveyed a residential parcel that was not owned by the seller at the time of conveyance and that the seller did not intend to convey. In an opinion characterized as “unpleasant to write,” the chancellor declared the purported conveyance a nullity and noted that the “matter has been litigated far beyond what a rational evaluation of its costs and potential benefits would dictate.” The chancellor found that the deed, purporting to transfer the residential parcel, was altered by the buyer’s attorney, to the detriment of the seller and without the effective consent of the seller and was ineffective to convey any property. The actual deed signed by the parties contained a reference to the residential parcel by tax number, but omitted that property from the metes and bounds description.

Plaintiffs challenged the Town's actions in regards to a Mutual Agreement and Release (MAR) for the redevelopment of Ruddertowne, primarily upon the bases that they constituted impermissible contract zoning and that the MAR, the Building Permit, and the Record Plat Plan (together, the Challenged Documents) violated numerous aspects of the Town's zoning, building, and land use regulations. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit. The court concluded that the Complaint was filed after the period provided for in the applicable statute of repose, 10 Del. C. 8126. As for the Building Inspector's approval and issuance of the Building Permit, the court concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because an adequate remedy at law was available to plaintiffs. Therefore, the court granted defendants' motions to dismiss. The Town's motion to strike, which was rendered moot, was denied.

This derivative action challenged a series of related-party transactions. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that laches barred the bulk of the claims. Defendants were partly right, laches barred the challenges to certain stock options granted in 2004 and 2005. Laches also barred a portion of the challenge to compensation received under certain employment agreements and rent-free sublease. With respect to these claims, the doctrine applied to the extent the compensation was paid and rent-free space provided before March 18, 2008. The doctrine did not apply to the extent that compensation was paid and rent-free space provided on or after March 18, 2008. On a final set of claims, the court granted plaintiffs leave to replead because although the complaint alleged facts sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, the pleading failed to identify when plaintiffs subsequently found out about the self-dealing transactions.

Plaintiff sued the State to challenge a demand for payment made by the State under Delaware's escheat law, 12 Del. C. 1101, et seq. The State countersued, seeking a declaration that the sums demanded from plaintiff were proper and authorized under the Statute. Both parties moved for partial judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the rebates at issue fit comfortably within two of the "specifically enumerated" items of property listed in section 1198(11) and therefore granted the State's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and denied plaintiff's cross-motion. Although the pleadings did not paint a clear picture of the form in which the rebates were issued by plaintiff to its customers, plaintiff's counsel conceded at oral argument that the rebates were issued as either negotiable "checks" or "credits." As such, the rebates consisted of specifically enumerated items of property under section 1198(11), and the State's claims could not be barred by any statute of limitations.

This action was before the court on a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the consummation of a proposed restructuring of a mortgage loan secured by certain resorts properties in Mexico and the Bahamas. Holders of more senior participations claim that the proposed transaction unfairly benefited the junior holder at the expense of the more senior holders in direct contravention of the terms of the agreements controlling the debt. The senior holders further claimed that if the proposed transaction was allowed to close, they would suffer irreparable harm through the loss of certain rights and guaranties under the new terms of the loan. The court concluded that the senior holders have stated colorable claims and made a sufficient showing that they would suffer imminent harm if the proposed transaction were allowed to close. Further, the court found that this potential irreparable harm outweighed the harm that would result to the junior holders by delaying the closing for a few weeks until a preliminary injunction could be heard. Accordingly, the court granted the TRO.

This matter involved the adoption of a land use comprehensive plan by the Kent County Levy Court. Petitioners, landowners, argued that the ordinance adopting the plan worked a zoning change on their properties because, pursuant to the land use map incorporated in the plan, the density of the permissible development of the properties was significantly reduced. Petitioners alleged numerous violations of constitutional and statutory law arising of the alleged downzoning of the properties. The county moved to dismiss, arguing that the matter was not ripe for adjudication because the plan and land use map were planning documents only and did not change Petitioners' property rights. The Chancery Court denied the motion to dismiss, holding (1) because land use maps have the force of law, and the county may not permit development of the properties except in conformity with the new land use map, Petitioners had suffered a diminution in their ability to develop the properties, assuming the factual allegation of their petition were true; and (2) therefore, Petitioners' allegations were ripe for consideration.

Petitioner, an attorney, brought this action pro se seeking reformation of a mortgage. Petitioner was not a party to the mortgage or the loan it secured; he had no interest in the underlying party; sued on his own name and not on behalf of either the borrower or the lender; and there were no defendants. Petitioner sought an order reforming a mortgage by substituting the correct legal description for the property, asserting that his potential exposure for negligence gave him a sufficient interest to bring the action. The court held that petitioner was a non-party to the contract and therefore, he lacked standing to seek reformation.

This case involved a challenge to the New Castle County Council's approval of the record plan for a housing development. The development was the joint effort of two record owners of individual parcels: the limited liability companies, Robinson Investments, LLC, and Robinson Investments Two, LLC. Plaintiffs, however, did not name Robinson Investments, LLC, as a party, and defendants moved to dismiss because of plaintiffs' failure to join an indispensable party. Because of the time limitations embodied in 10 Del. C. 8126, joinder of Robinson Investments, LLC, was not precluded. Therefore, if Robinson Investments, LLC, was an indispensable party, the action would be dismissed with prejudice. Consequently, the court found that Robinson Investments, LLC, was an indispensable party to the action and granted defendants' motion to dismiss.

This case involved the adoption and implementation of a redevelopment plan in South Wilmington known as the South Walnut Street Urban Renewal Plan (SWURP). Plaintiffs, property owners in the SWURP area, sought a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment finding that the SWURP and ordinances adopting the 2007 and 2009 amendments to the SWURP were legally invalid, and prohibiting their application. The City of Wilmington argued as a preliminary matter that there was no justiciable controversy, and moreover, even if there was a justiciable controversy, the SWURP was amended in 2009 and did not impose unlawful overlay zoning. The court concluded that, assuming that a justiciable controversy existed, the SWURP did not impose unlawful overlay zoning. Therefore, summary judgment was granted in favor of the city and plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without prejudice.