Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a dispute over certain property subject to a foreclosure. At issue was whether the parol evidence rule required that a person who claimed to hold a "purchase money mortgage" must prove his purchase money mortgage holder status solely by reference to the mortgage instrument itself. The court concluded that, in this case, the recorded deed and purchase money mortgage established that the sellers' mortgage satisfied, at least prima facie, all three requirements of 25 Del. C. 2108. Moreover, the mortgage contained no subordination language that would relinquish priority to the third party lenders. Therefore, the presumption that the sellers' mortgage was a purchase money mortgage entitled to statutory priority standards stood unrebutted. By applying the parol evidence rule to reach a contrary conclusion, the Superior Court erred as a matter of law.

Plaintiff sued defendant for personal injuries he sustained in a bicycle accident when he used defendant's parking lot as a short cut while riding his bicycle. Plaintiff claimed that defendant failed to maintain a safe premises, thereby breaching a duty defendant owed to plaintiff as a licensee. On appeal from summary judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff claimed that the Superior Court erred by holding that he was a trespasser, and not a licensee. Because commercial property owners/occupiers were held to the same common law standard whether or not the claimant was a licensee or a trespasser - namely to refrain from willful and wanton conduct - the court affirmed the judgment.

The Board appealed from a Superior Court decision reversing the Board's denial of the area variance application of appellants. Appellants had purchased the property at issue, made renovations and improvements on the property, including adding a barbecue area and building a shed in the setback area. The Board denied the application on grounds that appellants did not satisfy the statutory requirements of title 9, section 6917 of the Delaware Code. The court held that the plain language of title 9, section 6917 precluded the Board from granting a variance where, as here, appellants created the exceptional practical difficulty. The court also held that the decision of the Board that the property was being reasonably utilized without the non-conforming structures was supported by substantial evidence and was free from legal error. Accordingly, the court reversed the decision of the Superior Court.

This case arose when the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) granted three use variances to Ingleside to allow partial demolition and renovation of the H. Fletcher Brown Mansion for use as a thirty-five unit multi-family apartment building for senior citizens. Appellants raised three issues on appeal. The court concluded that the ZBA was not properly constituted and therefore, it was without authority to act. Consequently, there was no need to address the merits of appellants' other two arguments. The judgment of the Superior Court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

A real estate agent served as the seller's agent for two sales of the same house. The initial purchaser submitted a bid for the house and, the same day, hired the initial seller's agent to serve as seller's agent for the second sale. A few days later, the agent convinced the initial seller to accept the initial purchaser's bid without disclosing his conflict of interest or the purchaser's interest in flipping the house. After one day of trial concerning the initial seller's complaint against the agent alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duties, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The court held that because plaintiff raised issues of material fact concerning whether defendant breached his fiduciary duties to the seller, the court remanded the case for a new trial.