Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a parcel of property located in a network of alleyways in downtown Washington, D.C. The property, formerly owned by a partnership concerned about crime and disruption related to nightclub use, was sold in 2008 subject to a recorded restrictive covenant prohibiting operation of a nightclub or late-night alcohol establishment. The property changed hands again, and in 2023, the current owner and its lessee sought to open a large nightclub there, despite being aware of the covenant. They secured a provisional alcoholic beverage license, which was granted after a regulatory hearing that did not consider the covenant’s enforceability. When neighboring property owners and the original seller filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to enforce the covenant, the current property owner and lessee counterclaimed to invalidate it. After discovery and cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, upholding the covenant, and dismissed the counterclaim. The court found the covenant’s language unambiguous, that the defendants had notice, and that no substantial changes in the property’s character justified disregarding the restriction. A separate motion to intervene by a neighboring property owner, JPMorgan Chase Bank, was denied as moot. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s decisions. It held that unambiguous, perpetual restrictive covenants are enforceable unless unreasonable or contrary to public policy, and the circumstances here did not warrant equitable nonenforcement. The court also found that the proposed fact disputes were not material and that the denial of JPMorgan’s intervention was proper due to the outcome. The judgment was affirmed. View "DTLD, LLC v. Power Station Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

A law firm leased office space in downtown Washington, D.C. from a commercial landlord. In the spring of 2020, following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and in response to orders issued by the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the law firm curtailed most of its in-office operations and directed employees to work remotely. The firm subsequently invoked a rent abatement provision in its lease, arguing that the pandemic and the government’s orders constituted a force majeure event, which resulted in a material interference with its use and enjoyment of the premises due to an alleged interruption of the essential building service of “secure access” or “prompt access” to the building.The law firm filed a breach of contract suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia after the landlord denied the rent abatement request. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court denied the law firm’s motion and granted summary judgment to the landlord. The court found that the contract was unambiguous, and that there was no interruption of “secure or prompt access” to the premises, as the building remained physically accessible and the landlord did not impede entry. The court also determined that the government’s orders did not amount to a force majeure “taking” as defined by the lease. The law firm appealed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that under the plain meaning of the lease, “secure and prompt access” refers to physical ability to enter the premises, as provided by the landlord, and not to a generalized right to use the premises free from government restrictions. Because the law firm’s access to the building was never impeded by the landlord, the rent abatement provision was not triggered. View "Crowell & Moring, LLP v. Trea 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue Trust" on Justia Law

Danielle Pennington was the former owner of a property that was foreclosed and sold in 2019 to the predecessor of First Hand Land, LLC. After the sale, Pennington remained on the property, and First Hand Land subsequently sought to evict her. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted First Hand Land a writ of restitution, permitting Pennington’s eviction from the premises. Pennington, representing herself, appealed this order and requested that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals enjoin her eviction pending the appeal, which the court denied. She was evicted the following day.Following her eviction, Pennington moved for reconsideration, presenting what she claimed was a federal district court order granting her quiet title to the property. First Hand Land responded by asserting that the purported federal order was a forgery, pointing out discrepancies such as the absence of the order from the federal court’s docket and inconsistencies with the actual disposition of Pennington’s federal case, which had been dismissed prior to the date on the alleged order. The Superior Court, in a parallel action, also found the order to be fraudulent and noted further irregularities, including mismatched dates and the submission of the forged order to official agencies.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the materials and found, based on judicially noticeable facts and uncontested evidence, that Pennington had submitted a forged order. The court adopted a standard allowing dismissal of appeals as a sanction for willful deception and conduct grossly inconsistent with the administration of justice. Applying this standard, it dismissed Pennington’s appeal and pending motions as a sanction for her litigation misconduct, concluding that no lesser sanction would be sufficient. View "Pennington v. First Hand Land, LLC" on Justia Law

Lano/Armada Harbourside, LLC sold five condominium units in Washington, D.C. to Allegiance 2900 K Street LLC in 2013 for $39 million. The sale was documented by a deed that purported to reserve to Lano/Armada a leasehold interest in the property, referencing a separate ground lease agreement between Allegiance (as landlord) and Lano/Armada (as tenant). The ground lease had a term exceeding thirty years, with options to extend up to 117 years, and specified substantial annual rent payments. The ground lease itself was not recorded at the time of the sale, and no taxes were paid on it. Only the deed was recorded, and taxes were paid based on the transfer of the fee simple interest.After a series of assignments and a foreclosure, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, as subrogee of COMM 2013-CCRE12 K STREET NW, LLC, sought to record a deed of foreclosure in 2019. The Recorder of Deeds refused, noting that the ground lease had never been recorded or taxed. Commonwealth then recorded a memorandum of lease and paid the required taxes under protest. Commonwealth sought a refund from the Office of Tax Revenue, which was denied, and then petitioned the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for relief. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the District, finding that the ground lease was a separate taxable transfer and that the statute of limitations had not run because no return for the ground lease had been filed until 2019.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the ground lease was a separate transfer of a leasehold interest, not a mere retention, and was subject to recordation and taxation. The court further held that the statute of limitations for tax collection was not triggered by the earlier deed and tax return, as they did not provide sufficient information about the ground lease. Thus, the District’s collection of taxes on the ground lease was timely. View "Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

In this case, a condominium unit was sold at a foreclosure sale in 2014 to Tyroshi Investments after the original owner defaulted on both her mortgage and condominium assessments. The condominium association conducted the sale, and Tyroshi subsequently rented out the unit. In 2015, the mortgage and deed of trust were transferred to U.S. Bank, which then initiated its own judicial foreclosure and purchased the unit at a second sale in 2016. Both Tyroshi and U.S. Bank recorded their deeds at different times, and for a period, Tyroshi’s tenants continued to occupy the unit while U.S. Bank paid taxes and assessments. In 2020, Tyroshi was denied access to the unit, leading to litigation over rightful ownership.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bench trial and determined that U.S. Bank’s claims to quiet title and invalidate the 2014 foreclosure sale were timely, applying a fifteen-year statute of limitations for actions “for the recovery of lands” under D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1). The court declared the 2014 sale invalid and found U.S. Bank to be the legal owner. Tyroshi appealed, arguing that the claims were untimely.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the fifteen-year limitations period applies only to possessory actions, such as ejectment or adverse possession, not to claims like wrongful foreclosure or breach of contract, which are subject to shorter limitations periods. The court found that U.S. Bank’s claims were time-barred, except for a portion of its unjust enrichment claim related to payments made within three years of the suit. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of the unjust enrichment claim. View "Tyroshi Investments, LLC v. U.S. Bank, NA, Successor Trustee to LaSalle Bank NA" on Justia Law

The case involves MP PPH, LLC, the owner of the Marbury Plaza apartment complex in Washington, D.C., which was found in contempt by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for failing to comply with a consent order. The consent order was designed to address severe housing code violations, including pest infestations, mold, broken air conditioning, lack of heat, unsecured doors, leaks, and major plumbing issues. The trial court ordered a 50% rent abatement for all tenants, retroactive to the latest possible date by which MP PPH had agreed to complete the consent order’s requirements.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially denied the District of Columbia’s motion for contempt, finding that MP PPH had made good faith efforts to comply. However, upon a renewed motion, the court held a three-day evidentiary hearing and found MP PPH in contempt, citing extensive noncompliance with the consent order. The court noted that MP PPH had failed to conduct proper mold assessments, complete necessary repairs, and provide pest control services, among other violations. The court imposed sanctions, including a 50% rent abatement for all tenants, increasing to 60% and then 75% if compliance was not achieved within specified timeframes.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s contempt finding and sanctions. The appellate court found that the evidence of MP PPH’s contempt was overwhelming and that the trial court was not required to follow a three-step contempt process as argued by MP PPH. The court also held that the trial court’s sanctions did not interfere with the discretion of courts presiding over related landlord-tenant cases and that any improper reference to the wealth of MP PPH’s principal was harmless. The appellate court concluded that MP PPH had forfeited many of its arguments on appeal by not raising them in a timely manner before the trial court. View "MP PPH, LLC v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

In this case, 4022 Georgia Avenue, LLC (4022 LLC) acquired a townhouse in Washington, D.C., in April 2018, which it later sold in two units in 2020. In June 2021, the new owners reported significant structural issues, leading to an inspection by the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA). DCRA issued an order to correct (December OTC) to 4022 LLC in December 2021, directing it to address various building code violations. 4022 LLC appealed the order, arguing it could not comply without the cooperation of the new owners.The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) held a hearing in April 2024 and issued a final order in May 2024, affirming the December OTC. OAH found that 4022 LLC's appeal did not meet the criteria for appeals under the relevant regulations, as it did not specify which provisions of the building code were incorrectly interpreted or applied. OAH also found that 4022 LLC was responsible for the violations due to its warranty obligations under the Condominium Act.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that OAH did not err in its findings. The court concluded that 4022 LLC's failure to identify specific provisions of the building code in its appeal constituted a failure to comply with the criteria for appeals. The court also found that OAH's reliance on the Property Maintenance Code, instead of the Building Code, did not constitute reversible error, as the criteria for appeals were substantively similar. Finally, the court held that OAH did not err in finding 4022 LLC responsible for the violations, as substantial evidence supported this finding based on the LLC's warranty obligations.The court affirmed OAH's order, upholding the December OTC and the requirement for 4022 LLC to address the building code violations. View "4022 Georgia Avenue v. Department of Buildings" on Justia Law

Lauren and John Paul Szymkowicz, who live near Georgetown University, experienced secondhand smoke infiltrating their home from a neighboring property occupied by a Georgetown undergraduate student. The smoke caused health issues and discomfort for the couple. Despite their efforts to address the issue directly with the student and through various university channels, the problem persisted until the student was eventually relocated by the university.The Szymkowiczes filed a lawsuit against Georgetown University in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, asserting claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, public and private nuisance, and breach of contract. They argued that the university had a duty to mitigate the impacts of student behavior on the surrounding neighborhood, as outlined in Georgetown’s campus plan and the Zoning Commission’s order approving that plan. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that Georgetown owed no duty to the Szymkowiczes and that no contract existed between the university and the couple.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Georgetown University did not owe a duty of care to the Szymkowiczes under common law or based on the campus plan and Zoning Commission’s order. The court also found that the university was not in control of the student’s conduct and thus could not be held liable for nuisance. Additionally, the court determined that no enforceable contract existed between Georgetown and the District of Columbia that would allow the Szymkowiczes to sue for breach of contract. Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims. View "Szymkowicz v. President and Directors of the College of Georgetown University" on Justia Law

Peter Farina has lived at the Victor Howell House, a group home for low-income individuals, since 1989. In 2000, the Janet Keenan Housing Corporation (JKHC), a non-profit, purchased the property to maintain it as affordable housing. Recently, JKHC attempted to sell the house to a private third party, leading to two tracks of litigation. The District of Columbia sued JKHC to halt the sale, arguing it violated JKHC’s charitable purposes. As the District and JKHC neared a settlement allowing the sale, Farina sought to intervene but was denied. Farina then filed his own lawsuit, claiming his rights under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) were being violated.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied Farina’s motion to intervene in the District’s case, citing untimeliness and lack of standing. The court approved the settlement between the District and JKHC, which allowed the sale to proceed. In Farina’s separate lawsuit, the court ruled against him, stating his TOPA rights were extinguished by the court-approved settlement and that he lacked standing to bring his UTC claim.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Farina’s TOPA rights were not extinguished by the settlement, as the sale was an arm’s-length transaction and not exempt under TOPA. Farina must be given the opportunity to purchase the property under TOPA. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Farina lacked standing to bring his UTC claim, as he was neither a settlor nor a special interest beneficiary of JKHC. The court affirmed the judgment in the District’s case but vacated the judgment in Farina’s case, remanding it for further proceedings to afford Farina his TOPA rights. View "Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation" on Justia Law

Desean Hattix was convicted of attempted failure to register a firearm after police executed a search warrant at his home and found two unregistered handguns. Following his conviction, the District of Columbia Housing Authority (DCHA) sought to evict him from his federally subsidized housing unit, alleging that his possession of an unregistered firearm violated the federal "one-strike" provision in his lease, which prohibits tenants from engaging in criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or peaceful enjoyment of the property. The trial court found that Mr. Hattix's unlawful possession of a firearm violated this provision and issued a nonredeemable judgment against him.The magistrate judge found that Mr. Hattix's possession of an unregistered firearm threatened the safety of other residents and issued a nonredeemable judgment against him. An associate judge of the Superior Court upheld this decision, finding that Mr. Hattix's gun possession posed both a per se and an individualized threat to the health and safety of other residents. The reviewing judge noted that the District's registration requirements were designed to ensure firearms were not in the hands of dangerous and untrained individuals, and by ignoring this law, Mr. Hattix placed the public at risk.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. The court held that possession of an unregistered firearm does not constitute a per se threat to residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the property. The court also found that DCHA did not present sufficient evidence that Mr. Hattix's conduct posed an individualized threat to residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the property. Consequently, the judgment of the Superior Court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hattix v. District of Columbia Housing Authority" on Justia Law