Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Frank A. Louis, Esq. represented Plaintiff Julia Gere in connection with Plaintiff's divorce from Peter Ricker. Pursuant to the property settlement agreement, Plaintiff had a six month window, which ended in October 2000, to decide how she wished to proceed with respect to the parties' ancillary real estate investments. Plaintiff's understanding was that she would retain a one-half interest in those assets unless she affirmatively advised Ricker within six months that she did not wish to do so. One of those assets was Navesink Partners, which owned both the real estate and business operations of a marina. Based on Louis's interpretation of Plaintiff’s wishes after a discussion with her friend, Louis sent a letter dated October 11, 2000, to Ricker's attorney stating, "this will confirm that except for the Marina, Mrs. Ricker wishes to maintain one-half interest in all other properties." Subsequently, a dispute arose in which Ricker maintained that Plaintiff had waived any interest in Navesink Partners, and Plaintiff contended that she did not waive her interest, that she wanted to continue her ownership interest in the marina's real estate, and that she was entitled to fair value for her interest in the marina's business operations. Plaintiff ultimately sued Louis for malpractice over the purported waiver of her interests in the marina property. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether "Puder v. Buechel" (183 N.J. 428 (2005)) barred Plaintiff's malpractice action against her former attorney and whether that claim was time-barred. The appellate division affirmed the trial court decision that Plaintiff indeed was time barred, and that she voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement regarding the marina property which she testified was "fair and reasonable." Upon review, the Supreme Court found Plaintiff's case was materially distinguishable from "Puder," and that her legal malpractice claim was not barred.

This appeal involved a title to a house and lot in a residential subdivision in Forsyth County. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendants appealed. The court held that the trial court properly rejected defendants' claim of bona fide purchaser status; defendants' argument that the trial court erred in holding that the children acquired a collective two-thirds interest in the property by virtue of the 1998 quitclaim deed from their father was without merit; the trial court properly dismissed defendants' claim for equitable subrogation; the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' counterclaim for unjust enrichment; and the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' laches defense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Amber Williams and Frederick Ormsby, who were not married, lived together in a house Amber received through her divorce settlement. Frederick eventually paid the remaining mortgage balance, and Amber gave him title to the property by executing a quitclaim deed. As a result of a later separation, Amber and Frederick signed a document in March 2005 to sell the house and allocate the proceeds. The couple subsequently tried to reconcile and, in June 2005, they signed a second document, purportedly making themselves equal partners in the house and providing for property disposition in the event that their relationship ended. After their relationship ended, the parties filed suit against each other. The trial court determined that the March 2005 agreement was supported by consideration but that the June 2005 agreement was not and held that title to the property was vested in Frederick exclusively. The federal court of appeals reversed, concluding that moving into home with another and resuming a relationship can constitute consideration sufficient to support a contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that merely moving into a home with another while engaging in a romantic relationship is not consideration for the formation of a contract.

Larry DeFoor petitioned to establish title against all the world on a piece of property in Ellijay, Georgia. Appellants, certain descendants of Millie DeFoor, the record title holder, answered the petition and denied its material allegations. The court held that the earlier denial of appellants' motion for summary judgment was harmless or moot because the court found evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of Larry; Larry did not need to reside on the property in order to establish adverse possession, he only needed to exercise dominion over it; appellants' assertion that Larry could not "tack" his adverse possession to the adverse possession of his father was without merit; the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to conclude that Larry met his burden to show ouster; it was not error to grant Larry's first motion in limine which sought to exclude certain evidence; and the trial court did not err in refusing to permit appellants to show that Flint Timber agreed to pay Larry for an easement on the property. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Husband appealed a trial court's issuance of a final divorce judgment and decree that divided some unimproved real property in Florida and two Morgan Stanley funds equally between the parties and made no disposition of the interests in an apartment complex, thereby leaving each party with his or her own interest. The court held that the two Morgan Stanley accounts were transformed into marital property when Husband gave Wife an ownership interest in the property; the Florida property was transformed into a marital asset where it was deeded to him and his Wife as tenants in common; and in regards to the apartment complex, Wife acquired an ownership interest separate and distinct from Husband's. Finally, the court held that Husband's claims that the trial court abused its discretion by announcing a prejudgment of the case prior to his presentation of evidence was without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Husband and Wife divorced in 2005. During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Wife brought a separate civil suit seeking various forms of equitable relief and monetary damages, which the district court granted. At issue in the civil suit was certain property on which the couple ran an equestrian business but which a Husband's corporation owned. Husband filed a timely notice of appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the district court erroneously found that an express oral agreement existed between Husband and Wife to purchase, hold, and develop the property, and the equestrian business therein, for their mutual enjoyment and benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in imposing a constructive trust and declaring the property part of the marital estate; but (2) the district court erred in its determination that an enforceable agreement existed, as the purported agreement lacked sufficient specificity. Remanded.

Appellant Anthony Hayes appealed a superior court order that denied his petition to enjoin a sheriff's sale and found a prejudgment attachment by Appellee Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC or Hospital) valid and executable. In 2006, Appellant's wife Karen was admitted to the SNMHC for medical treatment stemming from alcoholism. SNHMC filed suit in superior court against Appellant for his wife's unpaid medical bills. At the same time, the hospital petitioned to attach a portion of the couple's real estate owned as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. During the pendancy of the attachment proceedings, the Hayses divorced. Under the terms of their separation agreement, each was responsible for their own medical expenses not covered by insurance. Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the real estate. Shortly thereafter, she died. SNHMC obtained a limited probate administration in order to proceed with the sheriff's sale of the properties. The trial court found that Mrs. Hayes' interests in the subject properties remained valid and that SNHMC was entitled to execute its judgment against them. On appeal, Appellant contended that, because Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the property prior to entry of final judgment against her, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to find that her death terminated SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment was obtained and recorded during Mrs. Hayes' lifetime and while she held the property jointly with her husband. As such the hospital's judgment remained valid. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the hospital.

Wife initiated a divorce from Husband. After a trial and after applying the parties' premarital agreement to the evidence presented to divide the parties' real and personal property, the court ordered Husband to pay Wife $145,000. The court then ordered Wife to pay Husband $300,000 to achieve an equitable distribution. Wife appealed. Wife subsequently moved the district court to enforce the preliminary injunction, claiming Husband removed her from his health insurance policy in violation of the injunction. The trial court denied Wife's motion. Wife appealed this judgment and consolidated her appeals. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's action with respect to Wife's motion for a preliminary injunction as the parties' premarital agreement unequivocally barred the awarding of spousal support, and therefore, neither spouse could be required to provide the other with health insurance; and (2) affirmed most of the divorce judgment but vacated the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding Husband $300,000 to create an equitable division of the marital estate because there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that $300,000 of the assets awarded to Wife were marital property. Remanded.

The Chapter 7 Trustee appealed from the Bankruptcy Court's judgment in favor of debtor's parents on a fraudulent transfer action, holding that debtor could not fraudulently transfer property that would have been exempt. Because the court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court erred in applying Minnesota fraudulent transfer law to the count seeking relief under section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court reversed and remanded for further findings.

Bankruptcy trustee and nondebtor spouse appealed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to H.D. Smith. The trustee and spouse argued that the bankruptcy court erred in holding that H.D. Smith had an enforceable lien against the proceeds of the sale of the debtor's homestead property in excess of the homestead exemption. The court held that, regardless of whether the lien attached prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee took the property with the state-law character it had in the debtor's hands: a property with an unenforceable lien. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The court also held that because it concluded that H.D. Smith's lien was unenforceable, it need not consider whether enforcing the lien would violate 11 U.S.C. 362 or 11 U.S.C. 549. The court also did not consider the issues that the spouse argued in her briefing regarding homestead rights.