Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Before the Supreme Court was whether an action for separate maintenance and support could be pursued when the parties were still living together. Eileen (Wife) and Clifford (Husband) Theisen were married in 1980. At the time of this action, the parties owned three properties: the marital home, which was in Wife's name, and two rental properties, both of which were in Husband's name. Wife had filed for divorce on two previous occasions, at least one of which was premised on the fault ground of physical cruelty. Wife filed this action for separate maintenance alleging Husband "has engaged and continue[ed] to engage in a course of conduct making it unreasonable and unfair to require [Wife] to continue to live with him." Husband counterclaimed for equitable distribution of the marital assets and debts as well as attorney's fees. Husband further made motions to dismiss Wife's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Both of Husband's motions were premised on the fact that Husband and Wife were not living separate and apart. He also moved to cancel the lis pendens placed on his rental properties. The court found it "ha[d] the jurisdiction to order separate support and maintenance, [but it did] not have the authority to do so when the parties [were] living together." Accordingly, the court dismissed her complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed the family court because Wife failed to allege that she and Husband were living separate and apart at the time of filing. Furthermore, because Wife's lis pendens and claim for attorney's fees hinged on the validity of her complaint, the Court found no error in the family court's denial of that relief.

Wife and husband were married in 1993 and, after a bench trial, were awarded a final decree of divorce on July 14, 2010. The court granted wife's application for discretionary review under this court's previously instituted Pilot Project for domestic relations cases. On appeal, wife contended that the trial court erred when it improperly designated her Scottrade account as marital property; improperly applied the source of funds rule, improperly made an erroneous finding of fact, improperly valued husband's separate property, and improperly valued property adjacent to the marital home. The court held that the trial court erred in designating the Scottrade account as marital property and the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the order denying the motion for new trial was reversed as to this issue and the matter remanded for the marital property to be equitably divided. The court also held that the trial court did not commit reversible error in its varied treatment of husband's office and of the $210,000 funds from wife's Scottrade account. The court further held that there was no merit in wife's claim that husband's testimony, regarding his contribution, was insufficient proof where the trial court had the right to credit husband's testimony on that matter. The court finally held that the trial court did not err in applying the source funds rule where wife had acquiesced to the trial court's use of county tax records to determine the value of the various real estate properties at issue. The court sustained the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial where wife's remaining enumeration of error was without merit.

The Minch Family sued the Estate of the Norbys in diversity, seeking injunctive relief and damages for flooding of the Minch Family's property, allegedly caused by a field dike built on the Norbys' land. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the Minch Family's claims were time-barred and whether the magistrate judge abused its discretion by denying the Minch Family's motion to amend its complaint to allege a claim for punitive damages and the Minch Family's motion to amend the scheduling order. The court held that the Minch Family had failed to meet its burden of showing that the applicable two year-statute of limitations should be tolled and its claims were untimely. The court held that because it had affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Minch Family's claims as time-barred, the issue of punitive damages was moot. The court further held that because the Minch Family's motion only related to its claim for punitive damages, the court need not address the issue of whether the magistrate judge abused its discretion in denying its motion to amend the court's scheduling order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This was an action for approval of accounting and termination of a testamentary trust. Jean I. Willey, the testator, had four sons: Todd, Mark, Scott, and Dale. Todd, filed a motion seeking approval of the trust accounting and the termination of Mark's supplemental needs trust, the corpus of which, according to Todd, was reduced to around $5,000 and should be turned over to Mark (via his guardians). The petition to approve the accounting and terminate the trust was opposed by Mark and Scott, together with Scott's wife (collectively, the "Objectors"). The Objectors made three objections to the Petition to Terminate the Estate: the gift of money from Jean to Todd during her lifetime worked an ademption on the bequest to Todd of a portion of the residue of Jean's estate; Jean's real property, which passed to the four brothers as co-tenants, and which was informally managed as a rental property for several years by Dale, generated more income than had been distributed to the brothers; and the language in the will which they construed as creating in Jean's real property a life estate for Mark. The court denied all of the Objector's objections and granted the Trustee's Petition to Approve the Accounting and the Dissolution of the Trust. The court also held that the trustee should submit a form of order consistent with the opinion within thirty calendar days.

This was an action for approval of accounting and termination of a testamentary trust. Jean I. Willey, the testator, had four sons: Todd, Mark, Scott, and Dale. Todd, filed a motion seeking approval of the trust accounting and the termination of Mark's supplemental needs trust, the corpus of which, according to Todd, was reduced to around $5,000 and should be turned over to Mark (via his guardians). The petition to approve the accounting and terminate the trust was opposed by Mark and Scott, together with Scott's wife (collectively, the "Objectors"). The Objectors made three objections to the Petition to Terminate the Estate: the gift of money from Jean to Todd during her lifetime worked an ademption on the bequest to Todd of a portion of the residue of Jean's estate; Jean's real property, which passed to the four brothers as co-tenants, and which was informally managed as a rental property for several years by Dale, generated more income than had been distributed to the brothers; and the language in the will which they construed as creating in Jean's real property a life estate for Mark. The court denied all of the Objector's objections and granted the Trustee's Petition to Approve the Accounting and the Dissolution of the Trust. The court also held that the trustee should submit a form of order consistent with the opinion within thirty calendar days.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the distribution formula of an irrevocable trust that Wilbert L. and Genevieve W. Gore set up for the benefit of their grandchildren (Pokeberry Trust). The court held that the October Instrument governed the Pokeberry Trust; the Pokeberry Formula would be applied to determine how the corpus of the trust would be distributed among the Gores' nineteen natural-born children; and Jan C. was neither a grandchild of the Gores for purposes of the Pokeberry Trust nor entitled to any relief other than what he was granted by the September Opinion. Counsel was requested to confer and to submit an implementing order.

This case stemmed from an adverse possession property dispute in Sussex County, Delaware. The court found that petitioners were, by at least 1980, aware of (and, therefore, on notice of) the claims of William Wiggins to the exclusive, fee simple ownership, as a surviving husband of Anna Wiggins, to attractive real property. The court also held that William's possession was known to plaintiffs at least by then to be exclusive as to them. Therefore, with these findings of fact, the rights of William and, thus, those claiming under him, including Parker Enterprises, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (Parker), now the only record owner of the property, to title by adverse possession, were hereby confirmed in light of passage of more than twenty years between 1980 and 2006, the date when this action was commenced. Accordingly, Parker had demonstrated that it was the fee simple owner of the property and that the remaining plaintiffs have no right to the property.

Pursuant to a 2005 divorce judgment, the court awarded Christiane McAllister possession of the couple's marital home and monthly spousal support that would cover the house expenses until October 2009. Christiane was required to refinance the house in her name no later than November 1, 2009, or, alternatively, sell the house. The first $63,000 of any remaining proceeds was to go to Christiane in lieu of alimony. Christiane filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment on October 29, 2009, asserting that she could not pay her normal living expenses after spousal support terminated because of a drop on the value of the house. The court modified the divorce judgment, ordering Russell McAllister to pay support for an additional 36 months. Russell appealed, arguing that the court (1) made an error of law by modifying a division of marital property, (2) abused its discretion in modifying spousal support based on a substantial change in circumstances, and (3) abused its discretion by granting relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Christiane was entitled to relief on the basis of a substantial change in circumstances, and that the grant of relief pursuant to 60(b)(6) was harmless error.

Virginia McClung appealed a circuit court judgment that reformed a deed that conveyed an interest in land to her and her brother. In 1979 Ms. McClungâs parents divorced. Their separation agreement conveyed two parcels of property to their adult children, Ms. McClung and Charles Green, as "tenants in common, reserving unto [the parents] a life estate therein." At that time, none of the parties recognized a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the actual deed, which conveyed the property to the siblings as "joint tenants with the right of survivorship." The deed was recorded, the parents divorced, and the divorce decree "ratified and confirmed" the separation agreement. In 1992, Charles Green died. His sole heir was his 21-year-old daughter, Bridget Williams. Loretta Green, Ms. McClungâs mother died in 2007 leaving Ms. McClung as her sole heir. Subsequently, a dispute arose between Senior Green and his daughter over who was entitled to the rental income Loretta had previously received from the property. The father sued his daughter seeking all rents received from the property. In his suit, Mr. Green argued that he and his ex-wife intended that his children take the property as tenants-in-common after his and Lorettaâs life estates expired. But owing to a mutual mistake, the deed had erroneously conveyed the property as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Mr. Greenâs granddaughter joined in the lawsuit because she inherited her fatherâs interest in the property if the court reformed the deed. A month after he commenced his suit, Mr. Green died. The trial court ruled in his (and his granddaughterâs) favor, and Ms. McClung appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial record, the court found that before the 1979 deed could be reformed, there must be evidence to indicate that Loretta Green did not intend to convey the property to her children as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Neither the separation agreement nor the recorded deed accurately reflected Lorettaâs intent at the time either document was executed. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial courtâs reformation of the 1979 deed was inappropriate. The Court reversed the lower courtâs decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

John Kelly appealed a divorce decree granting Christy Kelly a divorce, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in finding that Christy's stock in Tarco Roofing Materials (TRM) was nonmarital property, and (2) the circuit court erred in finding John liable for one-half of the deficiency resulting from the sale of the marital home. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding Christy acquired an enforceable right when she acquired her shares of TRM stock during her marriage, and therefore the circuit court erred in finding that the TRM stock was nonmarital property. Because the case was reversed for further proceedings relating to the division of property, the Court did not address John's second issue.