Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Joyce Anderson and Jerry Allen were involved in a long-term, non-marital relationship. Upon separation, the parties entered into a settlement agreement stating that each should have ownership of personal property in their respective possession. Allen later claimed some of the items Anderson took were his and filed a motion seeking recovery of those items through enforcement of the terms of the settlement agreement. The district court determined that Allen failed to claim the personal property at issue in a timely fashion and thus effectively abandoned his claim to it. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision that Allen had no claim to the property at issue but did so on separate grounds. The Court concluded that the settlement agreement granted ownership of the real property, including the shed in which the items at issue were located, to Anderson free of any claim or demand of Allen. All personal property on the land therefore was in Anderson's possession and granted to her under the terms of the settlement agreement.

Lucien Cabrel died in December 1963 and Cabrel's wife and four minor children were the recipients of a joint award of year's support in 1964. In 2000, Cabrel's two daughters filed a petition to partition real property in Henry and Spalding counties in which property the daughters claimed an interest by virtue of the 1964 joint award of year's support. The daughters also sought an accounting and to recover from their mother income generated by the property between 1964-1997. In Case No. S11A0212, the mother appealed the denial of summary judgment on the partitioning issue and in Case No. S11A0214, the daughters took issue with the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment, its failure to conduct a hearing on their motion for attorney fees, and its determinations that they were barred from having an accounting and were not entitled to prejudgment interest. The court held that since the motion to set aside was filed more than three years after the entry of judgment of partition and that judgment was made by a court with jurisdiction, the trial court did not err when it denied the mother's motion to set aside the judgment of partition. The court held also that the partitioning judgment was not appealed and the daughters cannot now complain that they had a greater interest in the property than that which was awarded in 2004; that the trial court did not err in concluding that the daughters were not entitled to income from the property where they did not meet certain contingencies; and that the trial court did not err when it did not award attorney fees since the daughters were not awarded any damages.

Husband and wife executed a will in 1980, which was expressly identified as being "joint and mutual," bequeathing all of their property to each other as the survivor in fee simple and at the death of the survivor, the residue of the estate was to be divided equally among husband's two children, David and Darrell, and wife's two children, Deana and Diane. After husband died in 2005, wife probated the 1980 will, became the executor, and conveyed husband's estate to herself. In November 2005, wife executed another will which could, at her death, leave 20% of the estate to appellant, Deana, and the residue to the children of Deana and Diane. Deana then obtained wife's power of attorney and conveyed all of her mother's real estate to her two children and to appellee, Diane's child. When wife died in 2008, Deana offered the 2005 will for probate and Diane filed a caveat and also sought to petition the 1980 will as the last will and testament. The court held that the trial court did not err when it applied the law in place before the 1998 probate code was adopted to determine whether husband and wife had a contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it concluded that the 1980 will was joint and mutual and that husband and wife had an enforceable contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it did not in fact find that the fee simple conveyance to wife was a marital trust; when it made no rulings as to whether wife's 2005 will was a contract, and as such, that issue could not be raised on appeal; and when the 1980 will specifically provided that the residue of the survivor's estate was to be divided equally among the four children. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order that the 1980 will would be specifically enforced by equity.

Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution in district court and the only contested issue between the parties was the valuation and division of the marital home and surrounding acreage, which was purchased for $45,000 in the mid-1990's. Petitioner had obtained a letter from a realtor stating that the marital home could be worth approximately $250,000-275,000 if the home was in good condition. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) motion, which was filed after the district court found the marital home was valued at $22,423, where petitioner alleged that her attorney grossly neglected her case when she failed to identify the realtor as an expert, or any other qualified real estate expert, and failed to prepare any evidence for trial to reflect petitioner's estimated value of the marital home. The court held that under the unique circumstances, where the district court had a statutory obligation to equitably apportion the marital estate and petitioner's counsel totally failed to present evidence on the issue, the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion and should have granted the motion, thereby allowing her to present evidence regarding the value of the marital home so that the district court could make an equitable distribution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.