Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Carol Einsel filed a petition for partition against Rodney Einsel, her ex-husband. The ownership interests at stake involved the Einsel family ranch, which consisted mostly of land and mineral interests. Carol’s claim derived from a journal entry of divorce in the parties’ earlier divorce proceedings. The judge had awarded Carol forty percent of Rodney’s remainder interest in the inheritance he received during the marriage. Before the partition court, the parties primarily argued over whether Carol’s award was an interest in a money judgment or an interest in real property. The partition court found that Carol’s interest in Rodney’s inheritance was $27,521 and granted her a judgment in this amount. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the award was an interest in real property - not a money judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals reached the correct conclusion regarding the nature of Carol’s award - an interest in real property. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Einsel" on Justia Law

Respondent Steven Allen appealed a superior court order granting a petition to partition real property and for other equitable relief filed by petitioner Renee Brooks, and denying respondent’s cross-petition to partition. Petitioner and respondent lived together for approximately twenty years from 1993 to 2013, except for an 18-month period of separation in 2006-2007. From 1998 through early 2013, the parties lived together in a home in Atkinson. In 2003, the parties, as joint borrowers, entered into a home equity credit agreement secured by a mortgage on the Atkinson property. The November 1998 mortgage in respondent’s name alone was discharged. Under the terms of the credit agreement, each party was individually liable for the full amount of the credit line. Respondent, however, was in control of the credit line and he alone withdrew funds from it. In 2007, the parties, as joint tenants, purchased a property in Northwood, New Hampshire. Respondent obtained a mortgage on the property in his name only. The parties refinanced the Northwood property several times. In 2013, petitioner moved out of the Atkinson property when she received a letter from respondent’s attorney notifying her that if she did not leave she would be evicted. Upon the advice of his attorney, respondent withdrew the remaining balance of approximately $59,000 on the 2012 Atkinson credit line so that petitioner could not access those funds. In March 2013, petitioner filed a two-count petition to partition. In count one, petitioner requested that the trial court order that the Northwood property be sold and that the net proceeds from the sale be distributed equally between the parties. In count two, petitioner requested, among other things, that the trial court “[e]quitably determine” each party’s interest and rights in the Atkinson property, each party’s liability for any debts or loans jointly entered into, and each party’s liability for any debts or loans entered into by the petitioner, whose funds were used by the respondent “individually, or by the parties jointly, to invest in or maintain real estate.” Respondent cross-petitioned, requesting that the trial court assign the Northwood property to him, and dismiss count two of petitioner’s petition. After review of the superior court's order, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Brooks v. Allen" on Justia Law

Respondent Steven Allen appealed a superior court order granting a petition to partition real property and for other equitable relief filed by petitioner Renee Brooks, and denying respondent’s cross-petition to partition. Petitioner and respondent lived together for approximately twenty years from 1993 to 2013, except for an 18-month period of separation in 2006-2007. From 1998 through early 2013, the parties lived together in a home in Atkinson. In 2003, the parties, as joint borrowers, entered into a home equity credit agreement secured by a mortgage on the Atkinson property. The November 1998 mortgage in respondent’s name alone was discharged. Under the terms of the credit agreement, each party was individually liable for the full amount of the credit line. Respondent, however, was in control of the credit line and he alone withdrew funds from it. In 2007, the parties, as joint tenants, purchased a property in Northwood, New Hampshire. Respondent obtained a mortgage on the property in his name only. The parties refinanced the Northwood property several times. In 2013, petitioner moved out of the Atkinson property when she received a letter from respondent’s attorney notifying her that if she did not leave she would be evicted. Upon the advice of his attorney, respondent withdrew the remaining balance of approximately $59,000 on the 2012 Atkinson credit line so that petitioner could not access those funds. In March 2013, petitioner filed a two-count petition to partition. In count one, petitioner requested that the trial court order that the Northwood property be sold and that the net proceeds from the sale be distributed equally between the parties. In count two, petitioner requested, among other things, that the trial court “[e]quitably determine” each party’s interest and rights in the Atkinson property, each party’s liability for any debts or loans jointly entered into, and each party’s liability for any debts or loans entered into by the petitioner, whose funds were used by the respondent “individually, or by the parties jointly, to invest in or maintain real estate.” Respondent cross-petitioned, requesting that the trial court assign the Northwood property to him, and dismiss count two of petitioner’s petition. After review of the superior court's order, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Brooks v. Allen" on Justia Law

Attorney Irene Schrunk represented Mary Ellen Nylen in a divorce and was involved subsequent legal matters regarding Mary Ellen and her new husband, Mark Nylen. When Mark served Mary Ellen with a summons and complaint for divorce, Schrunk advised Mary Ellen that Schrunk could not represent her because Schrunk had represented Mark in the past. On July 31, 2014, Mary Ellen’s adult children, Molly and Brendon, commenced this action against Mary Ellen seeking a declaration that Mary Ellen had gifted them personal property. Molly and Brendon sought to depose Schrunk regarding communications she had with Mary Ellen between November 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014. Mary Ellen moved to prohibit the discovery, citing the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The circuit court determined that the initial communications were privileged but did not extend the privilege to communications and documents shared with Schrunk after January 1, 2014. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mary Ellen failed to meet her burden of proving entitlement to the attorney-client privilege after January 1, 2014, and Mary Ellen waived the privilege with respect to certain documents when she shared with Schrunk privileged communications between Mary Ellen and her current attorneys. View "Nylen v. Nylen" on Justia Law

Husband appealed the trial court's finding of a family home as community property and award of reimbursement of husband's separate property contributions under Family Code section 2640. The trial court also charged husband for the fair market rental value of the home from the time wife moved out to the date of judgment. In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that if property is acquired during marriage with both separate and community funds, the transmutation requirements of section 852 must be satisfied before the reimbursement provisions of section 2640 apply. In this case, the documents do not contain an express transmutation of husband’s separate property, and therefore, husband’s separate property contributions remained husband’s separate property. Husband held a separate property interest in the property proportionate to the separate property funds that he contributed. View "Bonvino v. Bonvino" on Justia Law

Gary Wooten purchased property before marrying Iracy Wooten. Gary subsequently executed a deed of trust to secure a loan. Thereafter, Gary conveyed the property to himself and Iracy as tenants by the entirety. Approximately two weeks later, the lender recorded the deed of trust executed solely by Gary. Five years later, the lender filed suit against Gary and Iracy seeking a judicial reformation of the deed of trust to include Iracy as grantor or to declare her interest in the property to be encumbered by the deed of trust. Iracy responded that she knew nothing of the deed of trust or the loan and first learned of them during divorce proceedings with Gary. Meanwhile, a final divorce decree was entered ordering that the property be sold and any remaining proceeds be divided equally between the parties. In the lender’s proceeding, the lender argued that Iracy was judicially estopped from denying that her interest was subject to Gary’s deed of trust and that the divorce decree justified this conclusion. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the lender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel based solely upon the divorce decree. Remanded. View "Wooten v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

This dispute concerns the real estate partnership interest that husband and wife own. Husband had owned the interest before marrying wife. The court held that when a spouse places separate property in joint title form, the transmutation requirements of Family Code section 852 must be satisfied before the joint title presumption of Family Code section 2581 applies. In this case, the documents do not contain an express transmutation of husband's separate property interest in the partnership, and therefore, it remained husband's separate property. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court asked the parties for additional briefing on the character of loan proceeds received by the partnership after the modification. The court remanded for the trial court to determine whether the lenders intended to rely on the parties' community property to satisfy the loans. View "In re: Marriage of Lafkas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alan Benefiel and Christa Benefiel were divorced by a consent decree entered in 2005. Consistent with the terms of the parties' divorce decree, Plaintiff executed a quit claim deed, transferring title in the former marital residence to Christa. In exchange for relinquishing his ownership interest in the property, the decree required Christa to pay Plaintiff $25,000.00 as alimony in lieu of property division. Payments were structured incrementally over a period of four years; $10,000 was due in 2005, and $5,000 was payable on January 31 for years 2006, 2007, and 2008. As security for the property division judgment, Plaintiff was awarded a lien encumbering the residence. The lien was to remain in effect until all payments were completed. Further, the decree contained a clause which vested Plaintiff with the right to immediate title and possession of the property should Christa fail to timely remit any of the annual installments Prior to paying the final installment, Christa sold the subject real property to a third-party, Jewel Boulton. Boulton paid $17,000.00 as a down payment and financed the remainder of the purchase price. Though the divorce decree had not been filed with the local county clerk, it was made a part of the abstract of title. Despite its inclusion in the abstract, a title opinion issued prior to closing failed to identify the divorce judgment as a potential cloud or defect. Christa failed to make the final property division installment due on January 31, 2008. Plaintiff filed suit against both Boulton and Christa, asserting several claims, including demands to quiet title and to allow foreclosure of the lien. In her Answer, Boulton maintained that Plaintiff had no right, title, or interest in the house and that his lien from the divorce decree was ineffective and void. Both Boulton and Plaintiff sought summary judgment. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, finding: (1) the divorce decree created a valid "mortgage lien" against the property; (2) Christa defaulted on the property division obligation; and (3) in accordance with the divorce decree, Christa's default resulted in the automatic reversion of title to Plaintiff. In a prior appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals invalidated the reversionary clause, but found the property was subject to a valid lien. On remand, Boulton invoked her statutory right of redemption, under 42 O.S. 20, by paying the underlying obligation plus interest; however, Boulton's discharge of the lien was not accomplished for more than three years after litigation was commenced. Thus, Plaintiff was the prevailing party on the lien foreclosure claim. After its review, the Supreme Court held that Boulton's redemption of the subject property occurred when she tendered both the underlying $5,000.00 obligation and the accumulated interest owed thereon. The Court of Appeals' opinion was thus vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Benefiel v. Boulton" on Justia Law

The Avakians purchased a house with a loan secured by a properly executed deed of trust. The property was their homestead, where they lived together. Citibank refinanced the loan. Unlike the original loan, the refinancing note only listed Norair as the debtor. Citibank required that the Avakians execute another deed of trust. Norair signed the Citibank deed of trust. The next day, Burnette signed an identical deed of trust. The deeds of trust did not mention each other, and did not refer to signature of counterpart documents. Citibank recorded them as separate instruments. The Avakians received a loan modification. Around the time of Norair’s death, Burnette received notice that Citibank was taking steps to foreclose. After Norair’s death, Burnette sought a declaratory judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Burnette, finding that, because the two were living together when they signed the Citibank deeds of trust, the instruments were invalid. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under Mississippi law, a deed of trust on a homestead is void if it is not signed by both spouses, but the Mississippi Supreme Court would likely hold that a valid deed of trust is created when husband and wife contemporaneously sign separate, identical instruments. View "Avakian v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant Richard Hardie borrowed money from Brattleboro Savings & Loan Association in order to purchase a vacation home in Weathersfield. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the property and included a "second home rider" clause, asserting that the property was not a primary residence. Hardie was married to intervenor-appellee Lisa Mangini at the time, but was the sole owner of the property, and Mangini did not sign either the promissory note or the mortgage. Hardie twice refinanced the property without Mangini's participation, both with second home riders. By 2007, Hardie and Mangini's marriage was deteriorating. Mangini left the couple's New Jersey home and moved into the Weathersfield property. In 2008, Mangini filed for divorce in Vermont. In her divorce filing, Mangini claimed that the property had become her primary residence as of May 2007. Also in the divorce filing, Mangini requested "an award of the Weathersfield home and the adjoining land either without any encumbrances, or, in the alternative, that [Hardie] be responsible for paying off and releasing the mortgage[] to [Brattleboro Savings]." While Mangini was occupying the property and the divorce was pending, Hardie refinanced the mortgage on the Weathersfield property. The 2008 refinancing was completed without Mangini's participation, and Hardie again claimed that the property was a second home. In 2011, Brattleboro Savings commenced a foreclosure action on the property, naming only Hardie as a defendant. Despite not being named in the foreclosure case, Mangini filed an answer asserting an affirmative defense that she had established a homestead interest in the property prior to the 2008 mortgage, and that therefore the 2008 mortgage was "inoperative to convey" her homestead interest. Brattleboro Savings filed two motions for summary judgment, one requesting a foreclosure judgment against Hardie and the second seeking judgment against Mangini on her homestead claim. Mangini filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, detailing for the first time her claim that she had acquired an equitable interest in the property by her divorce filing. Brattleboro Savings appealed a superior court's decision denying its motions for summary judgment and granting Mangini's cross-motion for summary judgment, finding that Mangini held title to the Weathersfield property free and clear of a mortgage to plaintiff. The superior court ruled that the mortgage was inoperative because Hardie, mortgaged the property without the participation of Mangini in violation of 27 V.S.A. section 141(a). Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of Mangini's motion for summary judgment and the denial of Brattleboro Saving's motions for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brattleboro Savings & Loan Assn. v. Hardie, et al." on Justia Law