Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1999, Klein and Weidner divorced in California. Weidner was ordered to pay spousal and child support. He made some child support payments but had paid no spousal support, when Klein filed suit, resulting in a 2008, judgment that he owed $548,797.07 in unpaid spousal and child support. Klein later challenged, under the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Weidner’s 2006 transfer of Pennsylvania real estate to himself and his new wife as tenants by the entirety. The district court granted Klein summary judgment and awarded $548,797.07 in punitive damages; the Weidners were ordered to execute a deed transferring the property back to Weidner in fee simple by January 15, 2010. Klein also successfully attacked Weidner’s transfer of an ownership interest in a company, DMW, and attempted to pierce DMW’s corporate veil. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the new wife was not a good faith transferee and that the Pennsylvania statute does authorize an award of punitive damages. View "Klein v. Weidner" on Justia Law

Relatives of Bradford Lund (collectively, Miller) sought the appointment of a guardian and conservator to manage Bradford's assets. Bradford, his father, and his stepfather (collectively, the Lunds) opposed the appointment. Miller's counsel subsequently served a law firm that previously represented Bradford (JS&S) with a subpoena requesting all non-privileged information relating to Bradford. JS&S mistakenly delivered the entire client file to counsel without reviewing it for privileged information. Eventually, the trial court decided to review the documents in camera before ruling on whether each document was privileged. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding (1) before reviewing a particular document, a trial court must first determine that an in camera review is necessary to resolve the privilege claim; and (2) the trial court in this case erred by ruling that it would review all the documents to determine whether they were privileged without considering the parties' arguments regarding privilege and waiver to determine whether in camera review was warranted for particular documents before reviewing them. Remanded. View "Lund v. Myers" on Justia Law

Carl and Karen were married in 1993. In 1995, Karen made Carl a co-owner of certain property. In 2007, the county clerk recorded a quit claim deed transferring Carl's interest in the property back to Karen. When the parties divorced in 2009, the district court concluded that Karen was the owner of the property and that the $100,000 increase in the property's value from 1993 to 2009 was due to market force and had nothing to do with any contributions made by Carl. In 2012, Carl filed a complaint alleging that Karen fraudulently forged Carl's signature on the deed to the property and that Alta, another defendant, notarized the forged signature. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims had run. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Carl's fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations; but (2) erred by awarding fees and costs to Defendants. View "Kananen v. South" on Justia Law

After Edwin and Linda divorced, Linda obtained a New Jersey judgment ordering Edwin to pay $695,477 in unpaid alimony, unpaid child support, medical expenses, and attorney fees and costs. Linda subsequently filed a motion seeking to satisfy the New Jersey judgment with Edwin's interest in a Nevada limited liability corporation (BMR) licensed to do business in Montana and with assets in Montana. A writ of execution was issued against Edwin, and thereafter, the district court issued a charging order and an order for the appointment of a receiver, for foreclosure of the lien, and for the sale of BMR's property. Edwin subsequently filed a motion for relief from the charging order and order for the appointment of the receiver foreclosure of the lien, which the district court denied after concluding that Edwin's arguments were waived because he had foregone earlier opportunities to challenge the two orders on the bases he asserted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the law of the case doctrine to deny Edwin's motion; and (2) because Edwin's appeal was vexatious and filed for the purposes of delay, costs and fees assessed should be solely levied against Edwin. Remanded. View "Jonas v. Jonas" on Justia Law

In 1996, the district court ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff child support. In 2006, the court issued a writ of execution against Defendant's unspecified property to satisfy the child support lien. However, Defendant had conveyed the property to his girlfriend by quitclaim deed. In 2008, Plaintiff filed a second praecipe for an execution on Defendant's property, seeking an execution sale of the property that Defendant had previously owned and alleging that when the quitclaim conveyances were made, the property was subject to her lien. The court ordered the sheriff to execute on the property, and the sheriff sold the property to Plaintiff. John McWilliams challenged the sale, alleging that when the court issued the writ of execution, he was the record owner, and therefore, the court could not order the sheriff to conduct the execution sale because the property was not titled in Defendant's name. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order confirming the sale, holding that the court lacked authority to order the sheriff to levy the writ on property in which Defendant, the judgment debtor, no longer had an interest, absent any finding that Defendant's transfer of the property was fraudulent. Remanded. View "Fox v . Whitbeck" on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, the district court ordered Father to pay child support. After Father failed to make child support payments, the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) of the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) placed a support lien on all of his property. After Father and Mother's divorce, Mother married Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Mother subsequently divorced pursuant to a final decree of dissolution in which Mother assigned to Plaintiff her interest in the child support lien. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced a proceeding against Father seeking to foreclose on the CSED support lien. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ordering that Plaintiff could foreclose on the child support lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was precluded from obtaining an enforceable interest in the support lien, as, under Montana law, the Department alone held the rights to and was authorized to foreclose on the child support lien. Remanded. View "LeCount v. Davis" on Justia Law

In this criminal fraud case, defendant appealed from the district court's order denying his motion to release $3.7 million in assets that were frozen in a parallel civil enforcement action. Defendant and his wife had purchased a house in her name using funds unrelated to the alleged fraud. Pursuant to the divorce settlement, defendant received title to the house and gave his wife a $12.5 million distribution award, at least $6 million of which was directly traceable to defendant's alleged fraud. The court held that the district court properly applied the tracing analysis from United States v. Banco-Cafetero. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court made two related erroneous evidentiary rulings at the Monsanto hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Walsh" on Justia Law

In an appeal from a final divorce decree, respondent William Muller challenged the trial court's rulings apportioning the equity in the marital home and imputing $68,000 in annual income to him for child support. Upon review, the Supreme Court partly affirmed, partly vacated, and remanded the case for further proceedings: "[b]ecause the mortgage interest at issue here belongs to a third party, the family division lacked the jurisdiction to invalidate it. Our holding today does not imply that the family division lacks jurisdiction to divide an encumbered asset . . . However, when dividing such property pursuant to RSA 458:16-a, the family division does not have the jurisdiction to disregard or invalidate a third party's claim of interest in marital property." Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's order for the sale of, and distribution of the equity in, the marital home. With regard to the child support issue raised by respondent, the Court found his arguments unpersuasive, and affirmed the trial court's order with respect to that issue. View "In the Matter of Gabrielle Muller and William Muller" on Justia Law

Defendant Donna Mae Peck appealed a superior court judgment that granted plaintiff Victor Shattuck a writ of possession for the parties' former residence in Cavendish and that denied her counterclaim for an equitable interest in the Cavendish property and another former residence in Springfield. Between December 1997 and June 1999, plaintiff purchased two adjoining parcels of land in Cavendish. He made most of the payments for the first parcel, but defendant made a significant financial contribution toward payment of the second parcel. In 2001, plaintiff conveyed the Cavendish properties to himself and defendant as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, and defendant conveyed the Springfield property to herself and plaintiff as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The parties lived together in Cavendish until June 2010, when plaintiff decided to end their relationship. Following an angry confrontation, defendant obtained a relief-from-abuse order against plaintiff and was awarded sole possession of the Cavendish property. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in superior court seeking to evict defendant from the Cavendish property. Defendant answered and counterclaimed, alleging that the Cavendish and Springfield properties were the subject of a partnership agreement between the parties. Alleging that she had been induced to convey the Springfield properties by plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentations, she also sought equitable relief through imposition of a resulting or constructive trust. She later claimed that the Cavendish property was also held in a constructive trust for her benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court: "pursuant to the principles of equity, not every unmarried cohabitant who confers an economic benefit on his or her partner is entitled to payback if the relationship ends. In this case, defendant may or may not ultimately be entitled to restitution, whether in the form of a constructive trust or a money judgment, for her substantial investments in the Cavendish and Springfield properties, and any such judgment could well be subject to offsets for benefits received." View "Shattuck v. Peck" on Justia Law

The United States obtained a judgment for restitution of more than $85 million against Lawrence Duran for crimes that he committed in a conspiracy to defraud Medicare. After the United States obtained a writ of execution against an apartment that, according to property records, was owned jointly by Lawrence and his former wife, Carmen Duran, she moved to dissolve or stay the writ on the ground that she had acquired sole title to the property as part of their divorce settlement several months before his prosecution. The district court denied the motion without prejudice on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction. Because the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 28 U.S.C. 3203(a), provided that the United States could levy only property in which a judgment debtor had a substantial nonexempt interest, the district court erred in refusing to adjudicate Carmen's motion. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Duran" on Justia Law