Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Benefit Bank appealed from the circuit court's order finding that the mortgage it held to certain property was second and subordinate to the interest of Appellee Marilyn Rogers obtained in her divorce. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the circuit court erred in finding that Appellee's interest was prior to Appellant's interest because the divorce court lacked authority to impose a lien on real property to secure alimony payments. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order, holding (1) the divorce court did not lack the authority to impose the lien as it did, where it was stipulated to by the divorcing parties; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that the lis pendens filed by Appellee created or perfected a lien. View "Benefit Bank v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted further review of this dissolution-of-marriage case to consider the proper distribution of a retired spouse's monthly pension benefits. The district court awarded the entirety of those benefits to the retired spouse. The court of appeals reversed and divided the benefits between the spouses to the extent they were accrued during the marriage. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision in part and affirmed the district court's judgment as modified, holding that the court of appeals did not err in ruling that the benefits should have been divided but erred in dividing the benefits without taking into account the remaining allocation of property between the parties. Remanded. View "In re Marriage of O'Brien" on Justia Law

Daniel King, the substitute defendant and administrator of the estate of David Berzins (administrator), appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff, Mary Berzins. The administrator appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly relied on Ramin v. Ramin to grant the plaintiff's motion for sanctions and attorney's fees. Ramin held that a court has discretion to award attorney's fees to party who incurs those fees due to the other party's egregious litigation misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's award of attorney's fees did not fall within the scope of Ramin, as the phrase "egregious litigation misconduct" was limited to discovery misconduct; and (2) the court did not act within its inherent authority in awarding attorney's fees for filing frivolous and duplicative postjudgment motions because it failed to make a finding that the administrator had acted in bad faith as defined in Maris v. McGrath. View "Berzins v. Berzins" on Justia Law

Arla Johnson deeded farmland to her daughter Linda, and son-in-law, Claude Miller. Linda subsequently filed for divorce from Claude. Arla then sued Claude, claiming she was fraudulently induced by him into deeding the land. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Claude. Claude appealed the denial of his motion for attorney’s fees. On appeal, Claude argued Arla's suit was malicious and frivolous, and therefore when the trial court ruled in his favor, he was entitled to attorney's fees. The Supreme Court deferred to the trial court's discretion when it decided the suit was not malicious or frivolous, and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Miller" on Justia Law

When Sean and Dee Anna Ryan divorced, they agreed to sell two properties they owned and divide the proceeds, subject to a proviso that neither party was required to accept a sale yielding net proceeds below specified minimums. When the properties could not be sold at or above the specified minimums, Dee Anna refused to waive the proviso. Sean filed a motion for relief from judgment, seeking a court order that the properties be sold at prevailing fair market value and the private agreement be declared of no further force and effect. The trial court denied Sean's request. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) general rules applicable to contract construction dictated that Dee Anna was not required to agree to sell the properties for net proceeds less than the amounts set forth in the parties' agreement; and (2) Sean was not entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B), under which a court may relieve a party from a judgment. View "Ryan v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Blonde appealed denial of his motion to stay pending appeal after a probate judge appointed a special master for the purpose of selling the parties' former marital home. The property has since been sold. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. Blonde had the opportunity to appeal to a panel of the appeals court. He also could have requested that the appeals court expedite such an appeal. An exercise of the court's “extraordinary power” is not necessary because he did not attempt to pursue ordinary appellate remedies. A stay pending appeal was not required and the request for a stay of that aspect of the judgment has become moot.View "Blonde. v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tracy Walbridge appealed a superior court order that denied her petition to establish her homestead right exempt from the mortgage held by Respondents the Estate of Raymond Beaudoin, Jr. and its co-administrators Steven Beaudoin and Raymond Beaudoin, III. Petitioner owned property in Rochester that she purchased with her then-husband. At that time, it was undeveloped land. Petitioner executed a mortgage on the property and released her homestead rights to that property. Allegedly unbeknownst to Petitioner, her husband executed a mortgage deed and promissory note on the property in favor of the decedent Raymond Beaudoin once a home was built there. The mortgage on the property did not list it as part of the homestead of the mortgagor. Petitioner and her husband divorced, and pursuant to the divorce decree, she was awarded all right, title and interest in the property. The property was foreclosed upon. Petitioner filed a petition to establish that her homestead right to the property was exempt from Respondents' mortgage. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that her homestead right in the property was not established until she actually, physically occupied it. She contended that her "obvious intention of present and immediate occupancy of the home . . . followed by [her] actual occupancy within a reasonable time, was equivalent to actual occupancy." The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court. View "Walbridge v. The Estate of Raymond A. Beaudoin, Jr." on Justia Law

Wife and husband were married in 1998 and wife filed a complaint for divorce in 2008. The parties resolved all issues by agreement except the disposition of certain real property which was purchased by wife prior to the marriage. In 2005, wife transferred the property into a family trust for the benefit of her three children. Considering the lack of any evidence of the value of the maintenance work performed by husband, the testimony of wife that he was paid for this work, the fact that husband used a portion of the property rent-free as a commercial recording studio, and the fact that the property paid for the mortgage through its own rents, the trial court had evidentiary support for its finding that any increased value in the property attributable to husband's contributions and the expenditure of marital funds was nominal. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion to divide the marital property equitably.

This appeal grew out of an adversary proceeding in debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint against debtor and her husband, claiming that certain money and property belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate. The trustee sought turnover to the bankruptcy estate of certain proceedings from the sale of the couple's homestead, a rental property held in the husband's name, and income earned from the rental property. The bankruptcy court rejected all of the trustee's claims and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The court concluded that the proceeds of the homestead sale belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate but that the rental property held in the husband's name and the income did not. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.

This case concerned the ownership of James "Jim" and Terrie Gottstein’s former marital home. Jim paid for the property, but Terrie’s name alone was on the deed. The Gottsteins lived in the home for 15 years before moving out; they later separated. Terrie entered into a deal to sell the property to another couple, the Krafts, for significantly less than its appraised value, and Jim objected. One month before closing, Jim recorded a notice of interest under AS 34.15.010, which forbid a spouse from selling "the family home or homestead" without the consent of the other spouse. Neither the Krafts nor Terrie knew about the notice of interest, and the sale went ahead as planned. Following the sale, Jim filed suit against the Krafts, requesting that the superior court recognize his ownership interest in the property. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Krafts. The superior court concluded that it was not "the family home or homestead," rendering Jim’s notice of interest under AS 34.15.010 ineffectual. Jim appealed, arguing: (1) that the statute protected his interest in the property; (2) that the Krafts had constructive notice of his interest and therefore were not bona fide purchasers; and (3) that Jim has an equitable interest in the property and the superior court was mistaken in not granting his request for an equitable remedy. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the phrase "family home or homestead" in AS 34.15.010 refers to a family’s residence. Because the disputed property was vacant, and the couple had moved to another home at the time of sale, it did not fall under the spousal consent requirement of AS 34.15.010(b). Jim thus did not put the Krafts on notice of any legally valid claim to the property.