Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

CSX Transportation requested indemnification from the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) for the amount paid to resolve a negligence action arising from an accident at a railroad crossing. CSX based its request on a railroad crossing agreement under which the DOT received a revocable license to use land as a right-of-way. The sole consideration for the license was an agreement to indemnify the railroad for losses arising out of DOT’s activity on the land. The trial court required DOT to indemnify CSX for the settlement of the lawsuit and for the expenses arising from DOT’s failure to defend the suit. DOT appealed, arguing that the indemnity clause was invalid. The Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the indemnity clause was enforceable. The Second District then certified two questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) DOT is bound by the indemnity provision as party of the statutorily authorized railroad crossing agreement, and breach-of-contract principles prohibit DOT from using sovereign immunity to avoid suit for its breach of the crossing agreement; and (2) DOT’s liability under the crossing agreement is not limited by Fla. Stat. 768.28(5). View "Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Schwefringhaus" on Justia Law

This case arose from the claims of a group of owners of land abutting a railroad corridor who claimed that conveyances to the railroad by their predecessors in title granted only easements for a railroad right-of-way rather than convey fee simple title, that the abandonment of the railroad right-of-way entitled them to claim the land free of the easements, and that the conversion of the land to a public recreational trail constituted a taking for which they were entitled to compensation. The United States Court of Federal Claims found that the claimants did not own any property interests in the land formerly used as a railroad corridor and, therefore, were not entitled to compensation. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit certified a question of Florida law for the Supreme Court to answer. The Supreme Court answered (1) Fla. Rev. Stat. 2241 does not limit the railroad’s interest in the property, regardless of the language of the deeds; (2) state policy does not limit the railroad’s interest in the property, regardless of the language of the deeds; and (3) factual considerations do not limit the railroad’s interest in the property, regardless of the language of the deeds. View "Rogers v. United States" on Justia Law

Landowners rejected a condemning authority’s (the Authority) presuit written offer to purchase a parcel of their land. The Authority subsequently filed an action to condemn the property. After a jury determined the fair market value of the land, Landowners moved for attorney’s fees. The trial court awarded fees under Fla. Rev. Stat. 73.092(2). The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the attorney’s fees for the valuation proceedings were limited to those allowed by section 73.092(1). On remand, the trial court found that the Authority had caused excessive litigation and held that section 73.092(1) was unconstitutional as applied under the facts of this case because it operated to deny Landowners their right to full compensation. It then determined that the original fee award remained valid. The Court of Appeal again reversed on appeal. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fifth District, holding (1) when a condemning authority engages in tactics that cause excessive litigation, section 73.092(2) shall be used separately and additionally to calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee for the hours attributable to defending against the excessive litigation; and (2) this will result in an amount that must be added to the remainder of the fee calculated utilizing the benefits achieved formula delineated in section 73.092(1). Remanded. View "Joseph B. Doerr Trust v. Cent. Fla. Expressway Auth." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the land and improvements on certain leaseholds that were created under long-term leases granted by Santa Rosa County were subject to the ad valorem real property tax. The leaseholders argued that the leasehold interests were taxable only as intangible personal property because the leaseholders were not the actual owners of the property under Florida law, and there could be no equitable ownership absent the right to acquire legal title. The First District Court of Appeals concluded that, given the nature of their perpetual leasehold interests, the leaseholders were the equitable owners of the real property and the improvements thereon, and therefore, the land and improvements at issue were subject to the ad valorem real property tax. The Supreme Court approved of the decision reached by the First District, concluding that the leaseholders were the equitable owners of the real property at issue. View "Accardo v. Brown" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were improvements on certain leaseholds that were created under leases granted by Escambia County. The leaseholders (Petitioners) contended that the improvements were not subject to ad valorem taxation. The First District Court of Appeal determined that Petitioners were the equitable owners of the improvements, and therefore, the improvements were subject to ad valorem taxation. The Supreme Court approved the decision reached by the First District, holding that a lessee can have equitable ownership for purposes of ad valorem taxation of improvements on real property even if the lessees have neither a perpetual lease of the underlying real property nor an option to ultimately purchase such property for nominal value. View "1108 Ariola, LLC v. Jones" on Justia Law

Buyers purchased two condominium units pursuant to contracts entered into in 2006. Buyers later contended that the contracts were voidable because Seller failed to maintain Buyers’ deposits in escrow in the manner required by the Condominium Act (the Act). The trial court dismissed the claims against Seller. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding (1) the contracts were voidable under the escrow provisions of the Act that were in force in 2006; and (2) the application of a 2010 amendment to the Act that was intended to have retroactive effect and that removed a statutory ground for determining that the contracts were voidable violated the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of vested contractual rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2010 amendment did not make a substantive change in the law; and (2) the contracts were not voidable under the statutory provisions in force in 2006. View "N. Carillon, LLC v. CRC 603, LLC" on Justia Law

The Developer of a subdivision of a larger condominium complex (Complex) and the Complex sued the condominium association (Association), alleging that the Association failed to pay the Developer and Complex related expenses for common areas after collecting fees and assessments collected from owners of the condominium units. The Developer subsequently filed an emergency motion for the appointment of a receiver over the Association in order to facilitate the collection of the fees and assessments and to perform a proper accounting. The trial court concluded that it lacked the statutory authority to appoint a receiver in this instance. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred as a matter of law because its right to appoint a receiver in this case was inherent in a court of equity, not a statutorily created right. The Supreme Court approved of the appellate court's decision, holding that a court's inherent equitable power to appoint a receiver over a non-profit condominium association like the Association was not limited to certain statutorily enumerated circumstances. View "Granada Lakes Villas Condo. Ass'n v. MetroDade Invs. Co." on Justia Law

Lakeview Reserve Homeowners Association filed an action against Maronda Homes for breach of the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability, also referred to as the implied warranty of habitability in the residential construction context. The underlying cause of action arose from alleged defects in the construction and development of a residential subdivision that Maronda Homes and T.D. Thomson Construction Company developed. Lakeview Reserve served as the homeonwers association of the division. Maronda Homes filed a third-party complaint against T.D. Thomson for indemnification based on the alleged violations by Maronda Homes. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Maronda Homes and T.D. Thompson, finding that the common law implied warranties of fitness and merchantability do not extend to the construction and design of the private roadways, infrastructure, or any other common areas in a residential subdivision. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the common law warranty of habitability applied in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability applied to the improvements that provided essential services to the homeowners association. Remanded. View "Maronda Homes, Inc. of Fla. v. Lakeview Reserve Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this case, the circuit court entered a final summary judgment of foreclosure against Borrowers regarding their shared residence. One month before the scheduled judicial foreclosure sale, Chase Home Finance, Borrowers' mortgagee, offered Borrowers an opportunity for the reinstatement of their mortgage and dismissal of the foreclosure action conditioned on Borrowers making a lump-sum payment no later than May 6. Borrowers sent a cashier's check for the full reinstatement amount to Chase's counsel, who received the cashier's check on May 4. However, Chase's counsel failed to arrange for the cancellation of the foreclosure sale, and the sale took place as scheduled. Borrowers filed a motion to vacate the sale. The third-party purchaser (Purchaser) intervened. The trial court granted Borrowers' motion and ordered all funds paid by Purchaser to be returned. The final judgment of foreclosure was also vacated and the foreclosure case dismissed. Purchaser appealed, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Borrowers alleged and proved adequate equitable grounds for the trial court to set aside the judicial foreclosure sale and dismiss the foreclosure action; and (2) proof of an inadequate bid price is not a necessary requirement to set aside a judicial foreclosure sale. View "Arsali v. Chase Home Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court considered whether a municipal ordinance may validly establish superpriority status for municipal code enforcement liens. The court of appeal concluded that such an ordinance superpriority provision was invalid because it conflicted with a state statute and that the City's lien accordingly did not have priority over the lien of Wells Fargo's mortgage that was recorded before the City's lien was recorded. The City appealed, arguing that the ordinance superpriority provision within the "broad home rule powers" of the City. The Supreme Court accepted certification and concluded that the court of appeal correctly decided the ordinance superpriority provision was invalid because it conflicted with state law. View "City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo, N.A." on Justia Law