Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

EB Acquisitions I (EB) entered into a written contract to purchase real property from DK Arena. The parties orally agreed to modify their contract for the sale of the property by extending the due diligence deadline. After the original due diligence period expired, EB attempted to terminate the contract of sale and sought a return of its deposit. DK Arena filed suit alleging breach of contract. EB asserted several counterclaims, including breach of contract. The trial court held in favor of EB on all claims, concluding that the oral agreement was valid and enforceable, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The court ruled that EB retained an unqualified right to terminate the contract and obtain the return of its deposit. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court to the extent it was inconsistent with this opinion, holding that the district court applied an improper estoppel exception to the Statute of Frauds in express and direct conflict with the Court's decision in Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, Inc. Remanded. View "DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant, who had defaulted on his mortgage, sought to have a notice of voluntary dismissal of the mortgage foreclosure action struck and the case reinstated for the trial court to then dismiss the action with prejudice as a sanction to the mortgage holder for allegedly filing fraudulent documentation regarding ownership of the mortgage note. The court of appeal held that a trial court lacks the authority to set aside a plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal at the request of a defendant where the plaintiff has not obtained any affirmative relief before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer a question of public importance and held that when a defendant alleges fraud on the court as a basis for seeking to set aside a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal, the trial court has jurisdiction to reinstate the dismissed action only when the fraud, if proven, resulted in the plaintiff securing affirmative relief to the detriment of the defendant and, upon obtaining that relief, voluntarily dismissing the case to prevent the trial court from undoing the improperly obtained relief. View "Pino v. Bank of New York" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether an appellate court should review a non-final order denying a claim of sovereign immunity by Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), a state-created entity that provides property insurance, in a bad faith action stemming from the entity's handling of a property damage claim. The issue arose in the context of the broader question of when appellate courts should use common law writs to review non-final orders involving claims of immunity prior to the entry of a final judgment and when the Supreme Court should expand the list of non-final appealable orders. While the Court did not resolve the broader issue in this case, it determined that Citizens' claim of immunity was not reviewable by the appellate courts either through the writ of certiorari or the writ of prohibition, and the Court declined to expand the list of non-final orders reviewable on appeal to include the discrete legal issue presented in this case. View "Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

This case was before the Supreme Court on a property appraiser's appeal of the court of appeal's decision affirming a circuit court's grant of an ad valorem homestead tax exemption to David and Ana Andonie (the taxpayers) and declaration that a portion of Fla. Stat. 196.031(1) was invalid and unenforceable because the statutory provision limited the class of property owners otherwise eligible for ad valorem tax relief under Fla. Const. art. VII, 6(a). The Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal to the extent it was consistent with its holding here, holding (1) the plain language of article VII, section 6(a) permits every owner of Florida real property to apply for and receive ad valorem tax relief where it is sufficiently demonstrated that the owner has maintained on that property the permanent residence of another legally or naturally dependent on the owner; and (2) the property appraiser here failed to sufficiently preserve for appellate review any argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence introduced in the circuit court below, and the record sufficiently demonstrated that the taxpayers maintained on their property the permanent residence of their minor children, each of whom was legally and naturally dependent on the taxpayers. View "Garcia v. Andonie" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit wherein plaintiff appealed the dismissal of claims under section 627.701(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and the denial of a motion to enforce execution of the judgment, and defendant appealed the denial of motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff had filed a claim with defendant, its property insurer, pursuant to an insurance policy but was dissatisfied with defendant's investigation and processing of its claim. Based on the facts and analysis, the court answered the first, third, fourth, and fifth questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit in the negative. In doing so, the court did not reach the second certified question. The court concluded that under Florida law: (1) first-party claims were actually statutory bad-faith claims that must be brought under section 624.155; (2) an insured could not bring a claim against an insurer for failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established by section 627.701(4)(a); (3) an insurer's failure to comply with the language and type-size requirements established in section 627.701(4)(a) did not render a noncompliant hurricane deductible provision in an insurance policy void and unenforceable as the Legislature had not provided for this penalty; and (4) a contractual provision mandating payment of benefits upon "entry of a final judgment" did not waive the insurer's procedural right to post a bond and stay the execution of a money judgment pending resolution of appeal.

Delta sought review of the First District's reversal of summary judgment voiding a tax deed and quieting title to certain real property in Delta. The court concluded that the First District improperly applied the law-of-the-case doctrine and that the validity of the tax deed in this case should be determined by applying Jones v. Flowers and Vosilla v. Rosado. The court further held that because the Clerk failed to take reasonable, additional steps to provide notice to Delta upon learning that the notice sent by certified mail was not successfully delivered, the tax deed was invalid. Therefore, the court quashed the First District's decision and remanded with instructions that the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Delta be affirmed.

This case arose when petitioner's home was damaged in a hurricane and Florida Preferred was the insurer of the home. After petitioner sued Florida Preferred over a dispute regarding the covered loss and Florida Preferred subsequently became insolvent, petitioner filed a motion to substitute FIGA as the defendant. At issue was whether FIGA could be required to pay petitioner's attorney's fees and costs incurred in the litigation with Florida Preferred. Because petitioner's attorney's fee award pursuant to section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes, was not within the coverage of her insurance policy, it was not a covered claim under section 631.54(3), Florida Statutes, that FIGA must pay. Therefore, the court approved the decision of the Second District.

This case arose when respondents commenced an action to foreclose a mortgage against petitioner. At issue was whether Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.350 required the court to dismiss a case after the court had accepted jurisdiction based on a question certified to be one of great public importance and after the petitioner had filed his initial brief on the merits. This issue arose after the parties filed a joint Stipulated Dismissal, which advised that they had settled this matter and stipulated to the dismissal of the review proceeding pending before the court. The court held that well-established precedent authorized it to exercise its discretion to deny the requested dismissal of a review proceeding, even where both parties to the action agreed to the dismissal in light of an agreed-upon settlement. The question certified to the court transcended the individual parties to this action because it had the potential to impact the mortgage foreclosure crisis throughout the state and was one which Florida's trial courts and litigants needed guidance. The legal issue also had implications beyond mortgage foreclosure actions. Because the court agreed with the Fourth District that this issue was one of great public importance and in need of resolution, the court denied the parties' request to dismiss.

This case was before the court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal. In its decision, the Fifth District construed provisions of the state and federal constitutions and certified a question which the court rephrased: Did the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article X, Section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution recognize an exactions taking under the holding of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dollan v. City of Tigard, where there was no compelled dedication of any interest in real property to public use and the alleged exaction was a non land-use monetary condition for permit approval which never occurred and no permit was ever issued? The court answered in the negative, quashed the decision of the Fifth District and remanded for further proceedings. The court emphasized that its decision was limited solely to answering the certified question and the court declined to address the other issues raised by the parties.

This case arose from certain hurricane damage claims made by respondent under a 2004 insurance policy issued by respondent's original insurer. When the original insurer became insolvent, the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA) then became obligated to respond to certain claims made under that insurance policy. At issue was the proper test to be utilized by a court when determining whether a statute could be applied retroactively, in this case to a contract of insurance. The court held that the court's precedents both before and after the Fourth District's decision required the court to engage in a two-pronged inquiry to determine if the 2005 amendments to section 627.7016, Fla. Stat., were to be applied retroactively. Thus, the Fourth District misapplied this precedent when it omitted the first inquiry into whether the Legislature clearly expressed an intent that the statute be applied retroactively and moved directly to the second inquiry, whether retroactive application would be constitutional. For this reason, and because there was no clear evidence of legislative intent for retroactivity, the court quashed the decision of the Fourth District to the extent it was inconsistent with the opinion and remanded for further proceedings.