Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Nathaniel and Lucy Boyd once owned a small parcel of commercial property in Fulton County, but according to the tax commissioner, they failed to pay their taxes, and as a result, the property was sold at a tax sale. The buyer, National Tax, gave its deed to Southeast Diversified Development, Inc., and Southeast Diversified gave a promissory note and deed to secure debt back to National Tax. That security deed later was assigned to JohnGalt Holdings, LLC. Southeast Diversified eventually defaulted on the promissory note, and JohnGalt foreclosed on its deed. In the meantime, the Boyds had made efforts to redeem the property with Southeast Diversified, by which the Boyds were to make periodic payments. The Boyds failed to make all of the payments required under this agreement. JohnGalt gave notice to the Boyds of its intent to foreclose their right of redemption, and the Boyds entered into a new agreement with JohnGalt, by which the Boyds were to make periodic payments to JohnGalt to redeem the property. Again, the Boyds failed to make all of the required payments. The Boyds then attempted to rescind their agreement with JohnGalt, and eventually sued JohnGalt for trespass and ejectment, contending that they had redeemed the property. JohnGalt promptly answered the suit, but it did not then assert a counterclaim to quiet title. About three years later, JohnGalt sought leave to amend its pleadings and assert such a counterclaim, and the trial court granted its request. The Boyds filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim, and JohnGalt filed a motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim. A special master concluded that JohnGalt had good title to the property by virtue of its foreclosure of the right of redemption. The trial court adopted the report of the special master and quieted title in favor of JohnGalt. The Boyds appealed, asserting several claims of error. Finding no reversible error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boyd v. Johngalt Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties in this suit had interests in a parcel of land as tenants in common. The trial court ordered the equitable partition by sale of the parcel. Appellee Sidney C. Mahan, Jr. sought the equitable partition and sale of the property. Appellant Brittany Pack urged that statutory partition was an adequate remedy and that the property should be divided by metes and bounds. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the property could not be fairly divided by metes and bounds, and it granted the petition for an equitable division by sale. Pack appealed. The Supreme Court agreed with Pack's argument that the trial court's order was made in error, insofar as statutory partition was an adequate remedy in this case and no peculiar circumstances required an equitable partition. "But even in a statutory partition, a court may order the sale of property that cannot be fairly divided by metes and bounds, and we see no error in the finding that the property here cannot be fairly divided." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision that the property be sold, but vacated the judgment to the extent that it purported to order the sale as an equitable (rather than a statutory) partition. View "Pack v. Mahan" on Justia Law

Polo Golf and Country Club (a homeowners association), the Rymers (homeowners in the subdivision), and Forsyth County, all disputed which party was responsible for repairing the stormwater facilities in a subdivision. The stormwater facilities lying beneath the lots in the subdivision were not expressly dedicated to the county when originally built; and the county disclaimed ownership of any stormwater facility that did not lie under the county's streets. Polo did not own any stormwater facilities in the subdivision. Polo's covenants, recorded in 1987, provided that each homeowner had to maintain and repair the structures on his own property. The county enacted a stormwater management ordinance in 1996. In 2004, the Department of Engineering enacted an addendum contemplated by the ordinance. The section of the addendum at issue in this case required homeowners associations to take responsibility for stormwater management facilities on their property. The Rymers owned a house and lot in the Polo Fields subdivision. Because the interior of the Rymers' home was flooded on a number of occasions, the Rymers demanded that Polo and the county take action to fix the stormwater system. Polo responded by notifying the Rymers that it gave notice to the county that "neither the individual homeowner nor [Polo] should be held responsible for the maintenance." Polo later informed the Rymers that it would be selecting a contractor to repair the stormwater facilities in the entire subdivision, including the facilities on the Rymers' property, at Polo's expense. However, the repairs were never made and the Rymers experienced additional flooding. At no point prior to litigation did Polo assert that the Rymers were responsible for repairs to the stormwater facilities on the Rymers' lot. The Rymers brought suit against Polo and the county. Polo counterclaimed seeking, among other things, an injunction to compel the Rymers to repair the stormwater facilities under their property pursuant to the covenants. Polo also cross-claimed against the county, asserting the county could not require it to maintain the stormwater facilities because the addendum applied to new development, not Polo. Thereafter, pipes in the vicinity of the Rymers' property failed completely, causing flooding and sinkholes on other lots in the subdivision and additional flooding on the Rymers' property. The county issued a notice to comply and warning to Polo, directing Polo to make necessary repairs in the subdivision within 30 days. Polo did not make the repairs and the county issued a notice of violation, but no fines or citations were issued. Polo filed a separate declaratory judgment action against the county seeking a declaration that the addendum impairs the obligation of contracts and was unconstitutional and invalid. It also sought injunctive relief to prohibit enforcement of the addendum. The Rymers moved to intervene in that case; the motion was granted; and the trial court consolidated the two cases. After the parties filed motions and crossmotions for summary judgment, the trial court denied the Rymers' and Polo's summary judgment motions, but granted the county's summary judgment motion, finding the addendum can be enforced against Polo. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying Polo's motion for summary judgment in its dispute with the Rymers, but that the court erred in granting summary judgment for the county. View "Polo Golf & Country Club Homeowners' Association v. Rymer" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from a dispute over title and right of possession of certain real property in Randolph County. The dispute involved the location of the boundary between two adjoining parcels. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the Clouds with respect to the disputed property. The trial court then entered judgment in favor of the Clouds, declaring the border between the Cloud property and Mathews property to be defined by certain metes and bounds reflected in a survey map entered into evidence and referred to at trial by the surveyor as a status print. Those measurements were based upon the plat referenced in the Cloud deed. The judgment also enjoined the Mathews heirs from trespassing upon the property. The Mathews heirs appealed. After careful review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed. View "Mathews v. Cloud" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Department of Transportation (DOT) initiated condemnation proceedings for property owned by Brian McMeans. The condemnation petition named as defendants, inter alia, McMeans, and McMeans Leasing, Inc. (MLI), a corporation owned solely by McMeans. McMeans filed an answer acknowledging that he was the "owner of the property loosely described in" the condemnation petition, and alleging damages of at least $1.3 million. MLI filed an amendment to the answer McMeans filed in order "to provide that said Answer was for [MLI], a corporation solely owned by Brian K. McMeans." This pleading stated that McMeans was the owner of the property, that MLI was a leasehold tenant, and that MLI would sustain damages for business losses resulting from its removal from the property. At the same time, McMeans filed a pleading, "Answer of Brian K. McMeans," in which he alleged damages of at least $1.3 million as a result of lost uses of the property, interruption in his business income, loss of business, and damage to his business in addition to the value of the condemned real estate. Following a hearing, the trial court granted DOT’s motion and struck both pleadings. MLI filed a direct appeal, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on jurisdictional grounds because it was not an appeal from a final judgment; McMeans filed an application for interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals, which was granted, and he appealed the trial court’s order striking his "First Amendment" to his answer. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that it erred to the extent it ruled that McMeans could not plead a business loss based on his failure to include it earlier and that he could not plead a loss from the business he owns and operates on the condemned property. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the appellate court erred in its decision. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals indeed erred in its decision, and reversed. View "Dept. of Transportation v. McMeans" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over title to a 7.63 acre parcel of land located in Bacon County. The parcel was originally part of a 95-acre parcel owned by H.S. Carter that was taken by Bacon County via eminent domain proceedings commenced in 1973. As a result of the condemnation proceedings, Bacon County acquired over 2500 acres for creating a public recreation project known as Lake Alma and the Carter parcel was just one of the parcels condemned for that purpose. The proposed Lake Alma was part of a larger urban development project so that the City of Alma and Bacon County could execute a development plan that included, among other things, an industrial park, a waste water treatment plant, and improvement of the local airport, in addition to construction of Lake Alma. The other projects were completed but the Lake Alma project was abandoned and never constructed. After the project was abandoned, at the request of the city and county, the General Assembly passed an amendment to OCGA 36-9-3 that permitted counties to sell back to the original owners land that had been acquired for development, but the legislation failed to provide for repurchase of land by the heirs of the original owners. By that time, H.S. Carter was deceased and his original parcel was one of the only parcels condemned for construction that was not repurchased by the original owner. In 2010, OCGA 36-9-3 was amended again to grant the heirs of the original landowners the right to repurchase the land. Heirs of H. S. Carter sought to repurchase the original 95-acre parcel. The City of Alma executed a quit claim deed to Bacon County conveying its undivided interest in the 95 acres and, that same day, Bacon County executed a quit claim deed conveying all of its undivided interest in the property to the heirs. The heirs then filed a petition to quiet title and for ejectment against Darling and Southeastern Maintenance with respect to the 7.63 acres. Darling asserted it was entitled to summary judgment with respect to the quiet title and claim for ejection because, as a result of the county’s previous conveyance of the disputed property to the Development Authority and the subsequent chain of conveyances by which Darling ultimately obtained title, the heirs did not have title to that property. Without addressing Darling’s bona fide purchaser argument, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the heirs along with a decree that title to the property vested in them and was superior to Darling’s claim of title. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in concluding that the heirs’ title was superior to that of Darling’s as a result of Bacon County’s failure to comply with the requirements of OCGA 36-9-2 with respect to a 2003 conveyance of its interest in the property to the Bacon County Development Authority. Furthermore, the trial court erred in finding the 2003 conveyance to Southeastern Maintenance was invalid as a result of the governing authorities’ failure to formulate a new economic development plan. The trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the Carter heirs was reversed and the decree establishing title was vacated. View "Darling International, Inc. v Carter" on Justia Law

Mary Jane Nelson and other litigants appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to the Georgia Sheriffs Youth Homes and other entities in a quiet title action. In their sole contention of error in this appeal, Nelson argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment without the final report of the special master being filed. As the Georgia Supreme Court has recognized, "[i]f no demand for a jury trial is filed prior to the time he hears the case, the special master is the arbiter of law and fact and decides all issues in the case." And, as in this case, there was a demand for a jury trial filed before the special master holds a hearing, the trial court had jurisdiction to proceed to trial. The fact that a demand for a jury trial was filed pursuant to OCGA 23-3-66 does not mean that the trial court cannot grant summary judgment when warranted. Accordingly, Nelsons did not show an error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "Nelson v. Georgia Sheriffs Youth Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an effort by Mortgage Alliance Corporation (“MAC”) a residential subdivision called "Silverstone." In August 2008, MAC sued the county and various county officials alleging, among other things, that an August 2006 letter to MAC from the county's sole commissioner, which said that the county's position was that any proposal to develop MAC's property as a subdivision would need to comply with a recent amendment to the county's land use ordinances, resulted in a taking of MAC's property without just compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that MAC's complaint was untimely. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted MAC's petition for certiorari. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this case was resolved on the ground that the August 2006 Letter was not a “decision” within the meaning of the applicable statute, and the county never made a final decision on MAC's Silverstone proposal. Consequently, MAC's inverse condemnation claim never ripened for judicial review, and the trial court should have granted summary judgment to the defendants on this ground. Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding there was an appealable decision, they reached the right result, and therefore the Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County" on Justia Law

Stephen and Elizabeth Schultz contracted with Benchmark Builders, Inc. for the construction of a home. The Schultzes refused to close because they claimed the home was not built in conformance with the contract and Benchmark sued for specific performance or, in the alternative, for money damages for breach of contract. The Schultzes answered and filed a counterclaim for breach of contract seeking money damages for the return of earnest money they had paid and also for the value of certain fixtures they purchased and that had been installed in the home. They also sought attorney fees resulting from the alleged breach. The jury returned a verdict form that found for the Schultzes both as to Benchmark's claim and the Schultzes' counterclaim. The jury awarded the Schultzes zero dollars on the claim for light fixtures, zero dollars for return of the earnest money, and $16,555 on the claim for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals held the Schultzes were entitled, as the “prevailing party” to the award of attorney fees pursuant to the parties' contract and thus affirmed the award. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the parties' contract allowed for an award of attorney fees to a party that recovered no money damages or other relief that it sought. Under the terms of the contract, the fact that the jury did not award actual damages did not mean the Schultzes could not be deemed the prevailing party to the lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Benchmark Builders, Inc. v. Schultz" on Justia Law

In a foreclosure action, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to bankruptcy trustee J. Coleman Tidwell against National City Mortgage Company. Addressing its jurisdiction sua sponte, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the grounds that PNC Bank, N.A. was not a party to the foreclosure and therefore lacked standing to appeal the order entered against National City. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that PNC Bank lacked standing to appeal on behalf of its predecessor National City Mortgage Company. Because the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the appeal must be dismissed due to the trial court's failure to substitute or join PNC Bank as a party under OCGA 9-11-25 (c), the Court reversed and remanded the case for the Court of Appeals to address issues raised in this appeal. View "National City Mortgage Co. v. Tidwell " on Justia Law