Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Peter McGlashan and appellee Terrell Snowden own adjacent lots of real property in Ware County. McGlashan contracted to build a home on his lot and took exclusive possession of the completed home in July 2010. In March - April 2011, McGlashan discovered that his home encroached 1.11 acres onto Snowden's lot. After being informed by McGlashan of the encroachment, Snowden filed a complaint for ejectment, seeking to recover possession of his lot and the dwelling house and improvements located on it as well as damages for trespass, and seeking to be awarded fee-simple title to the home and improvements. McGlashan filed a counterclaim in which he raised an equitable claim for unjust enrichment and sought permission to remove the home and improvements from Snowden's lot. McGlashan also filed a third-party complaint against the builders of the home, seeking to recover from them the full value of McGlashan's loss should he lose the ejectment action or the cost of removing the dwelling and improvements from Snowden's lot should McGlashan have prevailed. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to Snowden. McGlashan appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Snowden on McGlashan's counterclaim for equitable unjust enrichment. Upon review, the Court disagreed with McGlashan's contention that the trial court erred. View "McGlashan v. Snowden" on Justia Law

Appellant City of Suwanee appealed a judgment in favor of Appellee Settles Bridge Farm, LLC in an inverse condemnation action. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the City of Suwanee's enactment of an amendment to its zoning ordinance was an unconstitutional regulatory taking of a large parcel of land owned by Settles Bridge and awarded Settles Bridge more than $1.8 million in damages. The City appealed, contending, inter alia, that the case was unripe for judicial review due to Settles Bridge’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the City that Settles Bridge should have exhausted its administrative remedies prior to initiating litigation in this matter, and therefore reversed the judgment entered against the City. View "City of Suwanee v. Settles Bridge Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

U. S. Bank, N. A. and Vatacs Group, Inc. both claimed title to certain residential real property in Fulton County, and U. S. Bank filed a petition to quiet title to the property. The trial court appointed a special master, and after an evidentiary hearing, the special master found that U. S. Bank had good title to the property, that Vatacs had no interest in the property, and that, even if Vatacs had some interest in the property, the doctrine of equitable subrogation rendered the interest of U. S. Bank superior to any interest of Vatacs. The trial court adopted the findings of the special master and entered judgment vesting fee title to the property in U. S. Bank. Vatacs appealed, contending that the case should have been tried by a jury and that the findings of the special master were erroneous. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no merit in these claims of error, and affirmed. View "Vatacs Group, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, NA" on Justia Law

We, the Taxpayers, an unincorporated association of individual taxpayer residents of Effingham County ("Taxpayers"), appealed the trial court's order dismissing Taxpayers's complaint against the Board of Tax Assessors of Effingham County ("Board"). In a separate case, the Board appealed the superior court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. Former OCGA 48-5B-1 became law in 2009, and was effective until January 2011. It placed a moratorium on increases in the assessed value of property subject to ad valorem taxation for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2009, and continuing through January 9, 2011, but provided an exception from the moratorium for any county which performed or had performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county in 2008 or any county which in 2009 was under contract prior to February 28, 2009, to have performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county. The Board, believing that Effingham County met the exception set forth in former OCGA 48-5B-1 (c), did not impose a moratorium on increases in assessed values in the 2009 tax year, but in fact, increased assessed values of certain property. Taxpayers, believing that the exception did not apply and that the moratorium should have been imposed, filed a complaint under OCGA 48-5-296 seeking the removal of Board members. Taxpayers amended the complaint to include the equitable relief of eliminating the 2009 assessed values and imposing instead the 2008 tax year figures; by later amendment, Taxpayers dropped the request to remove Board members, and added a request for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to act in accordance with Taxpayers's interpretation of OCGA 48-5B-1. Taxpayers moved for summary judgment, contending that the undisputed evidence showed that the exception to the moratorium did not apply; the Board also moved for summary judgment, asserting that OCGA 48-5B-1 was unconstitutional, and, alternatively, that the undisputed facts showed that the statutory exception applied. The trial court denied both motions. The Board then filed its motion to dismiss, asserting that the Taxpayers property owners were obligated to appeal their 2009 ad valorem assessments to the county Board of Equalization, or otherwise in the manner set forth in OCGA 48-5-311, and that the failure to do so precluded the trial court's addressing the equitable and mandamus claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in denying Taxpayers's motion, and vacated the court's decision denying the Board's motion. View "We, The Taxpayers v. Bd. of Tax Assessors Effingham Cty." on Justia Law

Norma Fitzpatrick, Barry Fitzpatrick and George Elrod, (taxpayers), own parcels of land in Madison County. Following a valuation of those properties for tax purposes by the Madison County Board of Assessors, the taxpayers appealed the valuation to the Madison County Board of Equalization. The Board of Equalization denied the appeal. Subsequently, the taxpayers filed an appeal in superior court, but the Board of Assessors refused to certify the appeal to the superior court unless the taxpayers first paid the filing fee to the superior court clerk. Thereafter, the taxpayers contended that, except for appeals to an arbitrator pursuant to OCGA 48-5-311(f), a taxpayer is not required to pay any fee at all for an appeal. Based on this argument, the taxpayers filed a declaratory action seeking a ruling to this effect. The trial court issued an order finding that the taxpayers are responsible for paying the filing fee, which prompted the taxpayers to appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Fitzpatrick v. Madison Co. Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

Through interrogatories, a jury determined that David Keever, individually and in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Henry Keever, failed to prove that he had adversely possessed certain land whose record title was held by James R. Dellinger, Jr. and Frank Troutman. Specifically, the jury found that, although Keever had proven all other elements of adverse possession, he had failed to establish exclusive possession. Keever appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court made improper evidentiary rulings. Finding no errors, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Keever v. Dellinger" on Justia Law

In 2004, Allen Ehlers signed a contract to sell certain property to Keith Sharp, the owner of Upper West Side, LLC. Allen had acquired the property in question pursuant to a 1995 deed of assent that identified the land as “Parcel Two,” and described the property as a strip of land 25 feet wide and 200 feet long. Although the deed of assent described the land as a 25' x 200' strip, Upper West Side believed that it would be purchasing the entire eight acre tract of land at the time that it entered the February 2004 contract with Allen. Eventually, in 2008, Allen deeded the property in the deed of assent to Upper West Side, and Upper West Side filed an action in the Fulton County Superior Court seeking to reform the deed of assent and asking the court to declare that, as reformed, the deed conveyed the entire eight acre tract of Parcel Two, and not just the 25' x 200' strip described in the deed. Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Upper West Side, and issued a certificate of immediate review. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, agreeing with the trial court's conclusion that Upper West Side’s action to reform the deed of assent was not barred by the seven-year statute of limitations applicable to reformation actions. View "Ehlers v. Upper West Side, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Andrea Brown Jacobs and several family members holding ownership interest in certain undeveloped real property filed a partition action in January 2006 after another family member, Mary Young, refused to sign a contract for the sale of the property. The parties entered into a consent writ of partition which provided for the sale of the property pursuant to OCGA 44-6-166.1. However, neither Young nor any other party in interest tendered the sums necessary to purchase petitioners' shares of the property. Mary Young then deeded her interest in the property to the Mary E. Young Revocable Trust and died one day later. In 2010, the case appeared on a pretrial calendar; the property not having been sold and there being no appearance by Young or anyone on her behalf, the trial court struck Young's pleadings, entered judgment in favor of the petitioners, and appointed three commissioners to conduct the sale of the property consistent with the requirements of OCGA 44-6-167 through 169. Because the property had not been sold and the owners of the property still were unable to reach an agreement with regard to its disposition, the court, believing that a mandated public sale would cause financial loss to all owners, amended its 2010 partition order to provide for the listing of the property with a particular broker with the terms of the sale to be established by a majority of the previously appointed commissioners. The 2010 judgment was quickly voided by the trial court after certain petitioners alleged counsel had acted without authority in seeking the partition order. In September 2011, petitioner Florence Brown through new counsel filed a motion for order for public sale. After a hearing on Brown's motion, the trial court entered an order for public sale and appointed three commissioners to conduct the sale. The sale was advertised and the property sold to the highest bidder. Appellant Jacobs appealed orders in Case No. S12A1340. In Case No. S12X1342, Brown filed across-appeal stating she was satisfied with the trial court's orders and was cross-appealing only to ensure the entire record was included on appeal. Because the Supreme Court found that all parties received proper notice of the partition action and in fact, agreed to the entry of a final consent judgment of partition which gave rise to the trial court's authority to order the public sale, the trial court's orders confirming the sale of the property and directing the parties and parties in interest to execute the deeds were affirmed. View "Jacobs v. Young" on Justia Law

In January 2011, Reliance Equities, LLC acquired title to an Atlanta property pursuant to an August 2009 tax sale and a subsequent foreclosure of all rights of redemption. Nancy Karlen claimed to have had an interest in the Property based on 2001-2003 tax liens on the Property that she had purchased in 2004. In February 2011, Reliance filed a quiet title action to establish that it was the fee simple owner of the Property free and clear of all adverse claims. Reliance requested that the matter be submitted to a special master, and the Superior Court granted the request. Following a hearing which was not transcribed, and after Karlen acknowledged that she had received proper service of the quiet title action, the special master allowed Karlen additional time to file an amended answer and extended the time for Karlen to assert her right to redeem the Property. Karlen neither amended her answer nor made a tender of the statutory redemption amount within the required time period. The special master found that any potential rights held by Karlen had been divested. The special master also ruled that Karlen was prohibited from challenging the validity of the tax sale due to her failure to tender the statutory redemption amount. The trial court adopted the special master's findings and entered a final order and decree vesting title in Reliance. Karlen appealed pro se from the trial court's order, and, finding no error in the special master's findings, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Karlen v. Reliance Equities, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether application of OCGA 32-3-11(c) pertaining to appellants' motion to set aside or vacate a declaration of taking violated their due process rights, and whether that statute imposed upon appellant the responsibility to obtain a timely hearing on their motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute as properly applied does not violate a condemnee's due process rights but reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with direction that it hold a hearing pursuant to the mandate of 32-3-11(c) because it is the duty of the trial court, not the condemnee, to schedule the required hearing. View "Adkins v. Cobb County" on Justia Law