Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Leonard Small filed suit seeking ejectment and mesne profits after learning that Appellee Alphonso Irving had built a home on a lot located at 4110 Raybun Street in Savannah, which Small had purchased at a tax sale. A special master was appointed and issued an order adopted by the trial court, recommending that Small recover the premises and pay Irving for the value of the improvements. Small appealed, alleging the trial court's adoption of the special master's order was in error because the evidence was insufficient to support it. He argued further that the special master erred in concluding Small could not recover mesne profits because he held only a tax title to the property. The Supreme Court concluded it was not an error for the trial court to adopt the special master's order. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in adopting the special master's conclusion that Small could not recover mesne profits. The Court partly affirmed, and partly reversed the trial court's decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court granted discretionary appeal to Haralson County to review a superior court's grant of the writ of mandamus. In 2008, Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc. sought to purchase a piece of property in a residential area. Before doing so, it wanted confirmation that the property had a permitted nonconforming use, so Taylor Junkyard asked for, and was issued, a letter written by the County Zoning Administrator, which stated that the business operated by Trawick "falls under the grandfather clause." When Taylor Junkyard applied for a business license for the year 2009, Haralson County administratively rejected the application, with the stated reason that the business engaged in on the property had changed from the original nonconforming business of "used automobiles and parts" to "metal recycling and metal fabrication," and thus violated the County's zoning ordinance. Taylor Junkyard appealed to the County Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), which, after a hearing, rejected the application for a business license, based upon found zoning violations. Taylor Junkyard then filed its petition for a writ of mandamus in superior court, which the court granted, finding that there was no evidence to support the ZBA's decision. The County contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court erred in addressing the petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the County Zoning Ordinance provided a means for Taylor Junkyard to file an appeal from the adverse decision of the ZBA, and thus, mandamus was not an available remedy. "When local zoning ordinances do not establish a means by which an aggrieved party may gain judicial review of an adverse decision by a zoning appeal board, a petition to the appropriate superior court for a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy." Accordingly, as no provision of the Haralson County ordinances set forth an available means of judicial review, the superior court did not err in concluding that a petition for a writ of mandamus was the proper avenue for Taylor Junkyard to seek review of the ZBA's decision.

MCI sued CMES on theories of negligence and trespass, and sought damages consisting of the costs to repair a severed cable, compensation for the loss of use of the cable during the time it took to repair it, and punitive damages. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of CMES, holding that MCI could not recover loss of use damages. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question: "Under Georgia law, may a telecommunications service provider whose cable is severed recover loss-of-use damages measured by the rental value of substitute cable when it has not rented such cable or otherwise incurred any monetary loss apart from the cost of repair?" The court concluded that a telecommunications carrier was not entitled to loss of use damages measured by the hypothetical cost to rent a replacement system where it suffered no actual loss of use damages and did not need to rent a replacement system because it was able to reroute calls within the existing redundant cable system the carrier necessarily installed in order to operate its business.

Appellants, owners of a tract of real property in Dawson County, filed a nine-count complaint against appellees challenging a rezoning decision in superior court. The superior court granted summary judgment to appellees on three of the nine counts and appellants subsequently filed three direct appeals to the court. The court initially dismissed the appeals by order for failure to comply with the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA 5-6-35. On appellants' motion for reconsideration, however, the court reinstated the appeals and directed the parties to brief whether OCGA 5-6-35(a)(1) applied. Having had the benefit of full briefing and oral argument on the issue, the court concluded that these appeals came under OCGA 5-6-35(a)(1) and so the court dismissed them again.

The United States Court of appeals asked the court to answer a question that stemmed from a dispute over the proper interpretation under Georgia law of a contract insuring real property. The primary issue presented was whether the court's ruling in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, a case involving an automobile insurance policy wherein the court held that a provision requiring the insurer to pay for loss to the insured's car required the insurer to also pay for any diminution in value of the repaired vehicle, was applicable. The court held that its ruling in Mabry was not limited by the type of property insured, but rather spoke generally to the measure of damages an insurer was obligated to pay.

Wife and husband were married in 1998 and wife filed a complaint for divorce in 2008. The parties resolved all issues by agreement except the disposition of certain real property which was purchased by wife prior to the marriage. In 2005, wife transferred the property into a family trust for the benefit of her three children. Considering the lack of any evidence of the value of the maintenance work performed by husband, the testimony of wife that he was paid for this work, the fact that husband used a portion of the property rent-free as a commercial recording studio, and the fact that the property paid for the mortgage through its own rents, the trial court had evidentiary support for its finding that any increased value in the property attributable to husband's contributions and the expenditure of marital funds was nominal. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion to divide the marital property equitably.

Micah L. Haffner filed this action to quiet title to a parcel of land in Haralson County that he claimed to have purchased from his mother's estate. The trial court granted summary judgment to James and Regina Davis and Community and Southern Bank and denied Haffner's motion for summary judgment. Because Haffner had been in possession of the property at issue for less than 20 years and failed to exercise reasonable diligence, the court affirmed the judgment.

EGL purchased 427 acres of land in Newton County, Georgia, for the purpose of constructing a landfill and the Board declined to issue a letter of zoning compliance based on its interpretation that a landfill was not a permitted use under the Newton County zoning ordinance. The court held that the trial court erred in holding that East Ga. Land and Development Co. v. Baker mooted any issue regarding the validity of the process used by the county to enact the original zoning ordinance. The court also held that the trial court erred by relying on parol evidence to provide a link between the original set of maps incorporated onto the 1985 zoning ordinance and the set that was currently located in the zoning office. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Stiles Apartment filed suit asserting ownership over a parking area and sought interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief to prohibit ACC from exercising any control over the parking area. ACC counterclaimed for declaratory judgment, ejectment, and breach of contract. The trial court issued an order granting the request for injunctive relief against ACC's efforts to assert ownership or control over the parking area but denied a request to enjoin ACC from arresting Mr. Stiles for towing vehicles from the parking area. ACC appealed from the order. The court held that there was evidence authorizing the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court rejected ACC's defenses of laches, waiver, and the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

BB&T brought suit against Borrowers and Guarantors for more than $19 million then due under certain promissory notes at issue. The promissory notes were executed as a result of BB&T's issuance of 16 loans for residential housing development. In Case No. S1161728, appellants argued that the Court of Appeals in holding that no valid foreclosure sale occurred, erroneously relied on its determination that BB&T did not satisfy the Statue of Frauds. The court held that there were no valid foreclosure sales to prevent BB&T from suing on the notes in the absence of confirmation under OCGA 44-14-161, regardless of whether there was a valid executory sales contract which satisfied the Statute of Frauds. In Case No. S11G1729, the court held that, although the Court of Appeals correctly held that none of BB&T's claims was barred by its failure to seek confirmation after the foreclosure auctions, that court did err in holding that the 2008 guaranties did not sufficiently identify any pre-2008 notes and that the 2008 Guarantors were estopped by BB&T's part performance from asserting a Statute of Frauds defense to BB&T's claims against them on pre-2008 notes.