Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Sea Gardens petitioned under OCGA 23-3-60 to quiet title to waterfront property in McIntosh County. Appellants appealed from the trial court's entry of a consent judgment purporting to resolve their ongoing dispute with Sea Gardens over title to the property at issue. Because both parties did not in fact consent to all terms of the consent judgment, the trial court erred in issuing it, and therefore the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings in the trial court.

This case involved an underlying action for quiet title and came to the court from the trial court's grant of appellee BB&T's motion for summary judgment. The court could not sustain appellants' allegation that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to BB&T because genuine issues of material fact remained. The court also held that the trial court did not err when it granted BB&T's motion for summary judgment when appellants failed to show specific damages to support their claim of slander of title. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This appeal involved three adjacent properties in rural Lee County owned by the Goodsons, the Ellers, and the Fords. All three properties descended from a common owner who recorded, but later withdrew, a subdivision plat that included the Goodson Property and the Eller Property. The Goodsons and Ellers claimed that they have the right to use all of "Carol Street." In 2007, the Fords filed a petition to quiet title to the Ford Property, which included Carol Street. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of the Goodsons' and Ellers' claim of title to Carol Street by adverse possession; held that the trial court properly found the Goodsons' interest in Carol Street based on the subdivision plat was in the nature of an easement rather than legal title and the Fords' were estopped from denying the Goodsons' easement by express grant; held that the trial court did not err in placing limitations on the scope of the Goodsons' easement to use Carol Street; and rejected the Goodsons' and Ellers' claims of unclean hands and laches. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This appeal involved a title to a house and lot in a residential subdivision in Forsyth County. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendants appealed. The court held that the trial court properly rejected defendants' claim of bona fide purchaser status; defendants' argument that the trial court erred in holding that the children acquired a collective two-thirds interest in the property by virtue of the 1998 quitclaim deed from their father was without merit; the trial court properly dismissed defendants' claim for equitable subrogation; the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' counterclaim for unjust enrichment; and the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' laches defense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant appealed from the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment in favor of appellee on its claim for ejectment. Appellant contended that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because the ejectment action was filed in violation of the bankruptcy court's automatic stay and because appellee failed to file a proof of claim to the property in her bankruptcy action. The court held that the record evidence demonstrated that neither the complaint nor the summary judgment order were entered in violation of the automatic stay. In addition, the court found no merit in appellant's contention that appellee was estopped from asserting a claim on the property based on its failure to file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. The court also held that the trial court erred by giving res judicata effect on the quiet title judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of appellee in spite of affidavit evidence that appellant was not served with the summons and complaint in the quiet title action. Because there remained a question of fact regarding whether appellant was a party to the prior action, the grant of summary judgment on the ground of res judicata was error. Accordingly the court reversed the judgment.

The Boyds sued JohnGalt for trespass and ejectment over a disputed piece of property that JohnGalt purported to gain ownership of. JohnGalt counterclaimed for trespass and conversion, and to quiet title. Following the trial court's grant in part of JohnGalt's quiet title claim, the Boyds filed a timely notice of appeal and requested to proceed in forma pauperis. The trial court denied the Boyds' request to proceed in forma pauperis and the Boyds filed a separate notice of appeal from that judgment. The trial court subsequently issued a single order dismissing both the Boyds' appeals and the Boyds filed a notice of appeal from the order. The court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals because it lacked jurisdiction over the claims where there was no title of land claim presented by the appeal.

In June 2002, Holders purchased from Brenda Ruth Pruitt Griffin a 70-acre tract of land in Gwinnett County. As part of the consideration for the purchase, Griffin was to grant Holders a right of first refusal to acquire an approximately 74-acre tract located across the road. Holders subsequently appealed from an order of the superior court ruling adversely on their claims for compensation stemming from Gwinnett County's condemnation of a portion of the real property subject to the right of first refusal. The court found that the right of first refusal in this case was not compensable under the 1983 Georgia Constitution, Art. I, Sec. III, Par. I, and affirmed the judgment of the superior court.

Joseph Washington and his wife field a quiet title action to establish that they had legal title to some disputed land. Joan Brown, Washington's sister, counterclaimed with her own quiet title action, seeking to establish that she was the rightful owner of the disputed land. The Special Master concluded that Brown was the rightful owner, the trial court entered an order that incorporated the Special Master's report and ruled in favor of Brown, and the Washingtons subsequently appealed. Because there was no evidence to support the conclusion that Brown owned the disputed property either by deed or by adverse possession, the court reversed that portion of the trial court's order awarding the disputed property to Brown. However, because evidence did not support the trial court's conclusion that the Washingtons also did not own the disputed property, that portion of the order determining that the Washingtons do not own the property must be upheld on appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Larry DeFoor petitioned to establish title against all the world on a piece of property in Ellijay, Georgia. Appellants, certain descendants of Millie DeFoor, the record title holder, answered the petition and denied its material allegations. The court held that the earlier denial of appellants' motion for summary judgment was harmless or moot because the court found evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of Larry; Larry did not need to reside on the property in order to establish adverse possession, he only needed to exercise dominion over it; appellants' assertion that Larry could not "tack" his adverse possession to the adverse possession of his father was without merit; the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to conclude that Larry met his burden to show ouster; it was not error to grant Larry's first motion in limine which sought to exclude certain evidence; and the trial court did not err in refusing to permit appellants to show that Flint Timber agreed to pay Larry for an easement on the property. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Husband appealed a trial court's issuance of a final divorce judgment and decree that divided some unimproved real property in Florida and two Morgan Stanley funds equally between the parties and made no disposition of the interests in an apartment complex, thereby leaving each party with his or her own interest. The court held that the two Morgan Stanley accounts were transformed into marital property when Husband gave Wife an ownership interest in the property; the Florida property was transformed into a marital asset where it was deeded to him and his Wife as tenants in common; and in regards to the apartment complex, Wife acquired an ownership interest separate and distinct from Husband's. Finally, the court held that Husband's claims that the trial court abused its discretion by announcing a prejudgment of the case prior to his presentation of evidence was without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.