Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

DRST Holdings filed a petition for money rule nisi and mandamus against Sheriff Brown demanding payment of excess funds where Sheriff Brown had determined that the redemption of certain property by DRST Holdings was unauthorized and thus released the excess funds to an unauthorized representative of the estate of the defendant who owned the property at the time of the sale. The court held that Sheriff Brown was required to file a verified answer and it was undisputed that he ultimately submitted verification of the answer. Therefore, the court rejected DRST Holdings' contention that the trial court should have granted the motion to strike the unverified answer and issue a rule absolute. The court also rejected DRST Holdings' contention that the trial court erred in holding that it was not a party entitled to redeem the real property from the tax sale where DRST Holdings failed to present evidence establishing that it held an interest in the real property or that it was a creditor of the defendant pursuant to OCGA 48-4-40 and 48-4-41. Therefore, the redemption by DRST Holdings was void and the excess funds from the tax sale were properly paid to the unauthorized representative.

In a hierarchical church property dispute, the court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the "neutral principles of law" doctrine set forth in Jones v. Wolf. The court held that neutral principles of law demonstrated that an implied trust in favor of the PCUSA existed on the local church's property to which TPC, Inc. held legal title. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding to the contrary and the judgment was reversed.

This case involved a dispute over control of property belonging to the oldest church in Georgia, Christ Church in Savannah. At issue was whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in applying the neutral principles doctrine, particularly with respect to OCGA 14-5-46 and 14-5-47. The court held that although those courts could have erred to some extent in their reliance on OCGA 14-5-46 and 14-5-47, they correctly concluded that neutral principles of law showed that the property of Christ Church at issue was held in trust for the benefit of the Episcopal Church.

The court granted certiorari to examine whether the "anti-indemnity" statute found at OCGA 13-8-2(b) applied to invalidate an indemnification clause within an assignment and assumption agreement transferring responsibility for the management and operation of a newly developed subdivision to its homeowner's association. The court held that OCGA 13-8-2(b) did apply to the assignment and assumption agreement. Therefore, the court held that the indemnification provision was invalid and given that the third party's claims were premised solely on this invalid provision, the Court of Appeals correctly held that summary judgment should have been granted to appellee.

Purchasers sued Developers and Brokers, alleging that at the time of their purchases in a 26-story condominium, Developers had already undertaken plans to develop a 46-story building directly across the street. Developers advertised "spectacular city views" from the 26-story condominium and Brokers advised that any future developments to the south of the building would be low to mid-rise office buildings. Purchasers alleged that they paid substantial premiums for their views of the city which was now blocked by the 46-story building. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings on Purchasers' claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligent supervision and violation of the Georgia's fair business practices statute. The court held that the trial court was correct in finding that Purchasers did not properly elect rescission as a remedy, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision; the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Purchasers were not bound by the agreements they signed; because there can be no justifiable reliance where Purchasers were bound by their agreements, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Purchasers' fraud-based claims could proceed; and the trial court correctly found that Purchasers did not sufficiently plead a cause of action against Developers for negligent supervision and the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's decision on that count.

These appeals arose from annexations by the City of parcels of unincorporated real property in Fayette County. At issue was whether appellee, the City resident seeking to enjoin the City from providing services to the area annexed in 2007, had standing as a citizen-taxpayer to do so; whether the appeal was moot; and whether a subsequent annexation by the City cured the flaw the Court of Appeals found in the first annexation. The court concluded that the appeal was moot when it was docketed in the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals should have dismissed it as such. In light of this decision, there was no need to address the issue of appellee's standing as a citizen-taxpayer. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the partition of a 40 acre piece of land where the testator's four heirs wanted to sell the land but the testator's grandson had been living on a 2.2 acre tract of land that was part of the 40 acres at issue. The grandson contended that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the heirs because a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to his claim that he owned the 2.2 acres at issue. The court held that despite the fact that the grandson had lived on the property at issue for several years, this fact alone was insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the requirements for a parol gift of land. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the heirs.

The parties in this case were adjoining landowners whose deeds both allegedly included a disputed six-acre parcel lying in Land Lot 95 of the 16th District, First Section, in Union County, Georgia. Based on the evidence, the trial court found that Porter had established superior title to the disputed property. In light of the court's holding in Division 1 that the trial court did not err in concluding that Porter had superior title by deed to the disputed property, the court need not address the trial court's alternative conclusion that Porter and her predecessors had otherwise established prescriptive title to the disputed property by adverse possession.

This case arose when Josephine Bailey petitioned to quiet title under OCGA 23-3-60 et seq., asserting that she owned an adjacent property at issue by deed and, in the alternative, by prescription. On appeal, Bailey appealed the order of the superior court adopting the report of a Special Master and decreeing that fee simple title to the parcel of land at issue was vested in Derether Moten. The court held that the judgment of the trial court that Bailey did not have title to the property by virtue of deed was not error; the trial court did not err in adopting the report of the Special Master and denying Bailey's claim of adverse possession; and that Moten's quitclaim deed was the only deed placed before the Special Master that described an interest in the property and it was not error for the trial court to adopt the Special Master's conclusion that title was vested in Moten. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Appellants filed suit against all appellees for compensatory and punitive damages, asserting breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), OCGA 16-14-1 et seq. In 2009, the trial court, inter alia, granted summary judgment to all appellees on the contract, negligence, and RICO claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grants of summary judgment. The court held that, since the Court of Appeals erred in making reliance an element of mail fraud and in affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees based on the failure of appellants to establish reliance, the court reversed that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees on the RICO claim based on mail fraud and remanded for further proceedings. The court also held that there was no evidence in the record that would provide the basis for a fact-finder to calculate damages upon a finding of liability and therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that summary judgment was authorized due to the failure of appellants to present evidence of damages.