Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Thomas owns hotels. He purchased 34 acres adjacent to I-24 between Nashville and Chattanooga in 2013 for $160,000, to develop a first-tier hotel. Most of the property is zoned agricultural-residential; a smaller portion is zoned rural center district. It has always been used for agriculture, The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) filed a condemnation action (40 U.S.C. 3113) with a deposit of $15,500 as estimated just compensation, for an easement 100 feet wide (1.72 acres) along I-24 for above-ground electrical power transmission lines. Thomas requested a trial on just compensation and disclosed his intent to present expert testimony that the property was no longer feasible for hotel development, because “power lines create both a visual and psychological barrier to guests.” The court granted the TVA’s motion to exclude the testimony, based on reliability defects. At trial, Thomas explained that the power lines are dangerous and unattractive. Thomas had not sought a rezoning. TVA’s expert opined that it was not financially feasible to develop a hotel on the property because of soil conditions, frontage, and the need for a zoning change and utilities. The court awarded Thomas just compensation of $10,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Thomas’s arguments about valuation. Thomas, who bore the burden of proof, did not overcome the presumption that the highest and best use was the property's existing use as agricultural land. View "Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 1.72 Acres of Land in Tenn." on Justia Law

When Carlo Gimenez Bianco (Gimenez) refused to remove his emotional support dog from his condominium unit in violation of the Castillo Condominium Association’s “no pets” bylaw, the Association forced Gimenez to vacate and sell the unit. Gimenez brought a complaint of disability discrimination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which filed a charge of discrimination against the Association. An administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a recommended decision concluding that the Association had not violated the Fair Housing Act. The Secretary of HUD set aside the ALJ’s recommended decision and found the Association liable for discrimination. On remand, the ALJ issued a recommended decision proposing to award Gimenez $3,000 in emotional distress damages and assessed a $2,000 civil penalty against the Association. The Secretary increased the proposed award of emotional distress damages to $20,000 and increased the civil penalty to $16,000. The First Circuit denied the Association’s petition for review and granted the Secretary’s cross-petition for enforcement of his order, holding (1) the Secretary’s final order was supported by substantial evidence in the record; (2) the ALJ did not err in refusing to apply res judicata to pretermit Gimenez’s HUD charge; and (3) the Secretary’s final order was not tainted by procedural error. View "Castillo Condo. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev." on Justia Law

In 2009, Spire Institute (Spire), a nonprofit corporation, entered into an agreement to lease land from Roni Lee, LLC, a for-profit company. By 2012, Spire had constructed Olympic-grade athletic facilities and related improvements on about a quarter of the property. In 2010, Spire sought a real-estate-tax exemption for the entire property under the charitable-use exemption. The tax commissioner denied exemption, finding that Roni Lee used the property for land development and commercial leasing and that Spire was not “engaged in charitable activity in any substantial way.” The commissioner also denied exemption of he undeveloped property under the prospective-use doctrine. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision, holding that Spire failed to establish that any portion of the subject property qualified for a charitable-use exemption. View "Geneva Area Recreational, Educ. & Athletic Trust v. Testa" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, homeowners, filed an inverse condemnation action against the City, seeking damages and injunctive relief based upon impairment of the views from their backyards by coastal redwood trees the City planted in Roxbury Park. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the judgment entered after a demurrer to their inverse condemnation complaint was sustained without leave to amend. The court concluded that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend because plaintiffs do not allege any physical intrusion, occupation, or invasion of their property or any physical damage to their property. The trees of which plaintiffs complain were not located on plaintiffs‘ properties and the first amended complaint does not allege that the trees or debris from the trees physically intrudes upon plaintiffs‘ properties. Because plaintiffs allege only impairment of their views and a speculative risk of fire danger, neither of which constitutes a taking or damaging of their property, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a district court order affirming in part an order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (“IDWR”). In response to a delivery call filed by Rangen, Inc., the Director had issued an order curtailing certain junior-priority ground water pumping in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (“ESPA”). The order provided that the junior-priority ground water users could avoid curtailment by participating in an approved mitigation plan. The Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc. (“IGWA”) filed several mitigation plans for approval. The Director issued an order conditionally approving IGWA’s Fourth Mitigation Plan, which proposed leasing water from another surface water right holder and piping the water to the Rangen facility. Rangen petitioned for review. The district court upheld the Director’s order in significant part. Rangen appealed. Finding no reversible error with the district court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rangen, Inc. v. Dept of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the homeowner’s association for a common interest community. Defendant owned a condominium unit in the community. Pursuant to a "standard collection policy" adopted by Plaintiff in 2011, Plaintiff brought this action seeking to foreclose a statutory lien for allegedly delinquent common expenses, attorney’s fees, and costs. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s failure to vote to commence a foreclosure action against Defendant’s unit or to adopt a standard foreclosure policy pursuant to the notice and comment requirements of Connecticut’s Common Interest Ownership Act. Plaintiff, in turn, argued that its policy was an "internal business operating procedure" rather than a rule and therefore was not subject to the notice and comment procedures for rules. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff’s standard foreclosure policy was an internal business operating procedure, not a rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the standard foreclosure policy is a rule and that the rule-making requirements are jurisdictional. Remanded with direction to dismiss Plaintiff’s action. View "Neighborhood Ass’n v. Limberger" on Justia Law

In 2005, Crossroads Investors, L.P. borrowed $9 million subject to a promissory note. The note was secured by a deed of trust recorded against an apartment building Crossroads owned in Woodland. Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was the beneficiary of the deed. The note imposed on Crossroads a prepayment premium should Crossroads pay the unpaid principal before the note’s maturity date or should Crossroads default and Fannie Mae accelerate the loan. Crossroads defaulted on the note in late 2010. Fannie Mae served Crossroads with a notice of default, and accelerated the loan. In February 2011, Fannie Mae initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. In April 2011, Crossroads entered into a contract to sell the property to Ezralow Company, LLC (Ezralow) for $10.95 million. A few weeks later, Crossroads and Ezralow proposed to Fannie Mae that Ezralow would assume Crossroads’ obligations and pay off the loan on Fannie Mae’s agreeing to waive the prepayment premium. Fannie Mae refused to waive the prepayment premium and rejected the proposal. By June, Fannie Mae recorded a notice of trustee’s sale against the property, stating the total unpaid amount of Crossroad’s obligations was estimated at more than $10.5 million. The day before the property was scheduled to be sold, Crossroads filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to protect its interest in the property. In its petition, Crossroads asserted it owed Fannie Mae $8.7 million. Fannie Mae sold the property after it was granted relief from the bankruptcy stay. Crossroads then sued Fannie Mae for wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, fraud, and other tort and contract actions. Fannie Mae filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending the actions on which Crossroads based its complaint were Fannie Mae’s statements in its papers filed in the bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. This appeal challenged the trial court’s denial of Fannie Mae's special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. "The principal thrust of Crossroads’ action was to recover for violations of state nonjudicial foreclosure law, not for any exercise of speech or petition rights by Fannie Mae. Even if protected activity was not merely incidental to the unprotected activity, Crossroads established a prima facie case showing it was likely to succeed on its causes of action." View "Crossroads Investors v. Federal National Mortgage Assn." on Justia Law

In 2005, Crossroads Investors, L.P. borrowed $9 million subject to a promissory note. The note was secured by a deed of trust recorded against an apartment building Crossroads owned in Woodland. Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was the beneficiary of the deed. The note imposed on Crossroads a prepayment premium should Crossroads pay the unpaid principal before the note’s maturity date or should Crossroads default and Fannie Mae accelerate the loan. Crossroads defaulted on the note in late 2010. Fannie Mae served Crossroads with a notice of default, and accelerated the loan. In February 2011, Fannie Mae initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. In April 2011, Crossroads entered into a contract to sell the property to Ezralow Company, LLC (Ezralow) for $10.95 million. A few weeks later, Crossroads and Ezralow proposed to Fannie Mae that Ezralow would assume Crossroads’ obligations and pay off the loan on Fannie Mae’s agreeing to waive the prepayment premium. Fannie Mae refused to waive the prepayment premium and rejected the proposal. By June, Fannie Mae recorded a notice of trustee’s sale against the property, stating the total unpaid amount of Crossroad’s obligations was estimated at more than $10.5 million. The day before the property was scheduled to be sold, Crossroads filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to protect its interest in the property. In its petition, Crossroads asserted it owed Fannie Mae $8.7 million. Fannie Mae sold the property after it was granted relief from the bankruptcy stay. Crossroads then sued Fannie Mae for wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, fraud, and other tort and contract actions. Fannie Mae filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending the actions on which Crossroads based its complaint were Fannie Mae’s statements in its papers filed in the bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. This appeal challenged the trial court’s denial of Fannie Mae's special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. "The principal thrust of Crossroads’ action was to recover for violations of state nonjudicial foreclosure law, not for any exercise of speech or petition rights by Fannie Mae. Even if protected activity was not merely incidental to the unprotected activity, Crossroads established a prima facie case showing it was likely to succeed on its causes of action." View "Crossroads Investors v. Federal National Mortgage Assn." on Justia Law

The property owners of three undeveloped residential lots in the Westerville City School District filed complaints with the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) seeking reductions in the county auditor’s valuations of all three parcels for tax year 2011. The BOR adopted the the opinion of the owners’ appraiser and granted the requested reductions. The Westerville City School District Board of Education appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopted the valuations of the school board’s appraiser, which were higher than the valuations arrived at by both the owner’s appraiser and the auditor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA did not act unlawfully or unreasonably by finding that the school board met its burden of proof at the BTA hearing and did not violate Ohio Const. art. XII, 2, which requires that property “be taxed by uniform rule according to value.” View "Westerville City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Team Rentals, LLC, the owner of a two-story office building in Summit County, sought a reduction of the value assigned to its property for tax year 2012. The Summit County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the value based explicitly on a bank appraisal presented by Team Rentals. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed the BOR’s valuation and reinstated the higher valuation originally assessed by the county auditor, concluding that the BOR’s determination to reduce the value record was unsupported by competent and probative evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) the BTA misapprehended the competency of the evidence and ignored case law barring the use of the auditor’s original valuation as “default value” under the circumstances presented in this case; and (2) a legal error in the BOR’s determination prevented affirmance of the BOR’s determination. Remanded for an independent determination of value based upon all the evidence in the record. View "Copley-Fairlawn City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law