Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Northeast Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission challenged the validity of a ninety-nine-year fixed-lease agreement with a private contractor, V.M. Cleveland. The Commission contracted to pay Cleveland $18,000 per month over a ninety-nine-year period to build and to lease a facility on land owned by the Commission. Payments continued uninterrupted for ten years, until the Commission became concerned about the agreement’s legality. The Commission stopped making payments and sought to rescind the agreement. The chancellor found that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the Commission to pay Cleveland $612,000 in back rent. The Commission appealed, arguing that the agreement’s ninety-nine-year duration rendered the agreement voidable at the Commission’s discretion as a matter of law due to the rule against binding successors. The Commission also argued that the specific terms of the agreement were unreasonable, illegal, or both, and thus void ab initio as a matter of law. The Supreme Court found that the agreement at issue here violated the common-law rule against binding successors, and as such reversed the chancellor’s judgment and rendered judgment in the Commission’s favor. View "Northeast Mental Health - Mental Retardation Commission v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The Northeast Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission challenged the validity of a ninety-nine-year fixed-lease agreement with a private contractor, V.M. Cleveland. The Commission contracted to pay Cleveland $18,000 per month over a ninety-nine-year period to build and to lease a facility on land owned by the Commission. Payments continued uninterrupted for ten years, until the Commission became concerned about the agreement’s legality. The Commission stopped making payments and sought to rescind the agreement. The chancellor found that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the Commission to pay Cleveland $612,000 in back rent. The Commission appealed, arguing that the agreement’s ninety-nine-year duration rendered the agreement voidable at the Commission’s discretion as a matter of law due to the rule against binding successors. The Commission also argued that the specific terms of the agreement were unreasonable, illegal, or both, and thus void ab initio as a matter of law. The Supreme Court found that the agreement at issue here violated the common-law rule against binding successors, and as such reversed the chancellor’s judgment and rendered judgment in the Commission’s favor. View "Northeast Mental Health - Mental Retardation Commission v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The High Line is an elevated “linear park” in New York City that runs along the west side of Manhattan from Gansevoort Street to 34th Street. The park, used for walking, jogging, and other recreational purposes, occupied the elevated viaduct of a former railway line. In 2005, the elevated viaduct was converted to a public recreational trail under the authority of the National Trails System Act. Before the Federal District Court of Appeals was a takings matter: appellant Romanoff Equities, Inc., contended that the conversion of the railway property to a trail entailed a taking of its property without just compensation. The Court of Federal Claims held, on summary judgment, that the conversion did not result in a taking of Romanoff’s property. Finding no reversible error, the Federal District appellate court affirmed. View "Romanoff Equities, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The City of Poway (Poway) was known as the "City in the Country." Harry Rogers had operated a horse boarding facility called the Stock Farm in Poway, but he decided to close the Stock Farm and build 12 homes in its place (the Project). Having the Stock Farm close down impacted members of the Poway Valley Riders Association (PVRA), whose 12-acre rodeo, polo, and other grounds were across the street from the Stock Farm. Over the objections of the PVRA and others, Poway's city council voted unanimously to approve the Project under a mitigated negative declaration (MND). Subsequently, project opponents formed Preserve Poway (Preserve) and instituted this litigation, asserting the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) required an environmental impact report (EIR) to be prepared instead of an MND. The trial court ruled an EIR was necessary because there was substantial evidence that the Project's elimination of the Stock Farm may have a significant impact on Poway's horse-friendly "community character" as the "City in the Country." The Court of Appeal reduced the real issue in this case to not what was proposed to be going in (homes with private horse boarding), but what was coming out (the Stock Farm, public horse boarding). Project opponents contended that because Rogers obtained a conditional use permit to operate horse stables they have enjoyed using for 20 years, the public had a right under CEQA to prevent Rogers from making some other lawful use of his land. "Whether the Project should be approved is a political and policy decision entrusted to Poway's elected officials. It is not an environmental issue for courts under CEQA." The trial court's judgment was reversed insofar as the judgment granted as to an issue of community character. The judgment was also reversed insofar as the judgment directed the City of Poway to "set aside its adoption of the Mitigated Negative Declaration for the Tierra Bonita Subdivision Project located on Tierra Bonita Road in the City of Poway ('Project')"; "set aside its approval of Tentative Tract Map 12-002 for the Project"; and "not issue any permits for the subject property that rely upon the Mitigated Negative Declaration or Tentative Tract Map for the Project." Additionally, the judgment was reversed to the extent the judgment provided that the trial court "retain[ed] jurisdiction over the proceedings by way of a return to the peremptory writ of mandate until the court has determined the City of Poway has complied with the provisions of CEQA." The trial court was directed to enter a new judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate as to community character. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Preserve Poway v. City of Poway" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the value for tax year 2012 of four residential properties used as rental properties. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) ordered reductions based on unspecified area sale prices and rents. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) retained the BOR’s reduced valuations of the property. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed, asking that the Supreme Court reverse the BTA’s decision and reinstate the original valuations found by the county auditor. The Supreme Court affirmed based on the authority of Columbus City Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision, in which the Court confronted similar claims in an appeal by the BOE and rejected the claims because the BOE had not raised and preserved them before the BTA. View "Oak View Props., LLC v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Fellows filed the underlying complaint challenging the Water Commissioner’s administration of water under the Perry v. Beattie decree. The district court dismissed Fellows’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that Fellows’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim. Fellows then requested the district court to certify a question to the Water Court. The district court granted the request. The Water Court entered a final order that tabulated the water rights necessary to address Fellows’s underlying complaint. By the time of its certification order, the water claims had been adjudicated in a temporary preliminary decree, and therefore, the Water Court ordered that the matter be closed and returned to the district court. The Perry Defendants filed a motion to alter or amend the Water Court’s judgment. The Water Court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Water Court correctly followed the law of the case; (2) Fellows’s petition for certification was proper; and (3) the Water Court did not err in defining the scope of the controversy, in determining the purpose of the tabulation, and in tabulating the applicable rights involved in the controversy. Remanded. View "Fellows v. Saylor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Jon Ellis appealed the dismissal of his suit against County of Calaveras, the Assessment Appeals Board for the County of Calaveras (the AAB), the Assessor for the County of Calaveras (the assessor), and the Auditor-Controller for the County of Calaveras (the auditor-controller) to Ellis’s petition and complaint relating to property taxes assessed against his real property. Ellis owned real property in Calaveras County on which he was constructing a large detached garage. In 2009, he was assessed property taxes based on an appraised value of the garage set by the assessor at $140,000 (90 percent of the estimated total cost of construction of $156,800). Ellis sought a reduction of the assessment from the AAB. The AAB reduced the value of the garage to $117,600, based on a finding that construction was only 75 percent complete. In February 2011, Ellis contested that finding by seeking writ relief from the trial court, but the parties reached a settlement before the trial court ruled on the merits. In 2010, Ellis was assessed property taxes based on the partially constructed garage having a “ ‘base year value’ ” in 2010 of $117, 600. In light of this assessment, in December 2011, after he had received a property tax assessment as of the 2011 lien date, Ellis sought a writ to enforce the settlement agreement. When his attempts to enforce the settlement agreement failed, Ellis filed an application with the AAB to reduce the assessment for his 2010 property taxes. He designated the application, which was filed November 29, 2012, as a claim for a tax refund, and he indicated his challenge was premised on the base year value being incorrect and there having been no new construction as of the 2010 lien date. By the time Ellis filed his application, construction of the garage had been deemed complete and a supplemental assessment had been issued. He also received a regular assessment as of the 2012 lien date. In July 2013, the AAB heard Ellis’s appeal of his 2010 tax assessment and determined Ellis’s appeal was not timely filed, and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. In March 2014, Ellis petitioned the trial court seeking a traditional or administrative writ of mandate, refund of his property taxes, and declaratory relief. The trial court found that Ellis had not exhausted his administrative remedies, he had an adequate remedy at law, and that to the extent the pleading could be construed as a complaint, it was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel because the trial court’s previous denial of Ellis’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement “amounted to a determination of the merits of the same legal arguments raised [here.]” Therefore, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and subsequently entered a judgment of dismissal. Ellis appealed that judgment, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Ellis v. County of Calaveras" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a partnership and an LLC, were related entities with common owners. The partnership acquired a commercial office complex and later transferred ownership of the property to the LLC. In 2008, the City of Norwalk’s tax assessor set the fair market value of the partnership at approximately $49 million. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ property tax appeal and reduced the valuation of the LLC’s property by approximately $15 million. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeal because the LLC had not appeared in administrative proceedings before the City’s Board of Assessment Appeals and did not initiate the appeal to the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the tax appeal was initially brought by a nonaggrieved party, the partnership, the appeal was also maintained by the LLC, an aggrieved party that had properly been added to the trial court proceedings by way of a promptly filed amended complaint. View "Fairfield Merrittview Ltd. P’ship v. City of Norwalk" on Justia Law

In June 2015, the State began this civil action against Patricia Goodale, contending that her home was a public nuisance. The Walsh County sheriff's office personally served Goodale with the summons and complaint. On August 5, 2015, after several weeks without receiving an answer from Goodale, the State filed with the district court an affidavit of default and proof for judgment; proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for abatement; and a proposed judgment. On August 7, 2015, the district court signed the findings and order, and a default judgment for abatement of nuisance was entered. Goodale was served notice of the judgment. Goodale did not seek relief from the default judgment in the district court under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b), but instead appealed directly to the North Dakota Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Goodale" on Justia Law

Dwight Johnson and Darin Vangsness appealed from a judgment affirming the State Board of Public School Education's decision to deny their petition for annexation of property from one school district to another. Johnson and Vangsness owned land that was transferred to the Lewis and Clark district, and they sought annexation of property to the Garrison district. The McLean and Ward county committees approved the petition. The petition was then submitted to the State Board of Public School Education for approval. Proponents and opponents of the petition testified and presented other evidence. Johnson, Vangsness and others, including the superintendent of Garrison, testified in favor of the annexation petition. The superintendent of Lewis and Clark and the president of its school board testified in opposition to the petition. Because the Board acted in accordance with the law, did not violate Johnson and Vangsness' constitutional rights or their rights to a fair hearing, and its decision was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Annexation of a Part of Lewis & Clark Public Sch. Dist." on Justia Law