Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

503 South Front Street, LP, a for-profit corporation, owned 30,000 square feet of commercial space and leased the property for a term of thirty years to ShadoArt Productions, a nonprofit organization. ShadoArt filed an application for exemption under Ohio Rev. Code 5709.12 and 5709.121, which statutes articulate the substantive requirements for public-use and charitable-use exemptions. The tax commissioner denied the request. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. On appeal, ShadoArt argued that because Ohio Rev. Code 5715.27, which permits certain long-term lessees to file applications for exemption, authorizes it to file an application for exemption, it was also entitled to receive an exemption under sections 5709.12 and 5709.121. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) amended section 5715.27 did not alter the substantive requirements for any specific exemption under chapter 5709; and (2) ShadoArt’s claim for exemption did not satisfy the requirements set forth in sections 5709.12 and 5709.121 because the property does not belong to a charitable institution. View "ShadoArt Prods., Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

Rural Health Collaborative of Southern Ohio, Inc. owned a facility in Adams County that was operated under lease by Dialysis Clinic, Inc. Rural Health filed a charitable-use exemption application for the property. The tax commissioner denied the exemption. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) concluded that Rural Health qualified as a charitable institution under Ohio Rev. Code 5709.121(A)(2) and granted the exemption. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s grant of exemption and remanded, holding (1) the BTA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Rural Health qualifies as a charitable institution; but (2) BTA erred in granting the exemption because the BTA did not fully analyze the claim under Ohio Rev. Code 5709.121(A)(1). Remanded. View "Rural Health Collaborative of S. Ohio, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Polk County assessor set the 2011 valuation of Wellmark, Inc.’s corporate headquarters located in Des Moines at $99 million. Wellmark protested. The Polk County Board of Review denied the protest. On appeal, the district court found the value of the property on January 1, 2011 was $78 million. At issue in this case was whether the property should have been valued as if it were a multi-tenant office building, which would likely be the result if the property were sold, or whether the property should have been valued according to its current use as a single-tenant headquarters building. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while there had been a showing of no active market for a single-tenant office building such as the Wellmark property, value should be based on the presumed existence of a hypothetical buyer at the property’s current use. View "Wellmark, Inc. v. Polk County Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Cadillac Place (former General Motors Building), a Detroit office complex, is home to state offices, a court of appeals, a restaurant, a gift store, and even a barber shop. It is owned by Michigan Strategic Fund, a public entity, and leased by the state. Babcock, an attorney, s disabled due to Friedreich’s Ataxia, a degenerative neuromuscular disorder that impairs her ability to walk. She worked in Cadillac Place. Babcock alleged that its design features denied her equal access to her place of employment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act , 42 U.S.C. 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Babcock did not identify a service, program, or activity of a public entity from which she was excluded or denied a benefit. The court noted the dispositive distinction between access to a facility and access to programs or activities. Babcock only identified facilities-related issues. View "Babcock v. State of Mich." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Washington County Auditor determined a value of $9,091,000 for a Lowe’s Home Center store in Marietta. Lowe’s filed a complaint before the Washington County Board of Revision (BOR) seeking a reduction to $3,600,000. The BOR retained the auditor’s valuation. On appeal, Lowe’s and the County presented competing appraisals. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopted the County’s appraisal, concluding that the County’s comparables were more appropriate. Lowe’s appealed, arguing that the BTA misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision in Meijer Stores Ltd. Partnership v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision by adopting the type of appraisal in this case that the BTA rejected in Rite Aid of Ohio, Inc. v. Washington County Bd. of Revision. The Supreme Court explained the significance of Meijer Stores in its decision in the Rite Aid appeal, also issued today. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision in the instant case, holding that reading the BTA decision in light of that explanation identified a significant omission in the BTA’s analysis. Remanded. View "Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Washington County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The 2010, the Washington County Auditor determined a value of $3,319,000 for multiple parcels that together constituted a Rite Aid drugstore and its parking lot. Rite Aid of Ohio, Inc. filed a complaint before the Washington County Board of Revision (BOR) seeking a reduction. The BOR retained the auditor’s valuation. On appeal, Rite Aid and the County presented competing appraisals. The County’s appraisal was more than twice that of Rite Aid’s. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopted Rite Aid’s appraisal as the value of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Meijer Stores Ltd. Partnership v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision did not require the use of the kind of comparables that the County’s appraiser relied upon because Meijer Stores was not applicable in this case. View "Rite Aid of Ohio, Inc. v. Washington County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2014, a petition was filed on behalf of the Seacliff Condominium Association for an order requiring Heather R., the owner of a condominium in Seacliff, to undergo an involuntary 72-hour psychiatric evaluation. The petition alleged that Heather was a threat to “herself . . . and her neighbors” based on “[y]ears of confrontation, threats, aberrant and widely swinging behavior suggesting drug use,” including “taking pictures inside people’s houses, inability to have normal social interactions, [and] lying [in] wait to confront neighbors.” After conducting a statutorily required ex parte screening investigation, which did not include an interview with Heather, the superior court master determined that there was probable cause to believe that she was mentally ill and presented a likelihood of serious harm to others. Heather appealed the evaluation order, claiming that the ex parte investigation violated due process and that the master failed to properly conduct the statutorily required screening investigation. Although this appeal was technically moot, the Supreme Court reached the merits of these claims under the public interest exception. The Court vacated the evaluation order because the superior court master failed to conduct the interview as part of the screening investigation required by statute; the Court did not reach the due process question. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Heather R." on Justia Law

The Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Meriden granted a variance to Mark Development, LLC to use a parcel of real property located in a regional development zone as a used car dealership on the grounds that the effect of applying the Meriden Zoning Regulations was so severe as to amount to a practical confiscation. Plaintiffs, the City of Meriden and two of its officers, appealed from the Board’s decision granting the variance. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ appeal in part and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to sustain Plaintiffs’ appeal, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been deprived of all reasonable uses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court correctly found that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been practically confiscated. View "Caruso v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for abatement of real property taxes that the Town of Lebanon assessed against her property for the tax years 2011 through 2013. The Town denied the application on the basis that the taxes had been paid. After a de novo hearing, the York County Commissioners ultimately denied Plaintiff’s application for abatement for tax years 2011 and 2012 and remanded the matter for further action with respect to tax year 2013. The superior court affirmed the decision of the Commissioners with respect to the 2011 and 2012 tax years. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to supply the Court with a complete and defined record of the evidence and arguments presented to the Commissioners, the Court could not review Plaintiff’s argument that the Commissioners were compelled to authorize an abatement. View "Penkul v. Town of Lebanon" on Justia Law

In an inverse condemnation action, the issue facing the Court of Appeal was a unique situation, where a state agency assumed control of a local flood control process, and it determined to provide less flood protection than historically provided by a local agency in order to protect environmental resources. Plaintiffs, whose properties suffered flooding damage when the lagoon level rose above eight feet msl, filed this action in 2007 for inverse condemnation. They alleged they suffered a physical taking from the Department’s actions, and a regulatory taking by the Commission retaining land use jurisdiction over the subdivision throughout this time instead of transferring it to the County. Plaintiffs also sought precondemnation damages and statutory attorney fees. The trial court found the Department and the Commission (collectively, the State) liable for a physical taking and awarded damages, but it concluded plaintiffs’ claim for a regulatory taking was barred. It rejected the State’s arguments that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ complaint. It awarded plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount they incurred under a contingency agreement, but it denied plaintiffs any precondemnation damages. Both the State and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment finding the state agency liable in inverse condemnation for a physical taking of plaintiffs’ properties, and not liable for a regulatory taking. The Court reversed the judgment to the extent the court found another state permitting agency liable in inverse condemnation. View "Pacific Shores v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife" on Justia Law