Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Cuyahoga County filed an exemption to a tract of real property it acquired in 2004. The property consisted of a marina/restaurant that operated in conjunction with an adjacent public park. The tax commissioner granted the application as to the the public park portion but denied the application as to the remainder constituting the marina and restaurant. In doing so, the Commissioner invoked his authority to order a split between the taxable and exempt portions. The County appealed, arguing that the Commissioner erred by finding that the property was not used exclusively for a public purpose. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed primarily on the ground that the marina and restaurant were operated “with a view to profit.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the marina and restaurant are considered separately from the park, the denial of the exemption was neither unreasonable nor unlawful. View "Cuyahoga County v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Town of Underhill appealed a trial court order that affirmed a decision of the County Road Commissioners requiring the Town to maintain a segment of Town Highway 26 (TH 26), a Class 4 highway. TH 26 has existed, in some form, for nearly 150 years. In 2001, the Town sought to reclassify a segment of TH 26 between Irish Settlement Road and Pleasant Valley Road as a legal trail, and the remainder of the roadway as a Class 4 highway. Following protracted litigation, these changes became effective in June 2010, and TH 26 became part of the Town’s six miles of Class 4 highways. Prior to the reclassification of TH 26, the Town performed periodic maintenance and repair work to both the roadway and the twenty-two culverts that were installed along and under TH 26 over the past thirty years. Although the ditches along TH 26 do not appear to have been maintained since 2010, the Town has continued to do some work, primarily the addition of base material to the roadway. Appellees David Demarest, Jeffrey Moulton, and Jonathan Fuller owned property on TH 26 in the Town of Underhill. Appellees Fuller and Demarest resided at their properties full time, while two additional residents along the road were part-time residents. In 2012, appellees filed a notice of insufficiency pursuant to 19 V.S.A. 971 requesting maintenance of TH 26, which had been largely deferred following the roadway reclassification. The Town denied appellees’ allegations, asserting that TH 26 was being maintained to the extent required by the necessity of the Town, the public good, and the convenience of the inhabitants of the Town. Appellees then brought an action for the appointment of County Road Commissioners pursuant to 19 V.S.A. 971 et seq. to compel the Town to undertake repairs of TH 26. Specifically, appellees sought repairs and maintenance to drainage, culverts, and the road surface, so as to make it reasonably safe and accessible for appellees’ use as residents of the Town. The Town contended on appeal that the trial court misconstrued and incorrectly applied the statutory provisions for the maintenance of Class 4 roads and erroneously established its own maintenance standard. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Town and reversed. View "Demarest v. Town of Underhill" on Justia Law

Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1502(2) imposes a requirement and specifies a consequence for its violation. In this case, a taxpayer filed a property valuation protest. The taxpayer’s protest form specified the assessed and requested valuation amounts but stated no reason for the requested change. The Lincoln County Board of Equalization dismissed the protest, citing section 77-1502(2). The taxpayer appealed to the Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). TERC dismissed the appeal with prejudice, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the protest due to the taxpayer’s failure to state the reason for the protest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board correctly dismissed the taxpayer’s protest because the protest failed to include a reason for the requested change in valuation; and (2) because the Board lacked authority to hear the taxpayer’s property valuation protest on the merits, TERC likewise lacked authority to do so. View "Village at North Platte v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the standard governing revocation of direct access from a state highway to property used for commercial purposes pursuant to the State Highway Access Management Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 27:7-89 to -98, and the State Highway Access Management Code (Access Code), N.J.A.C. 16:47-3.5(e)(11) and -3.8(k)(2). Arielle Realty, L.L.C. was the owner of a three-tenant commercial property located on the northbound side of Route 166 in Toms River. The DOT informed Arielle that access to its property from Route 166 would be eliminated because the DOT intended to construct an additional northbound travel lane. The DOT also advised Arielle that it intended to construct a median to separate northbound and southbound traffic on Route 166. This design would eliminate the eight parking spaces in the front of the building. The plan would also prevent direct access to Arielle s property for motorists traveling south on Route 166 because a motorist would no longer be able to make a left-hand turn onto West Gateway. According to the DOT design plan, a southbound motorist on Route 166, who intends to access Arielle s property, would be required to drive past the property, turn right onto a local road, turn right onto another local road, turn left onto Route 166 at an intersection controlled by a traffic signal, and turn right onto West Gateway. This alternative route traversed approximately three-quarters of a mile. In affirming the DOT Commissioner's decision, the Appellate Division determined that the DOT met its burden of proof that the alternative access plan was not only reasonable but also provided a convenient, direct, and well-marked means to enter the business and to return to the state road. Accordingly, the Appellate Division determined that the property owner failed to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the DOT design. The Supreme Court affirmed: "the Commissioner's analysis is ultimately aimed at selecting the plan that will best achieve the overarching goal of providing reasonable access to the state's system of highways rather than maximizing the business interests of a particular property owner." View "In re Revocation of the Access of Block #613" on Justia Law

Alesa Dawn Crum’s home in Corinth, Mississippi, was flooded with backflowed sewage, twice. Crum filed suit against the City of Corinth, alleging damages as a result of the City’s negligent maintenance of its sewage system. The Circuit Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss Crum’s complaint, finding that the City was immune under the discretionary-function exemption of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Crum appealed, arguing that the City was not entitled to discretionary-function immunity. Because the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in dismissing Crum’s complaint, it reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Crum v. City of Corinth" on Justia Law

Carol Reece applied for a coastal sand dune permit to create a vehicle access way to her property abutting a beach and to develop and lawn and walkway on the property. The Department of Environmental Protection granted the permit. Abutting landowner Jonathan Day and others appealed. The Board of Environmental Protection reached a de novo decision granting Reece’s application. The superior court vacated the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding that the Board’s interpretations of its own ambiguous rules do not conflict with the relevant statutes or with the rules, and the rules do not compel at the interpretation reached by the superior court. Remanded for entry of a judgment affirming the Board’s decision to grant Reece the permit. View "Day v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

In 2010, New Thistledown, LLC, which owned Thistledown Racetrack, petitioned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief. Thistledown was purchased at an auction for $43,000,000. The bankruptcy court authorized the sale, stating that the sale price constituted reasonably equivalent value and fair consideration of the purchased assets. For tax year 2010, the Cuyahoga County fiscal officer assigned a value of $14,264,000 to the parcels comprising Thistledown. The Board of Education of Warrensville Heights City School District filed a complaint with the board of revision (BOR) seeking an increase in valuation. The BOR retained the fiscal officer’s initial valuation. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) rejected the 2010 sale price as evidence of value and valued the real property at $13,800,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA reasonably and lawfully determined that the 2010 sale did not establish the true value of Thistledown; and (2) the evidence supported the BTA’s finding that Thistledown was worth $13,800,000 as of the tax-lien date. View "Warrensville Heights City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Talawanda City School District Board of Education (BOE) filed its application to exempt property located within the district. The tax commissioner granted an exemption for all of the property except for a parcel being farmed pursuant to lease, concluding that the pecuniary benefit realized by the farmer disqualified the land from exemption because that portion was not used for school purposes. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) following its amendment in 2010, Ohio Rev. Code 3313.44 does not contain a restriction requiring that the property owned by the BOE be used exclusively for school purposes; and (2) the entire property described in the BOE’s application shall be exempt for the year at issue. View "Talawanda City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Alameda County Waste Management Authority imposed a $9.55 annual charge on all households for disposal of household hazardous waste, by enactment of an ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Establishing a Household Hazardous Waste Collection and Disposal Fee.” Crawley challenged the Ordinance via a petition for a writ of mandate or administrative mandamus, arguing that the fee constituted an assessment under article XIII D of the California Constitution, requiring approval by a majority of the electorate pursuant to section 4. In the alternative, Crawley contended the fee was not imposed in compliance with the requirements of article XIII D, section 6. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal without leave to amend, rejecting Crawley’s assertion that the fee is not incidental to property ownership and concluding that the fee falls within an exemption to the constitutional requirements. View "Crawley v. Alameda Cnty, Waste Mgmt. Auth." on Justia Law

Appellants, The Sierra Club and Senator Clayton Hee, challenged the Land Use Commission’s (LUC) reclassification of 1525 acres of Appellee D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes’ land from the agricultural state land use district to the urban state land use district. The circuit court affirmed the LUC’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision and order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the reclassification did not violate article XI, section 3 of the Hawai’i Constitution or Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-41 through -52; and (2) reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported the LUC’s finding that the reclassification of the land at issue was consistent with the Hawai’i State Plan, would not substantially impair agricultural production, and was necessary for urban growth. View "Sierra Club v. D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes, LLC" on Justia Law