Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case returned to the Georgia Supreme Court for a second time. The central issue to this case involved a long-running boundary line dispute between Monroe County and Bibb County. In the prior appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of mandamus relief and remanded the case with direction for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. On remand, the trial court entered an order directing Secretary of State Brian Kemp to consider certain evidence and to preclude him from the consideration of other evidence in determining the true boundary line between the counties. Both the Secretary and Bibb County appealed the trial court’s order. The Supreme Court concluded, after review, that the trial court misapplied the Supreme Court's mandate, and accordingly, reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Kemp v. Monroe Cty." on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a former school property from the Town of Dexter for future redevelopment, and the Town initially supported Plaintiff’s redevelopment efforts. After Plaintiff contested the Town’s tax assessment of the property, the Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) issued a stop work order and notice of violation prohibiting all work on the property. Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendant, the Town of Dexter, alleging that the Town’s actions, through its CEO, were arbitrary and capricious and deprived him of equal protection of law and the use and enjoyment of property, in violation of both the federal and state constitutions. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages. The superior court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiff (1) failed to allege that the CEO’s actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy, (2) failed to pursue available administrative relief, and (3) failed to allege that he faced discriminatory treatment as compared with others who were similarly situated. View "Marshall v. Town of Dexter" on Justia Law

When the Mississippi State Highway Commission (MHC) sought a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) to fill wetlands in the roadbed of a proposed limited-access road, it pledged approximately 1,300 acres of Ward Gulfport Properties, L.P.’s and T. Jerard Gulfport, L.L.C.’s (collectively, “Ward”) property as wetlands mitigation. ACE issued the permit to MHC in 2009. Ward filed suit in state court against MHC, seeking damages from an unlawful taking, and in federal court against ACE, seeking to have the permit invalidated. The federal court vacated the permit. MHC moved for summary judgment, arguing that no taking had occurred and that the federal court had determined ACE, not MHC, had caused Ward’s losses. The trial court granted MHC’s motion. Ward appealed. Finding the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of MHC, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Ward Gulfport Properties, L.P. v. Mississippi State Highway Commission" on Justia Law

Platinum Lodging, LLC, the former owner of the property at issue in this appeal, was a party throughout proceedings challenging a real property valuation for the tax year 2008. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the valuation. Platinum Lodging and the current property owners appealed to the common pleas court. The common pleas court remanded the matter to the BOR. On remand, the BOR dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the complainant lacked standing. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education and Platinum Lodging appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) dismissed the appeals on the grounds that, because the first appeal had been filed in the common pleas court, the BTA lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the BOR’s dismissal order on remand. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s order or dismissal as to Platinum Lodging, holding that Platinum Lodging acted properly in filing its notice of appeal at the BTA instead of in the common pleas court. Remanded to the BOR with instructions that it determine the value of the property in accordance with the earlier remand order issued by the common pleas court. View "Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellees’ farm was condemned by the Board of Education for the purpose of building a school. On Appellees’ behalf, the Board paid the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. Appellees requested from the County a refund of a portion of the County farmland transfer tax, arguing that the County, in calculating the County farmland transfer tax, was incorrect in concluding that the twenty-five percent State surcharge was not part of the combined transfer tax. The County denied the request for a refund. The Tax Court affirmed, concluding that the State surcharge was to be collected in addition to the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. The circuit court reversed. The Court of Special Appeals certified the case to the Court of Appeals to answer a question of law. The Court of Appeals answered (1) the agricultural land transfer tax, as set forth in Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-407(a)(2) and (3), includes the State surcharge imposed under Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-303(d), and the State surcharge must be calculated into the tax ceiling on a county’s agricultural land transfer tax; and (2) therefore, Appellees were entitled to a refund in the amount of the overcharge of the County farmland transfer tax. View "Montgomery County v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Real-Parties-in-Interest Plaza Camino Real, LP and CMF PCR, LLC (collectively, "Westfield") proposed to renovate a shopping center originally built in the City of Carlsbad over 40 years ago. The City approved Westfield's request to renovate a former Robinsons-May store and other small portions of the shopping center. North County Advocates challenged the City's approval under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), arguing the project's environmental impact report (EIR) used an improper baseline in its traffic analysis because it treated the Robinsons-May store as fully occupied, even though it was vacated in 2006 and had been only periodically occupied since. Advocates also argued the City violated CEQA by failing to consider as a mitigation measure that it require Westfield to make a fair share contribution to the future widening of the El Camino Real bridge over State Route 78 and by failing to respond adequately to public comments regarding traffic mitigation. The trial court rejected Advocates' CEQA challenges and awarded the City costs for staff time spent reviewing and certifying the administrative record Advocates prepared. Advocates appeals the trial court's CEQA and costs determinations. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's CEQA determinations. View "North County Advocates v. City of Carlsbad" on Justia Law

This matter concerned a parcel of commercial/industrial property located in Springettsbury Township, which was owned by appellee Harley-Davidson Motor Company. Approximately 110 acres of the parcel contained buildings and other improvements, and the remaining 119 acres were considered “excess” land. Previously, the United States Navy, from 1941 until 1964, and, later, a private firm, American Machinery and Foundry Company (“AMF”), with whom Harley-Davidson merged in 1969, used the parcel to operate a weapons manufacturing plant and, in the course of their business, buried numerous contaminants (as well as unexploded military ordnance) in the subsurface strata. This use caused significant environmental damage to the property. In 1993, Harley-Davidson repurposed a portion of the site to operate a motorcycle manufacturing plant. In 2003, the Assessment Office of York County notified Harley-Davidson that it intended to increase the parcel’s property tax assessment. Harley-Davidson filed an appeal with the York County Board of Assessment Appeals, which affirmed. Harley-Davidson then filed a de novo appeal with the trial court. Appellant Central York School District (“School District”) intervened, and the parties proceeded to a three-day bench trial to determine the parcel’s assessments for tax years 2004 through 2010, pursuant to the Second Class A and Third Class County Assessment Law. This appeal by allowance before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involved the proper determination of the fair market value of Harley-Davidson's property for purposes of property tax assessment, including consideration of environmental contamination, remediation, and stigma, as well as the potential for future subdivision of the property. After review, the Supreme Court found: (1) hypothetical ways in which a property could be used by potential buyers are properly considered by an expert in evaluating what a willing buyer would pay for a property; (2) the potential effect of agreements concerning possible environmental remediation liability and ongoing environmental restrictions and maintenance is a relevant factor that must be taken into account when determining the fair market value of property, and (3) environmental stigma may be relevant to determining fair market value of real estate for tax purposes in appropriate circumstances. The Supreme concluded: (1) the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the School District’s expert valued the subject property as already subdivided, and, thus, its determination in this regard was reversed; (2) the Commonwealth Court properly concluded that these agreements were not accounted for by the trial court; thus, the Commonwealth Court’s remand was affirmed; and (3) the trial court properly relied upon the School District’s expert’s opinion regarding a 5% environmental stigma devaluation for the property; thus, reversed the Commonwealth Court’s rejection of the trial court’s reliance upon such stigma in its valuation of the property. View "Harley-Davidson v. Central York Sch District et al" on Justia Law

Crystal Lake South High School is surrounded by land zoned “R-2 residential single family,” and constitutes a legal, nonconforming use. The campus is owned by District 155. In 2013, the District’s Board decided to replace the bleachers at the Crystal Lake South football stadium after a failed structural inspection. The plan involved relocating new, larger, home bleachers to be adjacent to residential property and closer to the property line than existing bleachers. The McHenry County Regional Superintendent of Schools approved the plans and issued a building permit under the School Code, 105 ILCS 5/3-14.20. The District began work without notifying the city of Crystal Lake or seeking a building permit, zoning approval, or storm water management approval. The city ordered the Board to stop construction until it obtained a special-use permit, a stormwater permit, and zoning variances. The Board disregarded the order and proceeded with construction. Owners of adjoining residential properties sought to privately enforce the zoning restrictions under the Illinois Municipal Code, 65 ILCS 5/11-13-15. The Board sought declaratory judgment. The circuit court awarded the city summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a school district is subject to, and its school board must comply with, local governmental zoning and storm water restrictions. View "Gurba v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 155" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a coastal height setback requirement that limits development next to Waikiki’s shoreline. In 2010, Kyo-ya Hotels & Resorts LP submitted a land use permit to redevelop an existing hotel building with a twenty-six-story hotel and residential tower. The Director of the Department of Planning and Permitting granted partial approval of Kyo-ya’s variance application to allow the Project to encroach approximately seventy-four percent into the coastal height setback. Several entities (Petitioners) challenged the Director’s conclusion that Kyo-ya’s request for a variance from the coastal height Sstback met the requirements for issuance of a variance as set forth by the city charter. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) denied Petitioners’ appeal of the Director’s decision. The circuit court affirmed the ZBA order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Kyo-ya met none of the three requirements for issuance of a variance. View "Surfrider Found. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal" on Justia Law

John R. Cooper, in his official capacity as director of the Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT"), appealed a Circuit Court's December 16, 2014, order enjoining him from prohibiting Eddie Ziegler, Lisa Ziegler Player, Jennifer Ziegler Cousins, Angela Gay Ziegler Bracknell, and Cathy Donaldson (referred to collectively as "the Zieglers"), from obtaining legal permits to build seven to eight houses on the Zieglers' property or from otherwise interfering with the Zieglers' plans and likewise enjoining Cooper from withholding consent for the building of those houses in the event the Zieglers obtain the required permits. Because the Supreme Court found that Cooper was entitled to sovereign immunity, it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cooper v. Ziegler" on Justia Law