Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1973, the City of South Portland issued a variance to Kay Loring that brought her parcel of land, which was previously nonconforming, into dimensional conformity. For purposes of land use regulation, Loring’s 4,703 square foot lot became the equivalent of a conforming 5,000 square foot lot. In 2013, the City’s Building Inspector issued a building permit based on the 1973 variance that authorized Loring to construct a single-family house on her lot. Mary Campbell and others (collectively, Campbell), who owned nearby lots, appealed the issuance of the permit. The South Portland Board of Appeals affirmed the Building Inspector’s action, and the superior court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1973 variance was still in force when the building permit was issued, and the Building Inspector was authorized to act on Loring’s permit application; and (2) Campbell did not preserve her argument for municipal or judicial review that the building permit was not lawful because the proposed development would exceed the density restrictions for that zoning district. View "Campbell v. City of S. Portland" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the tax year 2008 valuation of an office-warehouse building in west Columbus. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the value assigned to the property from the $2,750,000 found by the auditor to the $1,520,000 advocated in an appraisal submitted by the property owner. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) alleged defects in the wording of the BTA’s decision do not establish it to be unreasonable or unlawful; (2) the BTA is not required to issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law; (3) alleged errors in the appraisal furnish no basis for reversal; and (4) the BOE failed to satisfy its burden under the rule announced in Bedford Bd. of Educ. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision. View "Columbus City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The Unit Owners Association of Centre Pointe Condominium (Centre Pointe) was formed in May 2003 by a declaration of condominium (Declaration) recorded in Whatcom County. A clubhouse and three residential buildings with 97 units of the Centre Pointe complex were built prior to 2011. In May 2011, Filmore LLP bought an unfinished portion of the Centre Pointe complex and all related development and special declarant rights. Filmore's property was part of the Centre Point complex and subject to its Declaration. Section 9.1.14 of the Declaration provided that there was "no restriction on the right of any Unit Owner to lease his or her Unit" other than the restrictions described in section 9.1.14. Nothing in section 9.1.14 limited the number of units that could be leased. In October 2011, owners of Centre Pointe units to which at least 67 percent (but less than 90 percent) of the votes in Centre Pointe were allocated approved a 12th amendment to the Declaration, requiring that no more than 30 percent of the total number of units could be leased. In October 2012, Filmore filed a complaint at the Whatcom County Superior Court alleging that the Declaration's Twelfth Amendment violated RCW 64.34.264(4) and section 17.3 of the Declaration because the 12th amendment was not passed with 90 percent of the eligible votes. Filmore requested that the 12th amendment be found void and unenforceable. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Filmore, and the Court of Appeals agreed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' judgments. View "Filmore, LLLP v. Unit Owners Ass'n of Centre Pointe Condo." on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Ray DeVilbiss owned property within a road service area, but did not make use of the roads built and maintained with the road service taxes levied on that property. He argued Alaska law required that his property therefore be excluded from the service area, and that the tax was invalid absent a special benefit to his property. The superior court rejected these claims, and granted the borough that oversaw the service area summary judgment. Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court affirmed. Alaska law neither required boroughs and municipalities to exclude properties that do not make use of roads financed by road service taxes nor tied the validity of a tax to each taxpayer’s receipt of a special benefit. View "DeVilbiss v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough" on Justia Law

In 2012, as the result of a change in the way the Custer County assessor classified irrigated grassland for purposes of valuation, the assessor increased the assessed value of the property owned by Appellant from $734,968 to $1,834,924. Appellant filed petitions with the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1507.01 challenging the valuation increase. After two separate hearings on Appellant’s petitions, TERC affirmed the assessor’s valuations for 2012. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that TERC’s consideration of Appellant’s petitions using the appellate standard of review described in Nev. Rev. Stat. 77-5016(9) constituted plain error. Remanded. View "Cain v. Custer County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant purchased a two-family dwelling from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development for $5,000. The Cuyahoga County fiscal officer valued the property at $126,800 for tax year 2011. Appellant sought a reduction to $30,000. The County Board of Revision retained the fiscal officer’s valuation. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA acted unreasonably when it found that the property’s 2011 sale price was not the best evidence of its tax year 2011 value. Remanded with instructions that the $5,000 sale price be used as the property’s value for tax year 2011. View "Schwartz v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the homestead exemption’s prohibition on the collection of real property taxes under S.D. Codified Laws 43-31. In January 2014, prior to turning seventy years old, John Reints filed an application for a prohibition on the collection of real property taxes assessed on his home in 2013. Pennington County denied Reints’s request because he had not turned seventy prior to January 1, 2014. The Department upheld the determination, determining that the prohibition does not apply to taxes assessed prior to the year in which the applicant reaches seventy years of age. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) once a prohibition is granted under chapter 43-31 a county is restrained from collecting any real property taxes on the applicant’s single-family dwelling, regardless of when those taxes were assessed; (2) nevertheless, an applicant cannot establish a base year under the exemption until he actually reaches the age of seventy; (3) because Reints was only sixty-nine years old when he submitted his application, he had not established a base year as required by section 43-31-32; and (4) therefore, Reints’s application was properly denied. View "Reints v. Pennington County" on Justia Law

Respondent lived in his home for nearly ten years before razing the existing house in order to build a new house on the lot. Respondent benefitted from the application of the homestead tax credit with respect to increases in the value of the prior structure while he lived in it. The new construction increased the value of the property by approximately $500,000. The tax assessor, while retaining Respondent’s existing credit, included the full value of the renovation in the value to be taxed. The Maryland Tax Court affirmed the assessor’s interpretation. The circuit court reversed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the “taxable assessment” used to compute the homestead tax credit under Md. Code Tax-Property (TP) 9-105 should include the value of renovations when a homeowner razes and rebuilds a home. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and circuit court affirmed the decision of the tax court, holding that, when a homeowner razes and rebuilds a home, the homeowner may retain existing homestead tax credit if the homeowner satisfies certain criteria and the tax credit computation for the property with the rebuilt house is to be done in accordance with TP 9-105(c)(5) and TP 9-105(e)(1). View "Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. Andrecs" on Justia Law

In an equalization proceeding before the Utah State Tax Commission, Decker Lake Ventures, LLC sought a reduction of the assessed valuation of its property under Utah Code 59-2-1006. Under this statute, the Commission is directed to “adjust property valuations to reflect a value equalized with the assessed value of other comparable properties” upon a determination that “the property that is the subject of the appeal deviates in value plus or minus 5% from the assessed value of comparable properties.” The Commission rejected Decker Lake’s equalization claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not commit reversible error in its determination of comparability or in its factual findings. View "Decker Lake Ventures v. Utah State Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) is a national electronic loan registry system that permits its members to transfer, among themselves, promissory notes associated with mortgages, while MERS remains the mortgagee of record in public records as “nominee” for the note holder and its successors and assigns. MERS facilitates the secondary market for mortgages by permitting members to transfer the right to repayment pursuant to the terms of the promissory note, recording such transfers in the MERS database to notify one another and establish priority, instead of recording such transfers as mortgage assignments in local land recording offices. It permits note holders to avoid recording fees. Recorders of deeds in Pennsylvania counties sued, seeking an injunction, and to recover millions of dollars in unpaid recording fees, contending that the MERS entities violated 21 Pa. Cons. Stat. 351. The Third Circuit rejected the claims, holding that section 351 does not create a duty to record all land conveyances and is so clear that certification to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was unnecessary. The transfers of promissory notes among MERS members do not constitute assignments of the mortgage itself. View "Cnty. of Montgomery Recorder v. MERSCorp Inc" on Justia Law