Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute over a permit application to repair and maintain Imperial Gulch Road (IGR), which provides access to the property of the appellant, Jeffrey "Jae" Hill. The respondent, Blaine County, denied the permit application, concluding that it did not have the authority to issue the permit because it had previously declined to validate IGR. Hill filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision.The district court affirmed the Board’s denial in part and vacated its decision in part. The court concluded that the Board did not validate IGR and therefore the Board lacked authority to issue the requested permit. However, the court remanded the matter back to the Board to determine if the Board had authority to issue the permit under a public easement theory. Hill appealed, arguing that the district court erred by determining that the Board had not validated IGR.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the district court did not err when it affirmed the Board’s decision that it lacked authority to grant Hill’s permit because it had not validated IGR. The court found that Hill failed to establish that the Board’s decision denying his permit was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The court did not disturb the district court’s order vacating the Board’s decision in part and remanding the matter to the Board for further proceedings. View "Hill v. Blaine County" on Justia Law

The case involves the Gardiner-Park County Water and Sewer District (District) and the Knight family (Knights). The Knights own a property in Gardiner, Montana, under which the District has a prescriptive easement for a sewer line. In 2016, a survey revealed that part of the Knights' house and porch was built within the easement and over the sewer line. The District requested the Knights to remedy the easement violation, but the parties failed to reach an agreement. Consequently, the District filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Knights violated the District’s easements and caused damage to a retaining wall. The Knights counterclaimed, alleging that the District's Board Members had not taken and filed an oath of office, thus rendering any action they took invalid.The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Park County, granted a declaratory judgment in favor of the District and summary judgment in favor of the individual Board Members. The court held that the District’s Board Members were not legally required to file oaths of office and were immune from personal liability for any actions taken related to the Knights. The court also held a joint hearing on the District’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment and the individual Board Members’ Motion for Summary Judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that there was no requirement for board members of a local water and sewer district to take and file an oath of office as they were not public officers of the state, nor members of the legislature or executive. The court also held that the Board Members were immune from suit in an action against the governmental entity for the same subject matter, even when oppression, fraud, or malice had been alleged. The court found no violation of the Knights' due process rights when the District Court entertained oral argument on a summary judgment motion and a declaratory judgment action at the same hearing. The case was remanded for the District Court to consider an award of attorney fees, if any, under the Declaratory Judgments Act. View "Gardiner-Park v. Knight" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Shawnee Community Unit School District No. 84 (the School District) and Grand Tower Energy Center, LLC (Grand Tower), the owner of a power plant in Jackson County, Illinois. For the 2014 tax year, the Jackson County assessor imposed an assessed value of $33,445,837 on Grand Tower’s property. Grand Tower appealed the assessment to the Jackson County Board of Review, which reduced the assessed value of the property to $31,538,245. Grand Tower then appealed to the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) under section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code, seeking a further reduction of the final assessment imposed by the board of review. The School District, which receives funding from property taxes generated in that county, was granted leave to intervene in the appeal.While the appeal was pending before the PTAB, Grand Tower’s 2014 property taxes came due. Grand Tower did not pay the taxes. In December 2015, the Jackson County collector prepared the annual list of properties with delinquent taxes, which included Grand Tower’s property. The collector then applied to the circuit court of Jackson County for a judgment and order of sale for taxes on the 2014 delinquent properties, including Grand Tower’s. The court entered a judgment and order of sale.The School District filed a motion before the PTAB seeking dismissal of Grand Tower’s appeal, arguing that Grand Tower was required to pay the 2014 property taxes under protest in order to pursue an appeal before the PTAB. The School District also argued that once the Jackson County collector made the application for judgment and order of sale, the circuit court acquired jurisdiction over the taxes and all supplemental matters, including the determination of the assessment, thereby divesting the PTAB of jurisdiction to review the 2014 assessment. The PTAB denied the School District’s motion to dismiss.The School District appealed the PTAB’s decision to the appellate court, which affirmed the decision of the PTAB. The appellate court held that payment of the contested taxes was not a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB and that the tax sale proceedings in the circuit court did not divest the PTAB of jurisdiction to review the 2014 and 2015 property assessments.The School District then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the payment of disputed property taxes is not a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB under section 16-160 of the Code, and that the county collector’s application for judgment and order of sale did not divest the PTAB of its jurisdiction to review Grand Tower’s properly filed appeals. The court also held that the entry of the judgment and order of sale did not estop Grand Tower from seeking review of its 2014 and 2015 assessments before the PTAB. View "Shawnee Community Unit School District No. 84 v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board" on Justia Law

Mark and Birgit Self owned a tract of rural land that adjoined a portion of Farm-to-Market Road 677 in Montague County, Texas. The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) had a right-of-way easement that reached fifty feet from the centerline of the road in each direction, which burdened part of the Selfs’ property. As part of a highway maintenance project, TxDOT contracted with T.F.R. Enterprises, Inc. (TFR) to remove brush and trees from the right-of-way. TFR subcontracted with Lyellco Inc. to remove the trees. Following TxDOT’s instruction to TFR to “clear everything between the fences,” Lyellco workers cut all trees up to the Selfs’ fence line, including trees that were outside the State’s right-of-way easement. The Selfs sued TxDOT for negligence and inverse condemnation.The trial court denied TxDOT’s plea to the jurisdiction, asserting immunity from both causes of action. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that there was a fact issue on whether the Texas Tort Claims Act waived immunity for the negligence cause of action, but reversed the trial court’s judgment on the cause of action for inverse condemnation, holding there was no evidence that TxDOT intentionally destroyed the Selfs’ property.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals. It held that the Selfs had not shown either that the subcontractor’s employees were in TxDOT’s paid service or that other TxDOT employees operated or used the motor-driven equipment that cut down the trees, as required to waive immunity under the Tort Claims Act. Therefore, the negligence cause of action was dismissed. However, regarding inverse condemnation, the court found that the Selfs had alleged and offered evidence that TxDOT intentionally directed the destruction of the trees as part of clearing the right-of-way for public use. Therefore, the cause of action for inverse condemnation was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. SELF" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit filed by plaintiff Harold Malmquist against the City of Folsom (City). The plaintiff alleged that the City failed to maintain proper corrosion control measures at its water treatment plant, causing the pH level of its water to rise and become corrosive. This, in turn, led to pinhole leaks in copper pipes receiving the water, damaging persons and property. The plaintiff sought class certification, defining the class as all individuals and entities who have owned or leased real property in the City, plumbed with copper piping receiving water from the City’s plant since February 23, 2015.The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification. The court found that the plaintiff had not shown that common issues predominated over individual ones. The court reasoned that the existence, cause, and extent of damage to copper piping required individual proof. The court also overruled the plaintiff's objections to the City's expert witness, concluding that the expert was qualified and his opinion was founded on reliable information.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. The court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that individual issues predominated over common ones. The court also found no error in the trial court's decision to overrule the plaintiff's objections to the City's expert witness. The court concluded that the expert was qualified and his opinion was founded on reliable information. View "Malmquist v. City of Folsom" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the dispute over whether the main roads within the Deerfield Estates subdivision in Newton County, Mississippi, are private or public. In 2001, the Newton County Board of Supervisors voted to accept the two main roads of the subdivision into the county road system. However, the roads were never added to the official county road registry. In 2020, the subdivision filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the roads are public and an injunction mandating the county to add them to the registry and perform repairs.The Newton County Chancery Court held that the roads had become public roads via express common law dedication and ordered that the roads be added to the county map and road register. The county appealed this decision, arguing that the subdivision's claims were barred by the doctrine of laches or the general three-year statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that the county's 2001 acceptance of the roads was effective and that the roads served public interest or convenience. The court also found that the county's failure to add the roads to the registry and the map in a timely manner did not negate the county's explicit acceptance of the dedication. Furthermore, the court ruled that the county could not invoke the doctrine of laches or the general three-year statute of limitations to bar the subdivision's request for a declaratory judgment that the roads are public roads. View "Newton County, Mississippi v. Deerfield Estates Subdivision Property Owners Association, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Northland Investment Corporation (N Co.), a landlord of multiunit residential buildings, and the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). N Co. sought a declaratory ruling from PURA that it could use ratio utility billing (RUB) to recoup utility costs from tenants in buildings without individual meters. Under RUB, N Co. would bill tenants for their proportionate share of utility usage, calculated based on factors like unit square footage and number of occupants. PURA concluded that RUB violated the statute because it prohibited charging a tenant for utilities they did not exclusively use. However, PURA suggested N Co. could use the "building in" methodology, incorporating estimated utility costs into fixed rent.PURA's decision was appealed to the trial court, which remanded the case back to PURA for further consideration of whether its decision on RUB conflicted with its conclusion on the "building in" approach. PURA reaffirmed its prior ruling, and N Co. appealed again to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal. N Co. then appealed from the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the trial court's decision, agreeing with PURA's determination that the statute prohibits N Co.'s proposed use of RUB to recoup building-wide utility costs by billing tenants for their estimated proportionate share of the total cost. The court concluded that the "building in" approach was acceptable as it allowed for consistent and predictable payments each month and placed the risk of higher-than-anticipated utility usage on the landlord. View "Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

The case involves Tony Paletta, the petitioner, and Nelson Phillips, III, Nathan Phillips, Robert Nelson Phillips, II, and the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways, the respondents. The petitioner and the Phillips respondents own adjacent land in Harrison County, West Virginia. A road, Harrison County Route 36/5 (CR 36/5), crosses the Phillips respondents' property and provides access to the petitioner's property. The road was never improved by the West Virginia Division of Highways (WVDOH) but appears on WVDOH maps for Harrison County beginning in 1937. After the Phillips respondents impeded the petitioner's access by way of CR 36/5, the petitioner brought suit in circuit court seeking an order requiring the Phillips respondents to remove the gates/fences and allow him access to his property, using CR 36/5.The Circuit Court of Harrison County granted summary judgment in favor of the Phillips respondents, finding that CR 36/5 was not a public road. The court based its decision on several factors, including the lack of specific description of the road, the WVDOH's admission that the road no longer exists in an identifiable form, and the lack of plans by the WVDOH to make any improvements to CR 36/5.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the circuit court erred in concluding that CR 36/5 is not a public road and in granting summary judgment in favor of the Phillips respondents. The court held that the burden of showing that a public road was abandoned falls on the party asserting the abandonment. In this case, the Phillips respondents failed to demonstrate that CR 36/5 was discontinued or abandoned. The court concluded that CR 36/5 was properly made a part of the state road system in 1933 and was never properly abandoned, discontinued, vacated, or closed by the WVDOH in the manner prescribed by West Virginia law. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Paletta v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Lori Randolph, who was injured after falling down stairs in a rental property owned by Aidan, LLC. Randolph sued Aidan, alleging negligence in failing to provide safe stairs. Aidan, in turn, filed a third-party claim against Sioux City, asserting that a city employee had inspected the property and declared it compliant with the municipal code. Aidan claimed that the city was negligent in hiring, retaining, or supervising the unqualified inspector, and thus, should indemnify Aidan for any damages owed to Randolph. Sioux City moved to dismiss Aidan’s claim, arguing it was immune under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(j).The district court denied Sioux City's motion to dismiss Aidan's claim. Sioux City and Randolph requested interlocutory review, which was granted. The Supreme Court of Iowa was tasked with reviewing the denial of Sioux City's motion for the correction of errors at law.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court held that Sioux City was immune from Aidan's claim under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(j). The court reasoned that Aidan's claim for negligent hiring was "based upon" the negligence of Sioux City's employee in inspecting the stairs. Therefore, the claim fell within the scope of the immunity provided by section 670.4(1)(j). The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including the dismissal of Aidan's claim against Sioux City. View "Randolph v. Aidan, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Pawtucket petitioned the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to review a judgment in favor of the Rhode Island Department of Revenue (DOR) and other defendants. The case revolved around two properties owned by The Memorial Hospital, which were deemed ineligible for state aid under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) Act for fiscal years 2021 and 2022. The City argued that the hearing justice erred in upholding the DOR’s interpretation of the PILOT Act, which stated that the properties were not eligible for PILOT funds.Previously, the Superior Court had ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the DOR's interpretation of the PILOT Act was not arbitrary or capricious, unsupported in the record, or an abuse of discretion. The court concluded that the properties were not owned by a licensed hospital and were therefore ineligible for consideration under the PILOT statute. The City appealed this decision, arguing that the properties should be eligible for PILOT funds because they were still being used for medical care and treatment, even though they were not owned and licensed by the same entity.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that the PILOT Act's definition of a "nonprofit hospital facility" required that the hospital-owner of the property also be the holder of a state-issued license. Since Memorial Hospital's license was deactivated in 2018, the properties were deemed ineligible for PILOT funds. The court concluded that the City's argument conflating tax-exempt status with PILOT fund eligibility was unpersuasive, and that the DOR's decision to deny the disbursement of PILOT funds for the properties was not erroneous. View "City of Pawtucket v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law