Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In the late 1990s, the Township of Ocean began a comprehensive planning process in anticipation of population growth and increased development. In April 2007, plaintiffs, who owned a significant amount of land in the Township, filed a complaint against the Township, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), and the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (DCA) challenging the validity of three ordinances affecting their property. They alleged that they were arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, and illegal and that the rezoning constituted inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs lived in a single-family residence on the eastern portion of one of several lots they owned; the remainder of the property consisted of undeveloped woodlands. When plaintiffs acquired the property, it was subject to mixed zoning. As a result of the Planning Commission s endorsement of the Township s Petition, all but one of plaintiffs lots were converted to PA-5 Environmentally Sensitive Planning Areas. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the circumstances under which municipal zoning ordinances represent a legitimate exercise of a municipality s power to zone property consistent with its Master Plan and Land Use Law (MLUL) goals. Upon review, the Court concluded that the ordinances represented a legitimate exercise of the municipality's power to zone property consistent with its MLUL goals, and held that plaintiffs did not overcome the ordinances presumption of validity. The inclusion of plaintiffs property in the EC district rationally related to the municipality's comprehensive smart growth development plan, which concentrated development in a town center surrounded by a green-zone buffer. The Court declined to invalidate ordinances that fulfill MLUL goals and other legitimate land-use planning objectives through plaintiffs as-applied challenge. "Rather, we reassert the importance of exhausting administrative remedies and conclude that plaintiffs claim for redress for the downzoning of their property is better addressed through their inverse condemnation claim, which, as the trial court held, plaintiffs may pursue if they are denied a variance." View "Griepenburg v. Township of Ocean" on Justia Law

A property owner appealed a valuation of its real property. After the Board of Tax Appeals issued its decision on August 29, 2013, the property owner appealed. The notice of appeal was filed on September 30, 2013, but the property owner failed to initiate service of the notice of appeal on the tax commissioner. On October 24, 2013, the property owner served the tax commissioner with the appeal. On November 4, 2013, the appeal was returned from mediation to the regular docket. That order specified that Appellant’s brief was due forty days from the date of the order. On November 12, 2013, the school board filed a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the property owner failed to initiate service of the notice of appeal on the tax commissioner, a necessary party, within the thirty-day appeal period. View "Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Blimar Team Cleaners appealed a superior court decision to uphold the Burlington Board of Tax Appeals' appraisal of its property at 150 Shelburne Road in Burlington at a value of $193,500. Taxpayer contended on appeal that: (1) there was sufficient evidence that the property was not assessed at fair market value to overcome the city appraisal's presumption of validity; and (2) the City of Burlington failed to meet its burden of proof demonstrating the property was assessed at fair market value. Finding no reason to disturb the appraisal or the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Bilmar Team Cleaners" on Justia Law

Petitioner, as assignee of his brother's interest in the forfeited property ($50,000 in bail money), appealed the district court's denial of his motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 983(e)(1). The district court dismissed the petition, holding that the assignment was invalid because the forfeiture had been completed and all interest in the property had vested in the United States at the time of the assignment. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that the Act permits any person with an interest in forfeited property to file a motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture after the forfeiture has occurred on grounds of lack of notice. The court also concluded that the assignment of petitioner's brother's interest to him was valid under New York law. View "Lucas v. United States" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were the efforts of the Alaska Board of Game to control, by regulation, the movement of bison that stray outside the boundaries of two game ranches on Kodiak Island. The Board had statutory authority to determine when a domestic animal becomes "feral," and thus legally characterized as "game." Pursuant to this grant of authority, however, the Board's regulatory definition of a "feral" domestic animal must be reasonable and consistent with its authorizing statute. The Board amended the first regulation at issue to read: "Under this section, and in accordance with the definition of 'game' [provided in statute,] (which includes feral domestic animals) . . . musk oxen, bison, or reindeer that [are] lawfully owned . . . that [are] not confined or [are] not under positive control [are] feral unless the animal is a free-ranging animal on a state or federal grazing lease." The Board amended a second regulation to authorize the Alaska Department of Fish and Game to announce a public hunt of bison in Unit 8 (which included Kodiak) by emergency order. These amendments effectively confiscated lawfully owned domestic animals, unreasonably transforming them from "domestic" to "game" solely by reference to a property boundary line. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State and held the contested regulations invalid. The Court also vacated the court's award of attorney's fees to the State. View "Ellingston v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Minneapolis imposes an annual vacant building registration fee on owners of vacant buildings “to recover all costs incurred by the city for monitoring and regulating vacant buildings, including nuisance abatement, enforcement and administrative costs.” If unpaid, the city can levy and collect the fee as a special assessment against the property. DRB owns a vacant building in Minneapolis and for several years failed to pay that registration fee. In 2011, DRB received notice the city intended to assess $6,550 for DRB’s unpaid 2010 fee. After a hearing attended by DRB, an administrative hearing officer levied the fee. This process repeated in 2012 and a fee of $6,746 was levied. DRB did not appeal either assessment, but brought a separate suit, on behalf of itself and similarly situated landowners. A magistrate judge recommended judgment in favor of the city, concluding the city had provided DRB with proper notice of the assessments and DRB did not bring its challenges to the assessments within the statutory 30-day appeal period. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s adoption of the recommendation. View "DRB #24, LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

Redus filed a foreclosure complaint against the Zagames and the parties entered into a settlement agreement that resulted in a joint stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment of Foreclosure. At issue on appeal was what a Marshal collects when he auctions a public judicial sale pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1921(c)(1). The district court calculated the Marshal's commission based only on the amount of the judgment lien because the judgment creditor failed to establish the property's appraisal value. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for proceedings because the court found that the plain meaning of "collected" in section 1921(c)(1) refers to the amount of the accepted winning bid. The court noted that this decision does not abolish the Marshal's commission. View "Redus Florida Commercial v. College Station Retail Center" on Justia Law

The property at issue in this case was transferred to Deadwood Stage Run, LLC (Developer) in early 2006. On December 18, 2006, the City of Deadwood created Tax Incremental District Number Eight (the District) out of the property. After the City and Developer entered into a contract for private development of the District, Lawrence County sent its 2007 assessment of the property reflecting the most recent assessment of $934,520. The Developer sought a declaratory judgment prospectively establishing the 2006 assessed valuation of the District as the appropriate tax incremental base rather than the 2007 assessed valuation, arguing that the Department of Revenue incorrectly calculated the tax incremental base for the District in the City by using the County’s November 1, 2006 annual assessment rather than the Department’s August 25, 2006 annual Certificate of Assessment, Equalization, and Levy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in calculating the tax incremental base for a tax incremental district, the Department is statutorily required to use the last aggregate assessed valuation certified by the Department prior to the date of creation of the tax incremental district. View "Deadwood Stage Run, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2011, Ted Price, as Trustee of the Price Family Trust, filed an application for the establishment of a private road asserting that his property had no outlet to or connection with a public road. The Crook County Board of Commissioners denied the application on the ground that Price already had access to his property from at least two existing public roads. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board’s decision denying Price’s private road application was supported by substantial evidence, the actions of the Board were not arbitrary or capricious, and the record did not establish the level of inconvenience required to establish necessity; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Price’s request that the final result be set aside due to malfunctioning audio equipment. View "Price v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Municipalities City of Spencer and the Town of Forest Park, and Blaze’s Tribute Equine Rescue, acting under a search warrant, seized 44 abused and neglected horses from plaintiff-appellant Ann Campbell’s properties. After a forfeiture hearing, a state district court in Oklahoma issued an order granting Spencer and Forest Park’s joint forfeiture petition. Campbell later sued the municipalities (and Blaze) in federal court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The district court dismissed Campbell’s complaint, applying both claim and issue preclusion to prevent relitigation of matters common to the state court forfeiture proceeding. Campbell appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court properly dismissed Campbell’s 1983 claims: because Campbell could have raised her constitutional claims in the forfeiture proceeding but did not do so, and because the Court's allowing her to raise these claims in this appeal would impair the Municipalities’ rights established in that proceeding, the Court held that the district court properly concluded that claim preclusion disallowed Campbell from pursuing her constitutional claims. View "Campbell v. City of Spencer" on Justia Law