Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court dismissing Duncan House Charitable Corporation's application for a charitable organization exemption, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Duncan's failure to timely apply for later exemption precluded it from receiving that exemption even if it ultimately qualified for an earlier exemption.For the 2017 tax year, Duncan applied for a charitable tax exemption covering its fifty percent ownership interest in a Houston historic home. The appraisal district denied the exemption, and the review board denied Duncan's ensuing protest. Duncan filed for judicial review. Thereafter, although Duncan House never applied for the charitable exemption for the 2018 tax year, it protested the district's 2018 appraisal on the grounds that the district court to apply the charitable exemption. The review board denied the protest. Duncan then amended its trial court petition to challenge the denial of the 2018 exemption. The trial court dismissed the 2018 claim for want of jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that Duncan's failure to timely apply for the 2018 exemption precluded it from receiving that exemption even if it ultimately qualified for the 2017 exemption. View "Duncan House Charitable Corp. v. Harris County Appraisal District" on Justia Law

Three individuals filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Wayne County has a policy or practice of seizing vehicles and their contents without probable cause, simply because of the vehicle’s location in an area generally associated with crime. Wayne County impounds the vehicles and their contents until the owner pays a redemption fee: $900 for the first seizure, $1,800 for the second, and $2,700 for the third, plus towing and storage fees. The owner's only alternatives are to abandon the vehicle or to wait for prosecutors to decide whether to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings. Before a forfeiture action is brought, there are multiple pretrial conferences involving the owner and prosecutors, without a judge; prosecutors attempt to persuade the owner to pay the fee by pointing out that storage fees accrue daily. Missing just one conference results in automatic forfeiture. It takes at least four months, beyond any previous delays to arrive before a neutral decisionmaker. The seizure proceedings are conducted under Michigan’s Nuisance Abatement statute, the Controlled Substances Act, and the Omnibus Forfeiture Act, which do not protect plaintiffs from the pre-hearing deprivation of their properties.The Sixth Circuit held that Wayne County violated the Constitution when it seized plaintiffs’ personal vehicles—which were vital to their transportation and livelihoods— with no timely process to contest the seizure. Wayne County was required to provide an interim hearing within two weeks to test the probable validity of the deprivation. View "Ingram v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting Donna Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying Kidd's application for permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation.In denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation the commission concluded that Kidd was capable of sustained remunerative employment at a sedentary level. The Tenth District granted Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the Commission exceeded its discretion by relying on a medical report that outlined limitations on Kidd's capabilities that were "seemingly inconsistent" with the definition of "sedentary work" in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2)(a). The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding that the commission did not abuse its discretion by considering "prevalent workplace accommodations to determine whether Kidd could return to 'sustained remunerative employment' with her medical restrictions." View "State ex rel. Kidd v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court denying Appellants' Me. R. Civ,. P. 80B petition for review of government action and affirming the decision of the Portland Planning Board to approve 37 Montreal LLC's application to construct a multi-unit residential building, holding that the Planning Board did not err in approving the application.On appeal, Appellants argued that the proposed development failed to meet the City of Portland's Code of Ordinance's height, setback, and design-review requirements, and therefore, the Planning Board erred in approving the application. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the matter to the Planning Board for findings of fact, holding that judicial review was impossible because the Planning Board's decision did not contain any of the required findings. View "Murray v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) began constructing a diamond interchange and installing a drainage system on property abutting Interstate 70 (“I-70”) in Washington County, Pennsylvania. The property’s owner, Appellant Donald Bindas, petitioned for the appointment of a board of viewers, seeking compensation for this encumbrance upon his land. PennDOT asserted that its predecessor, the Department of Highways (“DOH”), had secured a highway easement for the land in question in 1958. Both the trial court and the Commonwealth Court agreed, dismissing Bindas’ suit. Upon its review of the statutory authority that PennDOT invoked, as well as the record, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that DOH’s failure to comply with the requirements of 36 P.S. § 670-210 rendered that easement invalid. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Commonwealth Court’s order, and remanded with the instruction that PennDOT’s preliminary objections be overruled. View "Bindas. v. PennDOT" on Justia Law

The County of San Luis Obispo granted a permit to move an easement on a property in the coastal zone. However, the California Coastal Commission denied the permit. The trial court found in the Commission's favor.The County appealed under the California Coastal Act of 1976( Coastal Act). The CoastalAct establishes a “coastal zone,” defined by an official map and generally extending from the mean high tide line landward 1000 yards. Every city or county with jurisdiction over lands within the coastal zone is required to create a “local coastal program” to implement the provisions and policies of the Coastal Act.The Commission has de novo review authority over the County’s grant of the permit. Here, because the Commission denied the McCarthys’ permit on appeal, the development was not authorized pursuant to the Coastal Act. Thus the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's order. View "Cave Landing, LLC v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

In 2016, Salansky, the Great Smoky Mountains National Park’s Fire Management Officer, discovered a slow-moving fire covering less than an acre. Due to the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, most of the Park’s staff were away. Eight days later (November 24), Salansky observed that building a fire line would be impossible. Salansky opted to let the fire burn, using the natural terrain for containment. On November 27, Salansky requested additional firefighting resources. A National Guard helicopter dropped water onto the fire. By evening, the fire had spread to 35-40 acres within Park boundaries. Salansky did not monitor the fire overnight. At 4:05 a.m., the National Weather Service issued a high-wind warning. By 7:30 a.m., Salansky estimated that the fire had grown to 250-500 acres. Burning embers created smaller fires a mile away. People in Gatlinburg observed heavy smoke and ash. A 10:58 a.m. call was the first communication between Park staff and any local official about the fire. Around 5:45 p.m., the Gatlinburg Fire Department received reports of fires within the city. Winds gusted to 87 mph and the fire grew to 5,000 acres. Total evacuation of the Gatlinburg area was ordered. Evacuation efforts were hampered by infrastructure damage. Ultimately, 14 people died, 191 were injured, 2,500 structures were damaged or destroyed, and more than 17,000 acres burned.The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal of “failure to warn” suits under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA). Before filing suit under the FTCA, a claimant must “present” that claim to the agency, 28 U.S.C. 2675(a); the plaintiffs’ forms sufficiently enabled the Department of the Interior to investigate. On remand, to determine whether the claims are barred by the FTCA's discretionary-function exception, the district court should address whether certain publications constitute mandatory directives. View "Abbott v. United States" on Justia Law

In a suit filed in 2014 under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601–19, Cook County claimed that the banks made credit too readily available to some borrowers, who defaulted, and then foreclosed on the loans in a way that injured the County. The County alleged the banks targeted potential minority borrowers for unchecked or improper credit approval decisions, which allowed them to receive loans they could not afford; discretionary application of surcharge of additional points, fees, and other credit and servicing costs above otherwise objective risk-based financing rates; higher cost loan products; and undisclosed inflation of appraisal values to support inflated loan amounts. When many of the borrowers could not repay, the County asserts, it had to deal with vacant properties and lost tax revenue and transfer fees.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Entertaining suits to recover damages for any foreseeable result of an FHA violation would risk “massive and complex damages litigation.” Proximate cause under the FHA requires “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Cook County seeks a remedy for effects far beyond “the first step.” The directly injured parties are the borrowers, who lost both housing and money. The banks are secondary losers. The County is at best a tertiary loser; its injury derives from the injuries to the borrowers and banks. View "County of Cook v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

The Day family and Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust appealed a district court’s decision to grant the Idaho Transportation Department’s (“ITD”) motion for involuntary dismissal. ITD cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying its request for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). In 1961, the Days learned that access to their property via public highways would be affected when the state highway converted to a controlled-access federal interstate highway, then known as Interstate 80. The Days entered into a preliminary agreement with the Idaho Department of Highways (“IDH,” predecessor to ITD) that allowed IDH to take possession of approximately nine acres of the Day Property for construction of the interstate. In 1967, the Days entered into a right-of-way contract with IDH in furtherance of the 1961 Agreement. The 1967 Contract included an agreement for IDH to provide access to a future frontage road from I-80 to the Day Property. In the 1990s, the State began construction on the Isaacs Canyon Interchange near the Day Property. The Interchange Project eliminated a portion of the original 50-foot right of way that provided access to the Day Property under the 1967 Contract. Because of this, ITD provided replacement access easements to the Day Property. These replacement access easements were located southwest of the Interstate. The Days informed ITD the family was dissatisfied with the replacement easements and did not think they afforded the Days equivalent access to what they had prior to the construction of the Interchange. The Days sold the property to Edmonds Groves Land Holdings Inc. (“Groves”) in 2005, with the purchase price secured by a mortgage held by the Day Family. Groves later defaulted in its mortgage agreement with the Days during the recession in December of 2008. As a result, ownership of the Day Property reverted to the Day Family by way of deed in lieu of foreclosure. After the Days reacquired the property, they had difficulty obtaining title insurance because of concerns that “the access easement was owned by ITD and [the Days] did not have any statement that the easement was for the benefit of the Days.” They sued alleging inverse condemnation, and breach of contract. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Day v. Idaho Transportation Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's requests for writs of mandamus and certiorari to reverse the Clay County Board of Adjustment's decision affirming the order of the Clay County Planning Commission denying Appellant's proposed conditional use permit, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing the writ of certiorari as untimely.In denying Appellant's requests, the circuit court determined that the petition for writ of certiorari was untimely and that a writ of mandamus was not an available remedy. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying the writ of mandamus; but (2) erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the writ of certiorari. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether Appellant's petition seeking a writ of certiorari was timely filed. View "Hauck v. Clay County Commission" on Justia Law