Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that an action taken by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) in issuing a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System/State Disposal System permit was arbitrary and capricious and that the permit did not comply with a Minnesota rule addressing wastewater discharges to groundwater, Minn. R. 7060.0600, subp. 2.At issue was the MPCA's issuance of the permit for a Poly Met Mining, Inc. project. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that the MPCA failed properly to consider whether the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) applied to future discharges from Poly Met's facility to groundwater. The Supreme Court remanded the cause, holding (1) remand was required because there were suggestions that the MPCA did not properly consider whether the permit complies with the CWA and that the MPCA did not genuinely engage in reasoned decision-making; (2) remand was required for consideration of whether a variance was available to allow the planned discharge to the unsaturated zone within the containment system; and (3) the prohibition on injecting polluted water directly to the groundwater saturated zone for long-term storage did not apply in this case. View "In the Matter of the Denial of Contested Case Hearing Requests & Issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of the Town of Exeter in this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief challenging the Town's decision to amend its zoning ordinance, which prevented Plaintiff from developing three commercial solar-field projects in Exeter, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.On appeal, Plaintiff challenged several aspects of the superior court's judgment denying Plaintiff's request to enjoin enforcement of an emergency moratorium ordinance preventing review of Plaintiff's solar-field projects and to declare that Plaintiff's solar-field projects were vested pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 45-24-44. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under this Court's understanding of the relevant law, the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of the Town. View "Green Development, LLC v. Town of Exeter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Ohio Power Siting Board authorizing Firelands Wind, LLC to construct, operate, and maintain a wind farm in Huron and Erie Counties, holding that the nineteen nearby residents and the Black Swamp Bird Observatory that brought this appeal (collectively, Appellants) have not established that the Board's order was unlawful or unreasonable.On appeal, Appellants challenged the Board's determination that the wind farm satisfies the statutory requirements for constructing a major utility facility, asserting, among other things, that the project could kill birds and create excessive noise for residents near the wind farm and that the Board improperly failed to follow its administrative rules. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board's order was neither unlawful nor unreasonable. View "In re Application of Firelands Wind, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioners' petition objecting to a permit issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and affirmed by the Environmental Appeals Board requiring General Electric Company (GE) to clean up polychlorinated biphenyls from certain portions of the Housatonic River, holding that the EPA's challenged actions were not arbitrary or capricious.On appeal, Petitioners brought three substantive challenges and also brought procedural challenges to the permit's issuance. The First Circuit denied the petition after noting that should GE's cleanup of the river not achieve the goals set out in the permit, the permit requires further measures, holding that Petitioners were not entitled to relief on their procedural and substantive legal challenges. View "Housatonic River Initiative v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles (the City) approved a project at 1719-1731 North Whitley Avenue in Hollywood (the Project) that would replace 40 apartments subject to the City’s rent stabilization ordinance (RSO) with a hotel. The City determined the Project was exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to CEQA Guidelines relating to certain development projects. The relevant guideline addresses what is often referred to as the “infill” exemption or the “Class 32” exemption. Respondent United Neighborhoods for Los Angeles (United Neighborhoods) sought a writ of mandate in the Los Angeles Superior Court, arguing, among other things, that the in-fill exemption does not apply because the Project is not consistent with a General Plan policy concerning the preservation of affordable housing. The trial court granted the writ, effectively halting the Project until the City was to find the Project is consistent with that policy or 148-159 undertakes CEQA review. The City and real parties in interest appeal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order granting the petition for writ of mandate. The court explained that the City’s suggestion that the Project’s consistency with the Framework Element implies consistency “with the entirety of the General Plan” because of the Framework Element’s foundational role assumes, contrary to authority, the Framework Element stands in perfect harmony with the General Plan. However, the court explained that although it affirms the trial court, it does not suggest that the City was necessarily required to make formal findings that Housing Element policies are outweighed by competing policies favoring the Project. View "United Neighborhoods for L.A. v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs brought this action after the defendant modified a storm water drainage system, allegedly causing flooding onto their property. The plaintiffs raised two distinct claims that remained at issue on appeal: a claim under the sewage-disposal-system- event (SDSE) exception to governmental immunity under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), and a common-law trespass-nuisance claim seeking injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed both claims as untimely under the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Like the Court of Appeals, the Michigan Supreme Court disagreed, holding the SDSE claim, which sought relief only in connection with flooding that occurred within the three-year window, was timely. However, unlike the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that because the defendant was immune with respect to the plaintiffs’ common-law trespass-nuisance claim, that claim was properly dismissed. In light of this holding, the Court vacated as unnecessary the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trespass-nuisance claim was timely. Finally, because the plaintiffs only sought injunctive relief in connection with that claim, their request for an injunction was invalid. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant with respect to the plaintiff’s SDSE claim, affirmed with respect to the common-law trespass-nuisance claim, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sunrise Resort Association, Inc. v. Cheboygan County Road Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Missouri Mining Commission awarding attorney fees and expenses in favor of Fowler Land Company and the Margaret Leist Revocable Trust (collectively, Landowners) after Landowners prevailed in litigation concerning the creation of water impoundments on their property, holding that the Commission erred in awarding fees and expenses.Alternative Fuels, Inc. (AFI) leased land from Landowners, who consented to AFI's creation of water impoundments on their property, but AFI constructed additional impoundments without consent. Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) initiated enforcement actions against AFI, after which AFI received approval for a permit revision. The Commission upheld the approval. The circuit court reversed. On remand, the Commission denied the permit revision application. Thereafter, Landowners filed an application for attorney fees and expenses arguing that they were the prevailing party and were entitled to attorney fees. The Commission granted the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Landowners' fee application was untimely, and therefore, the Commission erred in awarding Landowners attorney fees and expenses. View "State ex rel. Dep't of Natural Resources v. Fowler Land Co." on Justia Law

Show Me State Premium Homes wants its purchase of a foreclosed property to be free and clear of all other interests, including those belonging to the United States. Getting what it wants would require a “judicial sale.” After removing the case the United States filed a motion to dismiss. Its position was that there could be no foreclosure without a judicial sale. The district court agreed, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over what remained, and remanded to state court.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court but modified the dismissal of the ejectment and damages claims to be without prejudice. The court explained that a buyer’s interest is only “inchoate” before it gets a valid deed, not after. And here, title vested once the bond company “exercised its right to have the legal title transferred.” No “judicial sale” ever took place, and it is too late to hold one now, meaning that the interests held by the United States have never been foreclosed. View "Show Me State Premium Homes, LLC v. George McDonnell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals determining that the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District Board of Commissioners failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 1545.11 when it initiated appropriation proceedings to take private property owed by Landowner, holding that the trial court's orders denying Landowner's motions for summary judgment were not final, appealable orders.The Park District initiated appropriation proceedings against Landowner. Landowner answered by denying the necessity of the appropriation and the Park District's authority to appropriate the property. The trial court denied Landowner's motions for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Landowner. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment, holding that the court erred in determining that the trial court's orders denying Landowner's motions for summary judgment were final, appealable orders. View "Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District Bd. of Commissioners v. Less" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Olen Properties Corp. owned commercial property in the City of Newport Beach (the City) within an area known as the Koll Center. The Koll Center was a mixed-use development area, near the John Wayne Airport, San Joaquin Freshwater Marsh Reserve, and the University of California, Irvine. It was located within the “Airport Area,” a portion of the City adjacent to John Wayne Airport, governed by the City’s Airport Business Area Integrated Conceptual Development Plan. In 2020 and 2021, the City considered and approved the request of Real Party in Interest TPG (KCN) Acquisition, LLC (TPG) to develop a five-story, 312-unit residential housing project (the Project) on an existing surface parking lot serving the Koll Center’s existing commercial tenants. In an effort to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the City obtained an addendum (the Addendum) to an existing environmental impact report prepared in 2006 (the 2006 EIR) as part of its general plan update. The Addendum considered a wide range of possible environmental impacts but concluded the Project’s impacts “would either be the same or not substantially greater than those described by the [2006 EIR].” Plaintiff opposed approval of the Project before the City. Among other things, plaintiff argued the City could not rely upon an addendum to the 2006 EIR and was legally required to obtain a subsequent EIR. After the City’s approval of the Project, plaintiff filed suit, seeking a writ of mandate compelling the City to void its approval for violation of CEQA, and for injunctive relief, barring construction at the site. The trial court explained its denial in an extensive written ruling, addressing and rejecting each of plaintiff's arguments. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court's judgment and affirmed. View "Olen Properties Corp. v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law