Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The property at issue was part of a larger tract purchased by Clarence Saloom in 1953 during his marriage to Pauline Womac Saloom. The entire tract was about 80 acres and became known as the “Pine Farm.” Plaintiffs were Clarence and Pauline’s three children: Patricia Saloom, Clarence Saloom Jr., and Daniel Saloom. Pauline died in 1973, and her one-half community interest in the Pine Farm was inherited by plaintiffs. A judgment of possession recognizing them as owners of Pauline’s one-half interest in the Pine Farm, subject to a usufruct in Clarence’s favor, was signed in 1974, and recorded in the public land records of Lafayette Parish. About two years later, the Louisiana Department of Highways (now the Department of Transportation and Development (the “state”)), contacted Clarence about purchasing a piece of the Pine Farm in connection with a project to widen and improve La. Highway 339. The instrument identifies Clarence as “husband of Pauline Womac Saloom” but does not mention Pauline’s death or plaintiffs’ inheritance of her interest in the property. Plaintiffs are not identified in the act of sale, did not sign it, and apparently were unaware of it for several years. In 1985, after learning of their father’s 1976 conveyance, plaintiffs hired an attorney who informed the state that plaintiffs owned an undivided one-half interest in the property. In 2015, about twenty years after Clarence’s death, the state began constructing improvements to Highway 339 on the property. Plaintiffs again contacted the state. In a May 18, 2016 letter, plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed the same information he had relayed to the state over thirty years earlier, specifically the state did not purchase all of the property in 1976 because Clarence only owned an undivided one-half interest. The state claimed to have acquired all interests in the property at issue and declined payment for plaintiffs' interest. Plaintiffs thereafter filed suit seeking damages for inverse condemnation. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal judgment reversing the trial court’s judgment and granting the state’s motion for summary judgment was vacated. Because the court of appeal did not consider the state’s remaining arguments in support of its motion and in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the case was remanded the matter to the court of appeal for consideration of the state’s remaining assignments of error. View "Saloom v. Louisiana Dept. of Transportation & Dev." on Justia Law

In this real property dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court for Defendants following the court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the trial justice did not err in ruling that the disputed land was a paper street and in finding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.Plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that certain property was a public road that ran to the boundary of Plaintiff's property and that Plaintiff had the right to use the full length of the property and the right of access to his property. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Davis v. Town of Exeter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff TransFarmations, Inc. appealed a superior court decision to uphold the Town of Amherst Planning Board's (Town) decisions to deny TransFarmations' two successive applications for a conditional use permit (CUP). In May 2019, TransFarmations requested a “Conceptual Meeting” with the Town’s planning board (Board) concerning its proposed development of an approximately 130-acre property known as the Jacobson Farm. It stated that the “development will be designed to meet many of the desired attributes the Town . . . has articulated in [its] Master Plan and [Integrated] Innovative . . . Housing Ordinance (IIHO),” including workforce housing and over-55 housing. TransFarmations subsequently submitted a CUP application under the IIHO for a planned residential development containing 64 residential units. In its challenge to the decisions, TransFarmations argued both that the decisions failed to adequately state the ground for denial and that the Board acted unreasonably because the second CUP application was materially different from the first. The trial court concluded that the Board adequately provided the reason for its first decision on the record because “the Board members discussed, in detail, their reasons for concluding that no material differences [between the first and second applications] existed.” The court also concluded that “the Board acted reasonably and lawfully in reaching [that] decision.” Accordingly, the court affirmed both of the Board’s decisions. TransFarmations contended the trial court erred in affirming the Board’s decision not to accept the second application because TransFarmations submitted that application “at the Board’s invitation and with the information the Board requested.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded TransFarmations’ second application supplying the requested information was “materially different from its predecessor, thus satisfying Fisher.” Because the trial court’s decision concluding otherwise misapplied Fisher v. Dover, it was legally erroneous. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order as to the second CUP decision and remanded. View "TransFarmations, Inc. v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

The federal district court for the District of North Dakota certified five questions regarding N.D.C.C. § 38-08-08(1) and North Dakota Industrial Commission pooling orders. The litigation before the federal court involved allocation of mineral royalties in the case of overlapping oil and gas spacing units. Allen and Arlen Dominek owned oil and gas interests in Williams County, North Dakota. In 2011, the North Dakota Industrial Commission pooled the interests in Section 13 on the Dominek property with the interests in Section 24 in a 1280-acre spacing unit (the “Underlying Spacing Unit”). In 2016, the Commission pooled the interests in Sections 11, 12, 13, and 14 in a 2560-acre spacing unit (the “Overlapping Spacing Unit). The "Weisz" well terminated in the southeast corner of Section 14. The Defendants (together “Equinor”) operated the Weisz well. The Domineks sued Equinor in federal district court to recover revenue proceeds from the Weisz well. The parties agreed production from the Weisz well should have been allocated equally to the four sections comprising the Overlapping Spacing Unit. Their disagreement was whether the 25% attributable to Section 13 should have been shared with the interest owners in Section 24 given those sections were pooled in the Underlying Spacing Unit. In response to the motions, the federal district court certified five questions to the North Dakota Court. Responding "no" to the first: whether language from N.D.C.C. § 38-08-08(1) required production from Section 13 to be allocated to Section 24, the Supreme Court declined to answer the remaining questions because it found they were based on an assumption that the Commission had jurisdiction to direct how production was allocated among mineral interest owners. "Questions concerning correlative rights and the Commission’s jurisdiction entail factual considerations. ... An undeveloped record exposes this Court 'to the danger of improvidently deciding issues and of not sufficiently contemplating ramifications of the opinion.'” View "Dominek, et al. v. Equinor Energy, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the grants of dismissal and summary judgment as to claims of improper actions taken by the Regional Transportation Commission of Washoe County (RTC) during the completion of a construction project on Appellants' party following condemnation proceedings, holding that the district court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Appellants' claim for waste; (2) did not err in dismissing Appellants' separate cause of action for injunctive relief; (3) did not err in granting the RTC's motion for summary judgment as to Appellants' contract-based claims; and (4) erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the RTC as to Appellants' trespass claim and their request for declaratory relief. The Court vacated the order awarding RTC attorney fees and costs because, after remand, the RTC might not be the prevailing party. View "Iliescu v. Regional Transportation Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court reversing the orders issued by Petitioner while sitting as the Berkeley County Board of Assessment Appeals arising from appeals of ad valorem assessments owned by Taxpayers, as determined by the Berkeley County Assessor for the 2019 tax year, holding that circuit court erred in reversing the Board.Although the two consolidated appeals dealt with different pieces of property owned by two different entities the Supreme Court concluded that resolution dependent on two overarching questions common to both appeals. The Court then held (1) Petitioner waived any objection to the Assessor not being named as a party to this action; and (2) the circuit court erred in determining the assessments as affirmed by the Board were not supported by substantial evidence or were otherwise in contravention of any regulation, statute, or constitutional provision. View "Berkeley County Council v. Government Properties Income Trust LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, California enacted a Property Assessed Clean Energy program (PACE) as a method for homeowners to finance energy and water conservation improvements. A PACE debt was created by contract and secured by the improved property. But like a tax, the installment payments were billed and paid as a special assessment on the improved property, resulting in a first-priority tax lien in the event of default. The named plaintiffs in these putative class actions were over 65 years old and entered into PACE contracts. The defendants were private companies who either made PACE loans to plaintiffs, were assigned rights to payment, and/or administered PACE programs for municipalities. The gravamen of the complaint in each case was that PACE financing was actually, and should have been treated as, a secured home improvement loan. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive business practices by violating consumer protection laws, including Civil Code section 1804.1(j), which prohibited taking a security interest in a senior citizen’s residence to secure a home improvement loan. Generally, a taxpayer could not pursue a court action for a refund of property taxes without first applying to the local board of equalization for a reduction and then filing an administrative claim for a refund. Here, defendants demurred to the complaints on the sole ground that plaintiffs failed to allege they first exhausted administrative remedies. The trial court agreed, sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, and entered a judgment of dismissal in each case. On appeal, plaintiffs primarily contend they were not required to pursue administrative remedies because they have sued only private companies and do not challenge “any aspect of the municipal tax process involved.” The Court of Appeal found that despite their assertions to the contrary, plaintiffs did challenge their property tax assessments. And although they did not sue any government entity, the “consumer protection statutes under which plaintiffs brought their action cannot be employed to avoid the limitations and procedures set out by the Revenue and Taxation Code.” Thus, the Court concluded plaintiffs were required to submit their claims through the administrative appeals process in the first instance. "Their failure to do so requires the judgments to be affirmed." View "Morgan v. Ygrene Energy Fund, Inc." on Justia Law

Long Beach Harbor Resort, LLC (the Resort), leased a parcel of land located on the Public Trust Tidelands from the City of Long Beach. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court to determine was whether the Resort was required to enter into a separate lease with the Secretary of State for the use of the tidelands property or whether the Resort already had a valid lease allowing use of the tidelands in question. The Supreme Court found that the State of Mississippi had, through its Boundary Agreement and Tidelands Lease with the City of Long Beach, ratified the prior lease entered into between the City and the Resort. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the chancery court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Resort and found that the Resort had a valid tidelands lease as ratified by the Secretary of State. View "Mississippi v. Long Beach Harbor Resort, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirming the decision of the Lancaster County Board of Equalization affirming the valuations of the agricultural land owned by Mary and Brad Moser for the tax year 2020 but reversing the County Board's decisions for the 2018 and 2019 tax years, holding that TERC erred.For the tax years 2018 and 2019, TERC reduced the value of the Mosers' irrigated acres to equalize those acres with a nearby parcel of agricultural property. The Supreme Court (1) reversed TERC's decision to the extent it ordered that irrigated cropland on certain property be valued as drylands cropland for the 2018 and 2019 tax years, holding that TERC's conclusions as to this property was factually incorrect, was not supported by competent evidence, failed to conform to the law, and was unreasonable; and (2) otherwise affirmed, holding that there was no error was to the 2020 tax year valuation. View "Lancaster County Bd. of Equalization v. Moser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Hanson County Drainage Board granting a drainage permit sought by James Paulson to clean out a pre-existing ditch, holding that Appellants were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error.On appeal, Appellants argued that the Board failed to follow the relevant approval procedures and that the Board abused its discretion by approving the drainage permit. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board complied with the proper procedures for approving the permit; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Appellants' request to present additional testimony; and (3) the circuit court did not err by denying Appellants' request to take judicial notice of an earlier proceeding. View "Little v. Hanson County Drainage Board" on Justia Law