Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This was one of several similar cases filed in the fall of 2020 by the owners of hundreds of commercial properties in eleven different Colorado counties seeking to compel the assessors in each of the counties to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year. This matter involved the valuation of 130 parcels of commercial property in Larimer County, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Larimer County property assessors to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations. View "Larimer County v. 1303 Frontage Holdings" on Justia Law

This was one of several cases filed in Colorado in which commercial property owners have sued to compel the county assessor to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year to account for the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. This case concerned the valuation of commercial real property located in the City and County of Broomfield, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the City and County of Broomfield Assessor to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations, and it did not require the Board of Equalization to correct the Assessor’s valuations. View "Hunter Douglas v. City & County of Broomfield" on Justia Law

This was one of several cases filed in Colorado in which commercial property owners sued to compel the county assessor to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year to account for the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. This case concerned the valuation of hundreds of parcels of commercial real property located in Jefferson County, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Jefferson County Assessor to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations, and it did not require the Board of Equalization to correct the Assessor’s valuations. View " MJB Motel v. County of Jefferson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court that reversed and modified the decision of the tax assessor of the Town of Vinalhaven denying Hurricane Island Foundation a local property tax exemption under Me. Rev. Stat. 36, 652(1)(B), holding that the Town's tax assessor correctly denied the tax exemption.In denying the Foundation's application, the Town's tax assessor concluded that the Foundation failed to meet the standard for a "literary and scientific" institution under the statute. The superior court twice remanded the case. For both the second and the third time, the assessor denied the tax exemption to the Foundation. The superior court modified the decision to designate the Foundation as tax exempt, concluding that there was an error of law in the assessor's decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded for the court to enter a judgment declaring that the Foundation was not exempt, holding that the Foundation failed to show it was a "scientific" institution. View "Hurricane Island Foundation v. Town of Vinalhaven" on Justia Law

Sackett began backfilling an Idaho lot with dirt to build a home. The Environmental Protection Agency informed Sackett that the property contained wetlands and that the backfilling violated the Clean Water Act, which prohibits discharging pollutants into “the waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The EPA ordered Sackett to restore the site, threatening penalties of over $40,000 per day. The EPA classified the Sacket wetlands as “waters of the United States” because they were near a ditch that fed into a creek, which fed into Priest Lake, a navigable, intrastate lake. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the EPA.The Supreme Court reversed. CWA jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland requires that the adjacent body of water constitutes waters of the United States (a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters) and a continuous surface connection between the wetland and that water, making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”The Court reviewed the history of judicial interpretation of “the waters of the United States” and enforcement by federal agencies, which argued that the significant-nexus test was sufficient to establish jurisdiction over “adjacent” wetlands. Under that test, nearly all waters and wetlands are potentially susceptible to regulation, “putting a staggering array of landowners at risk of criminal prosecution for such mundane activities as moving dirt.” The CWA’s use of “waters” encompasses only relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies, ordinarily called streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes. Wetlands qualify as “waters of the United States” only if “indistinguishable from waters of the United States,” having a continuous surface connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right, with no clear demarcation between waters and wetlands. View "Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the Town of Ogunquit Board of Appeals concluding that good cause existed for this appeal brought by Appellant pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B challenging the issuance of building permits by the Town's code enforcement officer (CEO) to 477 Shore Road LLC, holding that the Board erred.At issue was the issuance of building permits to the LLC of construction relating to six single-family dwelling units. Appellant, who owned property abutting the LLC's parcel, filed a complaint requesting an injunction, a writ of mandamus, and a declaratory judgment. The complaint was denied. While Appellant's appeal was pending (Tominsky I), the CEO issued a certificate of occupancy for one of the dwelling units. Appellant appealed the issuance of the certificate, but the Board voted not to hear the appeal. Appellant then filed a second complaint containing multiple counts against the Town and the LLC (Tominsky II). The superior court denied Appellant's appeal in Tominsky I and dismissed the appeal in Tominsky II. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in Tominsky I and affirmed the judgment in Tominksy II, holding (1) the appeal in Tominsky I before the Board was untimely; and (2) the appeal in Tominsky II failed to allege a viable claim for relief. View "Tominsky v. Town of Ogunquit" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court determining that the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) erred in granting Montana Artesian Water Company's application for a beneficial use permit and denying Objectors' motion for attorney fees, holding that the district court erred in denying Objectors' motion for attorney fees.The district court vacated the DNRC's order granting Artesian's application for the permit and remanded the case on the grounds that the DNRC improperly relied on an internal agency memorandum in analyzing availability. Artesian appealed, and the Objectors in this case - Flathead Lakers Inc. and Water for Flathead's Future - cross appealed from the deemed denial of their motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that the district court (1) erred by determining that DNRC erroneously granted Artesian's application for a beneficial use permit; and (2) abused its discretion by denying Objectors' fee motion by operation of law. View "Flathead Lakers Inc. v. Mont. Dep't of Natural Resources & Conservation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Water for Flathead's Future (WFF) and vacating the Montana Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (MPDES) permit issued by the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to Artesian Water Company, holding that the district court erred.In granting summary judgment, the district court determined that the DEQ had erred by (1) submitting inadequate responses to the comments from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Services (WSFWS), and (2) DEQ's analysis of the permit's environmental impact was inadequate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this matter has not been mooted; (2) the district court improperly substituted its own judgment for the agency's in concluding that DEQ, in issuing the permit, had failed to give a "hard look" at relevant concerns; (3) the district court erred by holding that DEQ improperly considered only the volume of water that would be discharged under MPDES permit rather than the full volume of water authorized for use under the DNRC's water use permit; and (4) the district court erred by vacating the permit. View "State v. Noli" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Water for Flathead's Future (WFF) and vacating the Montana Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (MPDES) permit issued by the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to Artesian Water Company, holding that the district court erred.In granting summary judgment, the district court determined that the DEQ had erred by (1) submitting responses to the comments from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Services (WSFWS) that were inadequate, and (2) DEQ's analysis of the permit's environmental impact was inadequate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this matter has not been mooted; (2) the district court improperly substituted its own judgment for the agency's in concluding that DEQ, in issuing the permit, had failed to give a "hard look" at relevant concerns; (3) the district court erred by holding that DEQ improperly considered only the volume of water that would be discharged under MPDES permit rather than the full volume of water authorized for use under the DNRC's water use permit; and (4) the district court erred by vacating the permit. View "Water for Flathead's Future, Inc. v. Mont. Dep't of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT) contracted with Jones to repair State Route 141. The project involved 68,615 tons of “graded solid rock” for the new road's bottom layer. To obtain graded solid rock, Jones leased land near the roadway, paying the property owner $75,282. Jones prepared the Site and began pattern blasting the limestone to produce appropriately sized rock pieces, using a “shaker” bucket to allow debris to fall away. Appropriately-sized rocks were hauled to the road site. The Site also served as a waste pit for material from the road repair. After several months, a Federal Mine Safety & Health Administration Inspector inspected the Site, determined that Jones had violated several Administration standards, and issued citations and orders.An ALJ ruled that the Site was a mine subject to the Mine Act, not a “borrow pit,” which is not subject to the Administration’s jurisdiction. On remand, the case was assigned to another ALJ, who indicated that she had read the vacated decision. Jone moved for recusal, citing the Sixth Circuit’s command that Jones receive fresh proceedings. The ALJ denied the motion and held that the Site was a mine, not a borrow pit, based on findings that Jones did not only use the Site on a one-time basis or only intermittently; engaged in milling, sizing, and crushing; and did not use the rock more for bulk fill than for its intrinsic qualities. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision as supported by substantial evidence. View "Jones Brothers, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law