Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

For years, the High Lonesome Ranch restricted access to two roads by locking a gate. But in 2015, during a county meeting, the Garfield County Commission directed the Ranch to remove the locked gate after concluding that the two disputed roads were subject to public rights-of-way. The Ranch refused and filed a declaratory-judgment action in Colorado state court opposing the County’s position. At first, the County asked the state court to dismiss the case for failure to name the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) as a party. But rather than dismissing, the state court ordered the Ranch to join the United States (BLM) as a necessary party, and the Ranch did so. The United States removed the case to federal district court. In October 2020, after a five-day bench trial, the district court ruled that the entire lengths of the two disputed roads were subject to public rights-of-way. On appeal—and for the first time—the Ranch contended that various procedural shortcomings deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. It also challenged the district court’s rights-of-way rulings. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s adverse-use ruling, but reversed its Colorado R.S. 2477 ruling and remanded for the court to reconsider that ruling under recent circuit authority governing acceptance of R.S. 2477 rights. The Court also remanded for the district court to determine the locations and widths of the rights-of-way by survey. View "High Lonesome Ranch v. Board of County Commissioner, et al." on Justia Law

Southern California Edison Company (Edison), an investor-owned public utility, filed a complaint in eminent domain to condemn an easement across a landowner’s property for the purpose of accessing and maintaining existing power transmission lines. Edison also filed a motion for order of prejudgment possession under the quick-take provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410.1 The trial court granted the motion. The landowners filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting the court vacate the order granting Edison prejudgment possession.   The Fifth Appellate District vacated the order of prejudgment possession and directed the trial court to conduct further proceedings on the motion. Because the maintenance of power transmission lines is a matter of urgency, the court issued a peremptory writ in the first instance. The court explained a trial court evaluating a quick-take motion in the absence of a timely opposition shall grant the motion “if the court finds each of the following: (A) The plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain (B) The plaintiff deposited pursuant to Article 1 an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.”   Here, the trial court did not make express findings. Among other things, the court did not expressly find that it was necessary for the access easement to be 16 feet wide, that the 16-foot-wide access easement was compatible with the least private injury, or that it was necessary for Edison to have the right to move guy wires and anchors, crossarms, and other physical fixtures onto the property. View "Robinson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Schwab Multimedia received a construction permit from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). But Schwab never built its station. Though the FCC granted Schwab’s first three requests for more time, it denied Schwab’s fourth. Schwab appealed the FCC’s decision, claiming that it was arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the FCC based its denial of Schwab’s tolling request on three underlying determinations, and those determinations were reasonable. First, the FCC reasonably found that Schwab had no construction site. Indeed, Schwab admitted as much. It told the Media Bureau that the landlord of the original site had “rescinded [its] verbal agreement . . . to use the site.” And it offered no evidence to suggest that it had since secured the landlord’s permission. Second, it was reasonable for the FCC to conclude that site loss was the real reason Schwab could not build. Third, the FCC reasonably held that site loss is not a legitimate basis for tolling. Further, Schwab produced no evidence to show that good cause would support a waiver. View "Levine/Schwab Partnership v. FCC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying a motion to intervene on the grounds that it was untimely, holding that the proposed intervenors were not entitled to relief on their claim of error.Plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from a decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan (Board) upholding the issuance of a zoning permit to Grace Farms Foundation, the intervening defendant. Nearly nineteen months later and after the trial court issued a decision remanding the case to the Board for further proceedings, the proposed intervenors brought the motion to intervene at issue. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the motion to intervene as of right was untimely. View "Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the tax appeals commission concluding that the sales tax exemption in Wisconsin Act 185, which expanded an existing sales tax exemption to include the sale of aircraft parts or maintenance, did not apply to Lessees' payments for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Citation Partners, LLC owned an aircraft that it leased to Lessees. Citation Partners charged per-flight-hour rates for aircraft repairs and maintenance as part of the total amount Lessees paid to lease the aircraft, which rates corresponded to the amount Citation Partners spent on repairs and maintenance. Citation Partners argued that this portion of the lease payment was tax exempt because it was a sale of aircraft parts or maintenance. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that the payments were not exempt from sales tax under the plain language of the statutes. View "Citation Partners, LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Lunada Bay Boys (Bay Boys) are a group of young and middle-aged men local to the City of Palos Verdes (the “City”), who consider themselves to be the self-appointed guardians of Lunada Bay. One of their tenets is to keep outsiders away from the surf location. They accomplish this through threats and violence. Plaintiffs are (1) two non-locals who encountered harassment by the Bay Boys when they tried to surf Lunada Bay and (2) a non-profit dedicated to preserving coastal access. They brought suit against the Bay Boys, some of its individual members, and the City itself for conspiracy to deny access under the California Coastal Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the City conspired with the Bay Boys essentially to privatize Lunada Bay, depriving nonlocals of access. The trial court granted the City judgment on the pleadings.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an unpermitted “development” in the Bay Boys’ denial of access to the beach. Further, the court explained that parties can, in fact, be liable for Coastal Act violations under the doctrine of conspiracy. Conspiracy liability is not limited to tort; defendants may be liable if they agree to engage in conduct that violates a duty imposed by statute. The court wrote, at this point, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an actionable conspiracy in which the City has participated. View "Spencer v. City of Palos Verdes Estates" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the circuit court's judgment reversing the determination of the Board of Public Works that a decision of the procurement officer for the Department of General Services (DGS) was arbitrary and capricious, holding that the procurement officer's decision was not arbitrary or capricious.The Maryland Department of General Services (DGS), on behalf of the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA), issued a request for proposal (RFP) for office space. Montgomery Park was originally named the awardee, but through its procurement officer, DGS cancelled the RFP before the award was presented to the Board for approval. Thereafter, the procurement officer renewed MIA's existing lease between MIA and the leased premise. Montgomery Park filed two bid protests, which the procurement officer denied. The Board overturned the procurement officer's decisions determining that they violated Maryland procurement law. The circuit court reversed, and the appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that (1) the procurement officer's decision to cancel the RFP was not arbitrary or capricious; and (2) Montgomery Park lacked standing to protest the renewal of the existing lease between MIA and St. Paul Plaza. View "Montgomery Park v. Md. Dep't of General Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing an action seeking to enjoin two members of a county board of commissioners from voting on an application for a conditional use permit (CUP), holding that the district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action.Plaintiffs, opponents of the CUP application, filed a complaint seeking an injunction and alleging, among other things, that two members of the county board of commissioners had conflicts of interest and should be enjoined from considering or voting on the CUP application. The district court ruled that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the issuance of the CUP and that the district court properly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Preserve the Sandhills v. Cherry County" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the determination of the Planning Board that Amazon Services, LLC's's proposed use of property it owned in Prince George's County fell within the definition of "Warehouse" under section 27 of the Prince George's County Code and was, therefore, permitted by right at the property, holding that the district court did not err.Amazon sought approval to make certain modifications and improvements to its property, which the Planning Board approved, concluding that the proposed use of the property qualified as a "warehouse" use under the applicable zoning ordinance. The District Council for Prince George's County affirmed. On review, the District Council concluded that the Planning Board correctly determined that Amazon's proposed use of the property qualified as a "warehouse and distribution facility" use under the zoning ordinance. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the decision of the District Council affirming the Planning Board's approval of Amazon's design plan for the property. View "Crawford v. County Council of Prince George's County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant, in her capacity as the Town of Lincoln's tax assessor, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on its claims of error.Plaintiff brought this action arguing that Defendant (1) illegally increased the value of Plaintiff's property in light of a solar energy development on a portion of Plaintiff's property for tax years 2019 and 2020, and (2) improperly created a new tax classification not recognized by R.I. Gen. Laws 44-5-11.8(b). The superior court granted judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in including the presence of a solar energy development as an element of value assessed to real property; and (2) Plaintiff's claim that the tax assessor effectively created a new tax classification for property upon which a solar energy development is located, in contravention of R.I. Gen. Laws 44-5-11.8(b), was unpersuasive. View "Polseno Properties Management, LLC v. Keeble" on Justia Law