Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Lucille Ray sued the City of Rock Hill, South Carolina (the City) for inverse condemnation, claiming her property was taken as a result of stormwater flowing through pipes under City streets and into a terra cotta pipe that ran underneath and behind her property. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City, and the court of appeals reversed, holding a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City engaged in an affirmative, positive, aggressive act sufficient to support Ray's claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals (as modified), and remanded the case back to the circuit court for a determination on the merits as to whether the City's reconnection of its three stormwater pipes to the catch basin and the resumed flow of water through the Pipe constituted an affirmative, positive, aggressive act causing damage to the Property over and above any damage that had occurred before the three pipes were severed and reconnected. "Given the posture of this case and the above discussion, Ray cannot recover for any damage to the Property caused by the flow of water though the Pipe before the City reconnected its three pipes to the catch basin in November 2012." View "Ray v. City of Rock Hill" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs fell into arrears on the taxes on their home in the Borough of Rutherford, New Jersey. After the date of redemption but before entry of final judgment, plaintiff John Winberry called the Tax Collector to determine the total amount needed to redeem the certificate. According to Winberry’s deposition testimony, the Tax Collector told him that she “[didn’t] have the time” to give him either the total amount or the per diem interest rate. The day after plaintiffs attempted to redeem the certificate, the court entered the final foreclosure judgment. After costly legal proceedings, plaintiffs succeeded in having the foreclosure judgment overturned and reclaimed their property. When deposed, the Tax Collector acknowledged the right to redemption at any time before entry of a final foreclosure judgment, and that her computer software could calculate arrearages “within a matter of minutes.” She testified that her policy as Tax Collector required the property owner put the redemption request in writing. and that her policy was to contact the certificate holder to get the correct amount owed. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Borough's Tax Collector was entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs' suit to recover costs, and if not, whether the Borough could be liable for her actions. Plaintiffs alleged: (1) the Tax Collector violated their clearly established constitutional and statutory right to redeem the tax sale certificate on their home before entry of a final foreclosure judgment; and (2) that the Borough was liable for the Tax Collector’s violation of their right because the Tax Collector was the Borough’s final policymaker in the area of tax sale certificate redemptions. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision to deny the Tax Collector qualified immunity. Based on the summary judgment record, the Tax Collector’s refusal to provide the redemption amount to plaintiffs because the request was not in writing or timely made was not objectively reasonable. The Court disagreed, however, that plaintiffs did not establish the basis for municipal liability: if the Tax Collector was the final policymaker on matters related to the redemption of tax sale certificates in the Borough, the Borough was liable if the Tax Collector violated the constitutional or statutory rights of plaintiffs. View "Winberry Realty Partnership v. Borough of Rutherford" on Justia Law

Property owners sued the Matanuska-Susitna Borough, challenging the validity of easements that crossed their property to give access to neighboring residences. The superior court dismissed most of the property owners’ claims on res judicata grounds, reasoning that the claims had been brought or could have been brought in two earlier suits over the same easements. The court also granted the Borough’s motions for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings on the property owners’ claims involving the validity of construction permits, redactions in public records, and whether the Borough had acquired a recent easement through the appropriate process. However, one claim remained: whether the Borough violated the property owners’ due process rights by towing their truck from the disputed roadway. The court found in favor of the Borough on this claim, and awarded the Borough enhanced attorney’s fees, finding that the property owners had pursued their claims vexatiously and in bad faith. The property owners appealed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the superior court, View "Windel v Matanuska-Susitna Borough" on Justia Law

Plaintiff H.C. Equities, L.P. asserted contract claims against its commercial tenant, the County of Union, after the County began to withhold rent payments in response to a dispute about the condition of the leased commercial buildings. During negotiations to settle the contract matter, the County directed its co-defendant, the Union County Improvement Authority (Authority), to assess the County’s real estate needs. H.C. Equities obtained a copy of a consultant’s report prepared as part of that assessment and objected to statements in the report about the condition of the buildings that it had leased to the County. H.C. Equities filed suit against the County and the Authority, asserting conspiracy claims against both defendants and trade libel and defamation claims against the Authority. Plaintiff did not apply for permission to file a late tort claims notice until more than eight months after the expiration of the one-year period allowed under N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 for the filing of such motions. The trial court held that H.C. Equities had failed to file the notices of claim that the Tort Claims Act required and dismissed its tort claims. H.C. Equities appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed the trial court. Relying on a combination of excerpts from three letters written by H.C. Equities’ counsel, the Appellate Division found that H.C. Equities substantially complied with the Act’s notice of claim provisions. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed that a finding of substantial compliance with the Tort Claims Act could be premised on comments made by plaintiff’s counsel in three different letters sent to lawyers representing the defendant public entities. The Supreme Court did not find that H.C. Equities’ letters, individually or collectively, communicated the core information that a claimant had to provide to a public entity in advance of filing a tort claim. The Appellate Division’s determination was reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court. View "H.C. Equities, LP v. County of Union" on Justia Law

Gary and Bella Martin appealed after the trial court granted in part and denied in part their petition for writ of administrative mandate to challenge the imposition of certain special conditions placed on the development of their property - a vacant, oceanfront lot in Encinitas - by the California Coastal Commission (Commission). The Commission also appealed the judgment. The Martins’ challenged a condition requiring them to eliminate a basement from their proposed home, while the Commission challenged the trial court’s reversal of its condition requiring the Martins to set back their home 79 feet from the bluff edge. Because the Court of Appeal agreed with its own recent decision in Lindstrom v. California Coastal Com., 40 Cal.App.5th 73 (2019) interpreting the same provisions of the Encinitas Local Coastal Program (LCP) and Municipal Code at issue here, the trial court’s invalidation of the Commission’s setback requirement was reversed. The trial court’s decision to uphold the basement prohibition was affirmed. View "Martin v. Cal. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (CARES Act), among other things, imposed a 120-day moratorium on evictions for rental properties receiving federal assistance. The CDC then issued a temporary eviction moratorium on September 4, 2020, that suspended the execution of eviction orders for nonpayment of rent. Before the CDC's order was originally set to expire on December 31, 2020, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which extended the CDC's order through January 31, 2021. The CDC's order was then extended again through March 31, 2021, and again through June 30, 2021, and again through July 31, 2021.Plaintiffs, several landlords seeking to evict their tenants for nonpayment of rent and a trade association for owners and managers of rental housing, filed suit alleging that the CDC's orders exceeds its statutory and regulatory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates their constitutional right to access the courts.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs' failure to show an irreparable injury. The court declined to find that the CDC's order is unconstitutional, and failed to see how the temporary inability to reclaim rental properties constitutes an irreparable harm. Furthermore, the court explained that, without any information about a tenant’s financial or employment picture, the court has no way to evaluate whether she will ever be able to repay her landlord; to decide otherwise based solely on the CDC declaration would be to conclude that no one who signed the declaration is likely to repay their debts after the moratorium expires. Given the lack of evidence and the availability of substantial collection tools, the court could not conclude that the landlords have met their burden of showing that an irreparable injury is likely. View "Brown v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court vacating the determination of the Town of Wells Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) denying Plaintiff's application for two setback variances on the grounds that Plaintiff had not met his burden of proof, holding that the evidence did not compel the ZBA to grant him a variance.The ZBA denied Plaintiff's application on the basis that he did not meet his burden of proof to show that granting the variances would not alter the essential character of the locality. The superior court vacated the ZBA's determination, concluding that Plaintiff had met his burden of proof. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded with instructions to affirm the ZBA's denial, holding that the ZBA properly decided that Plaintiff failed to show that the nature of his proposed residence with the variances would conform with the neighborhood as zoned and would not degrade the value of surrounding environmental structures. View "Hill v. Town of Wells" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming a decision of the State Board of Property Tax Review upholding the Town of Madison's denial of Madison Paper Industries' (MPI) request for a property tax abatement for the 2016-17 tax year, holding that the Board made no errors of law, and its findings were supported by competent evidence in the record.The Board found MPI's appraisal and its underlying factual assertions were not credible and that MPI had failed to meet its burden of persuasion. On appeal, MPI argued that the Board failed to apply the Maine Constitution's required that it apply the "just value" standard to valuing the property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Board's determinations were not erroneous and that its findings were supported by the evidence. View "Madison Paper Industries v. Town of Madison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the decision of the tax commissioner denying Appellant's complaint challenging the continuing property tax exemption for a real estate parcel owned by the state and operated as the Ohio State University Airport (OSU Airport), the BTA's decision was reasonable and lawful.On appeal, Appellant argued that, given its use as of the tax lien date, the airport parcel did not qualify for exemption. Specifically, Appellant argued that either the entire airport should be taxed or that certain areas of the parcel should be split-listed as taxable. The Supreme Court affirmed BTA's decision continuing the exemption for the entire airport parcel, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 5715.271 placed the burden of proving entitled to continued exemption on OSU, and therefore, the BTA properly required OSU to bear that burden; (2) this Court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief to OSU on its evidentiary arguments; and (3) OSU proved that the airport was entitled to exemption under Ohio Rev. Code 3345.17. View "O'Keefe v. McClain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court affirming the decision of the Stillwater Board of County Commissioners to abandon a portion of Eerie Drive, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in limiting its review of the record to whether there was sufficient evidence that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction to justify intruding on the Board's inherent discretion regarding road abandonment decisions; and (2) the district court did not err in concluding that the Board adequately documented its decision, as required by the statutes governing county road abandonment and caselaw. View "Williams v. Stillwater Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law