Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v. Astaldi Construction
The Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) awarded a contract to OC 405 Partners Joint Venture (OC 405) for improvements to Interstate 405. OC 405 then awarded subcontracting work to Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. (GSB). However, the parties disagreed on the scope of the subcontract work and did not execute a written subcontract. OC 405 subsequently contracted with another subcontractor, leading GSB to file a lawsuit seeking benefit of the bargain damages, claiming OC 405 did not comply with Public Contract Code section 4107’s substitution procedures.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of OC 405 and other defendants, holding that GSB was not entitled to the protections of section 4107 because it did not meet the requirements of section 4100 et seq. Specifically, GSB was not a "listed subcontractor" in the original bid, and its proposed work did not exceed one-half of 1 percent of the prime contractor’s total bid, a threshold requirement under section 4104.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that section 4107’s substitution procedures did not apply to OC 405’s substitution of GSB. The court emphasized that the protections of section 4100 et seq. only apply to subcontractors whose proposed work exceeds the one-half of 1 percent threshold of the prime contractor’s total bid. Since GSB’s bid did not meet this threshold, it was not entitled to the protections under section 4107. The court also noted that the contractual provisions in the prime contract did not alter this statutory requirement. Thus, the judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v. Astaldi Construction" on Justia Law
People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties
A landlord argued that a case brought by the Los Angeles City Attorney to enforce California's Public Nuisance Law (PNL) violated Government Code section 53165.1, which bars local governments from penalizing tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The case involved a 116-unit apartment complex in North Hollywood, where the People alleged a gang-related public nuisance. The complaint sought abatement of the nuisance, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to implement several security measures, including proper lighting, video monitoring, and private security. The court also ordered criminal background checks on tenants. Defendants appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction but directed the trial court to consider modifying it in light of section 53165.1. On remand, the trial court modified the injunction to remove the background check requirements but confirmed the validity of the rest of the injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that enforcing the PNL is not prohibited by section 53165.1 because the PNL is a state law, not a local ordinance, rule, policy, program, or regulation. The court also determined that the action brought by the city attorney on behalf of the People of the State of California is not an action by a "local government" within the meaning of section 53165.1. Additionally, the court found that the preliminary injunction did not penalize tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The order was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties" on Justia Law
Felts v. City of Rochester
In December 2020, Raymond Felts' wife was struck and injured by a motor vehicle while walking across North Main Street in Rochester within a painted crosswalk that lacked warning signs or signals. She later died from her injuries. Felts, individually and as executor of his wife's estate, filed a lawsuit in January 2022, alleging negligence and violation of RSA 231:90-:92 by the City of Rochester for failing to design, monitor, and maintain the crosswalk safely, including the absence of warning signs or signals. The City moved to dismiss the claims, arguing limited liability under RSA 231:92 for injuries arising from the construction, maintenance, or repair of public highways.The Superior Court partially granted and denied the City's motion to dismiss. The court ruled that "highway" under RSA 231:92 includes crosswalks but not pedestrian warning signs or signals, thus dismissing the negligence claim related to the crosswalk itself but allowing the claim regarding the City's failure to install warning signs or signals to proceed. The City moved for reconsideration, which was denied, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo, focusing on statutory interpretation. The court concluded that "highways" under RSA 231:92 includes pedestrian warning signs, crossing signals, and other traffic controls. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative intent support a broad interpretation of "highways" to include these elements, which are integral to the safe use of public roads. Consequently, the court vacated the trial court's ruling that RSA 231:92 does not apply to the plaintiff's claim regarding the City's failure to install pedestrian warning signs and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Felts v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law
Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation
The case involves a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the Oregon State Building and Construction Trades Council (OBTC) against a preliminary injunction issued by the Marion County Circuit Court. The injunction was part of a public contracting dispute between the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) and the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). AGC challenged the process used by ODOT to set the terms of "community benefit contracts" for certain highway improvement projects under ORS 279C.308.The Marion County Circuit Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing ODOT from using the terms of a Community Workforce Agreement (CWA) in any projects while AGC's challenge to the validity of the CWA under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was pending before the Oregon Court of Appeals. AGC had filed three cases: one in the circuit court and two petitions for judicial review in the Court of Appeals. The circuit court case sought declaratory relief and an injunction against ODOT's use of the CWA. The Court of Appeals certified the case challenging the CWA's validity to the Oregon Supreme Court, which accepted the certification.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and decided the challenge to the validity of the CWA in a related case, Oregon-Columbia Chapter of AGC v. ODOT. As a result, the preliminary injunction issued by the circuit court expired, rendering OBTC's request for mandamus relief moot. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law
Ex parte City of Orange Beach
Sara Pearl Fahrmann filed a complaint against the City of Orange Beach and D.R. Horton, Inc., alleging that the City failed to ensure that Horton's construction of the Cypress Village subdivision complied with the City's zoning ordinance and the approved Planned Unit Development (PUD). Fahrmann claimed that this failure led to inadequate parking, which obstructed emergency services and delayed treatment for her husband, resulting in his death. She asserted wrongful-death claims based on wantonness and negligence.The Baldwin Circuit Court denied the City's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from Fahrmann's claims. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant its motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the City was immune from Fahrmann's wrongful-death claim alleging wantonness under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, which limits municipal liability to injuries caused by neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness, and does not include wanton conduct. The Court also held that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from the negligence claim, as the City's failure to enforce its zoning ordinance did not create a legal duty to individual plaintiffs. The Court granted the City's petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to grant summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ex parte City of Orange Beach" on Justia Law
Hoff v. City of Burlington
Casey Hoff applied for a building permit from the City of Burlington to add an addition to his home, which is located within the city's floodplain. Hoff, an experienced contractor, provided appraisals and plans to the city officials, who approved the permit based on the information provided. However, after Hoff began construction, it was later determined that the remodel constituted a "substantial improvement" under the city's floodplain ordinances, requiring additional compliance measures. The city subsequently refused to issue a certificate of occupancy, leading Hoff to sue the city.The District Court of Ward County held a bench trial and denied Hoff's claims for a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, injunction, and inverse condemnation. The court found that Hoff did not comply with the city's floodplain ordinances and that the remodel was a substantial improvement. The court also granted summary judgment dismissing Hoff's negligence claim, concluding that the city was immune under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Hoff did not establish a clear legal right to a certificate of occupancy, as he did not comply with the city's ordinances. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Hoff's declaratory judgment and injunction claims. Additionally, the court concluded that Hoff failed to establish a "special relationship" with the city, which is necessary to overcome the city's immunity from negligence claims. The court also rejected Hoff's inverse condemnation claim, finding no total regulatory taking occurred. View "Hoff v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law
KENSINGTON TITLE-NEVADA, LLC v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Kensington Title-Nevada, LLC, a Nevada-based real estate company, acquired property in Denton, Texas, which contained radioactive materials owned by US Radiopharmaceuticals, Inc. (USR). The Texas Department of State Health Services had denied USR’s application for a radioactive material license and ordered decommissioning of the materials. Kensington proposed a decommissioning plan, which the Department approved, and a licensed contractor began the cleanup. However, Kensington faced conflicting demands from the Department and local taxing entities, leading to a halt in decommissioning.The Department issued a notice of violation to Kensington for possessing radioactive material without a license and sought an $8,000 penalty. Kensington amended its pleading in an ongoing tax dispute to seek a declaratory judgment under Section 2001.038(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the licensing rule did not apply to it as it did not own or possess the radioactive material. The trial court denied the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Kensington failed to allege a proper rule-applicability challenge.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Kensington had standing to seek a declaratory judgment under Section 2001.038(a). The Court found that Kensington’s allegations of interference with its legal rights due to the Department’s notice of violation were sufficient to establish standing. The Court also concluded that Kensington’s challenge to the applicability of the licensing rule was within the scope of the statute’s waiver of immunity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "KENSINGTON TITLE-NEVADA, LLC v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES" on Justia Law
In re: Burrell v. City of Muscle Shoals
Several residents of the City of Muscle Shoals filed a lawsuit against the City, seeking damages for negligence and trespass due to flooding caused by the City's management of a stormwater-drainage pond in their neighborhood. The plaintiffs claimed that heavy rainfall in February 2019 overwhelmed the pond, leading to the flooding of their homes. They argued that the City failed to plan adequately for such events and did not maintain the pond properly.The plaintiffs initially filed their complaint in the Colbert Circuit Court in March 2020, seeking damages for negligence, wantonness, and trespass. They later amended their complaint to drop the wantonness claim and added a request for injunctive relief, which the trial court denied. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, and that there was no substantial evidence to support the trespass claim. The trial court denied the City's motion, leading the City to file a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the City was immune from the plaintiffs' claims under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975. The Court found that the City's decision to plan for 25-year rainfall events was within common municipal practice and did not constitute neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness. Additionally, the Court concluded that the City's design and maintenance of the pond were not defective within the meaning of the statute. As a result, the Court granted the City's petition and issued a writ directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the City, effectively barring the plaintiffs' claims for damages. View "In re: Burrell v. City of Muscle Shoals" on Justia Law
Marlowe v. SC DOT
James and Lori Marlowe own a home on Highway 378 in Florence County, South Carolina. In 2015, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) began construction to widen and realign a portion of Highway 378 adjacent to the Marlowes' home. During the construction, the home flooded twice, once in October 2015 and again in October 2016, during major storm events. The Marlowes filed a lawsuit against SCDOT, alleging inverse condemnation, conversion, due process violations, and negligence.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's decision on the negligence claim but reversed on the inverse condemnation claim. The Court of Appeals also held that the Stormwater Management and Sediment Reduction Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. SCDOT petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the inverse condemnation and Stormwater Act issues, which the South Carolina Supreme Court granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the Stormwater Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision on the inverse condemnation claim, finding that there was insufficient evidence on the causation issue to allow the claim to proceed. The court held that the evidence, including expert testimony, did not rise above speculation regarding whether the construction of the new roadway caused the flooding of the Marlowes' home. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the grant of summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on the inverse condemnation claim. View "Marlowe v. SC DOT" on Justia Law
Ashe County v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd
In June 2015, Appalachian Materials submitted an application to the Ashe County Director of Planning for a permit to build an asphalt plant under the Polluting Industries Development Ordinance (PID Ordinance). The application included aerial images, topographical maps, a marked floorplan, and a pending state air quality permit application. The Planning Director initially indicated the application met the ordinance's requirements but could not issue a permit until the state permit was received. Public opposition led to a temporary moratorium on polluting industries in October 2015. Appalachian Materials received the state permit in February 2016, but the Planning Director denied the application in April 2016, citing proximity to commercial and residential buildings and other issues.The Ashe County Planning Board reversed the Planning Director's decision, finding the application was complete and met the PID Ordinance requirements. The Board determined the mobile shed and barn near the proposed site were not commercial buildings and that there were no material misrepresentations in the application. The superior court affirmed the Board's decision.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision, holding the application was not complete until the state permit was received, thus falling under the moratorium. The court also found the mobile shed and barn were commercial buildings, and the application did not meet the setback requirements.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the application was complete when initially submitted in June 2015, triggering the Permit Choice statutes. The court found the mobile shed and barn were not commercial buildings under the PID Ordinance and upheld the Board's determination that there were no material misrepresentations. The court directed the Board to issue the permit under the PID Ordinance. View "Ashe County v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd" on Justia Law