Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A Compact between Pennsylvania and New Jersey created the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission, which is authorized to “acquire, own, use, lease, operate, and dispose of real property and interest in real property, and to make improvements,” and to "exercise all other powers . . . reasonably necessary or incidental to the effectuation of its authorized purposes . . . except the power to levy taxes or assessments.” The Commission undertook to replace the Scudder Falls Bridge, purchased land near the bridge in Pennsylvania, and broke ground on a building to house the Commission’s staff in a single location. Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry inspectors observed the construction; the Commission never applied for a building permit as required under the Department’s regulations. The Commission asserted that it was exempt from Pennsylvania’s regulatory authority. The Department threatened the Commission’s elevator subcontractor with regulatory sanctions for its involvement in the project. The Commission sought declaratory and injunctive relief.After rejecting an Eleventh Amendment argument, the Third Circuit upheld an injunction prohibiting the Department from seeking to inspect or approve the elevators and from further impeding, interfering, or delaying the contractors. Pennsylvania unambiguously ceded some of its sovereign authority through the Compact. The fact that both states expressly reserved their taxing power—but not other powers—indicates that they did not intend to retain the authority to enforce building safety regulations. View "Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent City of Norco (City) filed a receivership action to abate what it described as “nearly 20 life-safety hazards” on a property belonging to defendant-appellant Ronald Mugar. During the litigation, Mugar abated the substandard conditions on the property, and the matter was dismissed. Mugar appealed the trial court's order declaring the City as the prevailing party, and awarding it attorney fees pursuant to Health & Safety Code section 17980.7(c)(11). Mugar contended: (1) his due process rights were violated because the City was represented by a private law firm with an inappropriate financial interest in the litigation, and without adequate supervision by neutral government attorneys; (2) the award of attorney fees unconstitutionally burdened his First Amendment right to petition by penalizing him for asserting defenses in the action; and (3) the City should not be considered the prevailing party. The City argued Mugar forfeited his constitutional arguments, and it contested the merits of Mugar’s claims. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the City that Mugar forfeited his constitutional arguments. On the merits, however, the Court rejected each of Mugar’s contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "City of Norco v. Mugar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court approving the Dodge County Board of Adjustment's grant of variance for a 4-H pigpen built in violation of county setback requirements, holding that competent evidence supported the district court's factual findings and that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in approving the variance.The variance was based on, within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 23-168.03(1)(c), peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties or exceptional and undue hardships. In affirming the Board's decision to grant a variance, the district court found that the Board's decision was reasonable, well considered, and within the Board's discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not make an error of law or abuse its discretion in determining that the narrowness or shape of the property resulted in sufficient hardship to justify upholding the Board's decision to grant the variance. View "Dolezal-Soukup v. Dodge County Board of Adjustment" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court finding that E. Jane Egan lacked standing to challenge the Lancaster County Board of Commissioners' issuance of a special use permit allowing Randy Essink to construct and operate a poultry production facility on land within the county's agricultural zoning district and that the permit was appropriately issued, holding that the district court did not err.Egan and Janis Howlett challenged the Board's decision in the district court, asserting that the proposed poultry production facility would lead to adverse effects on the environment, properly values, public health, and local infrastructure. The district court affirmed the issuance of the special use permit, concluding that Egan did not have standing and that the permit was appropriately issued. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by failing to find that Egan had standing and finding that the special use permit was properly approved. View "Egan v. County of Lancaster" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a local zoning court of appeals approving homeowners' variance request, holding that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 62.23(7)(e)10., certiorari review of the board's decision is triggered when a written copy of the decision is filed in the board's office.The homeowners in this case petitioned the Village of Williams Bay Extraterritorial Zoning Board of Appeals for a variance request. The Board unanimously approved the variance. Plaintiff, the homeowners' neighbor, filed for a writ of certiorari within thirty days after the Board orally voted to grant the variance but before the Board issued and filed a written copy of its decision. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the court of appeals properly determined what constitutes the "triggering event" for purposes of appealing the Board's decision on a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an aggrieved party's right to certiorari review is triggered when a written copy of a zoning board of appeals' decision is filed in the office of the board; (2) the Board's written decision and approved minutes were properly included in the certiorari record; and (3) the Board acted under the correct theory of law. View "Moreschi v. Village of Williams Bay" on Justia Law

In this dispute between petitioner Ashe County Board of Commissioners and respondents Ashe County Planning Board and Appalachian Materials, LLC arising from Appalachian Materials' application for a permit pursuant to the County's Polluting Industries Development Ordinance authorizing Appalachian Materials to operate a portable asphalt production facility on property located in Ashe County, the Supreme Court held that the case should be remanded due to errors by the court of appeals.After the Planning Board ordered that a permit be issued to Appalachian Materials Ashe County sought judicial review. The trial court ordered the County to issue the requested permit within ten business days. The court of appeals affirmed the challenged trial court order. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the County's failure to appeal a letter written by the Planning Director gave that letter partially binding effect. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the court of appeals erred by holding that Ashe County lost its right to challenge the issuance of the contested permit because it failed to seek review of opinions that the Planning Director expressed in the letter. View "Ashe County v. Ashe County Planning Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court reversing and vacating the decision of the County of Knox board of supervisors approving a conditional use permit for an expansion of H&H Cattle's feedlot to 20,000 head of cattle, holding that there was no merit to Defendants' appeal.In 2003, H&H Cattle, the predecessor in interest of Epic Land and Cattle, LLC, obtained an impact easement from the mother of Plaintiffs. Thereafter, the County's board of supervisors approved a conditional use permit for an expansion of H&H Cattle's feedlot to 7,500 head of cattle. Fourteen years later, H&H Cattle again sought expansion of its feedlot. Relying in part on the 2003 impact easement, the board of supervisors granted the conditional use permit. The district court reversed and vacated the decision approving the permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding Plaintiff was unable to execute an easement that bound the shares of her children; (2) Defendants' arguments regarding estoppel by deed and ratification were without merit; and (3) any reliance on the easement was not reasonable. View "Harts v. County of Knox" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York (BSA) interpreting the definition of open space within the meaning of the New York City Zoning Resolution to encompass rooftop gardens accessible to a single building's residents as long as the residents of each building on the zoning lot receive at least a proportionate share of open space, holding that the BSA's determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.Plaintiff commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding asserting that BSA's interpretation of open space had no legal basis under the Zoning Resolution. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that the definition of open space unambiguously required that open space be accessible to the residents of every building on a zoning lot. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BSA's application of the definition of open space to multi-owner zoning lots was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. View "Peyton v. New York City Board of Standards & Appeals" on Justia Law

In this appeal brought by the landowner in a condemnation proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in all respects, holding that the circuit court did not err.After a trial, the circuit court entered a final order confirming the award entered by the Commissioner of Highways of $107,131 for the take and setting aside the award for damages to the residue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit ten-year-old site plans into evidence; and (2) did not err in deciding to strike the testimony of the owner of the property concerning damage to the residue of the property. As to Appellant's remaining assignment of error, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of invited error foreclosed relief on the claim that the trial court "put the parties on terms." View "Palmyra Associates, LLC v. Commissioner of Highways" on Justia Law

The Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases (AVGC) proceeding litigated whether the water supply from natural and imported sources, which replenishes an alluvial basin from which numerous parties pumped water, was inadequate to meet the competing annual demands of those water producers, thereby creating an "overdraft" condition. Phelan ultimately became involved in the litigation as one of the thousands of entities and people who asserted they were entitled to draw water from the aquifer.The trial court subsequently defined the boundaries for the AVAA to determine which parties would be necessary parties to any global adjudication of water rights, and then determined that the aquifer encompassed within the AVAA boundaries (the AVAA basin) had sufficient hydrologic interconnectivity and conductivity to be defined as a single aquifer for purposes of adjudicating the competing groundwater rights claims. Settlement discussions ultimately produced an agreement among the vast majority of parties in which they settled their respective groundwater rights claims and agreed to support the contours of a proposed plan (the Physical Solution) designed to bring the AVAA basin into hydrological balance. Phelan, which provides water to its customers who are located outside the AVAA boundaries, became subject to the AVGC litigation because a significant source of its water is pumping from a well located in the AVAA basin.The Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence supports the judgment as to Phelan and Phelan was not deprived of its due process rights to present its claims. In this case, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Physical Solution will bring the AVAA basin into balance; the trial court correctly rejected Phelan's fourth cause of action asserting it had acquired water rights as a "public use appropriator;" the phased decisional procedure did not deprive Phelan of due process; and the trial court correctly concluded that Phelan had no priority claim to return flows from native safe yield. View "Phelan Piñon Hills Community Services District v. California Water Service Co." on Justia Law