Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
Tomasino v. Town of Casco
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Town of Casco Zoning Board of Appeals in which the Board denied the request for a shoreline zoning permit filed by Mark and Valerie Tomasino, holding that the Tomasinos lacked standing to seek such a permit.On appeal, the Tomasinos argued that the Board erred in determining that they demonstrated insufficient right, title, or interest in the property to obtain a permit to remove three trees from property owned by Lake Shore Realty Trust, the abutting property owner, over which the Tomasinos claimed a deeded easement. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, even assuming that the Tomasinos demonstrated that they had some interest in the particular portion of property at issue in this case, they failed to demonstrate that they had the kind of interest that would allow them to cut the trees if they were granted a permit to do so. View "Tomasino v. Town of Casco" on Justia Law
Kalima v. State
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the circuit court's final judgment granting and apportioning monetary damages to Native Hawaiian beneficiaries after ruling that the State breached its duties as trustee of the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust (Trust), holding that the Fair Market Rental Value (FMRV) model is an adequate method for approximating actual damages.Plaintiffs were a group of Native Hawaiian Trust beneficiaries who claimed that they incurred damages while on the waitlist to receive homestead land due to breaches of trust duties by the State. In 2009, the circuit court ruled that the State breached its duties as trustee of the Trust. In 2018, the circuit court entered a final judgment adopting a FMRV model by which it could estimate the actual loss each individual beneficiary incurred. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err by adopting the FMRV model; (2) incorrectly ruled that a beneficiary's damages did not begin to accrue until six years after the State received a beneficiary's homestead application; and (3) did not err in finding that the State breached its trust duties by failing to recover lands that were withdrawn from the Trust prior to statehood. View "Kalima v. State" on Justia Law
Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus
Plaintiff appealed from a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate, contending that the trial court misinterpreted the conditions placed on the approved vesting tentative map for a small subdivision he is attempting to develop. The trial court interpreted the conditions to require a fire suppression system, with functional fire hydrants to be in place, before the county would approve the final subdivision map.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiff's claims of misinterpretation are not barred by the 90-day period set forth in Government Code section 66499.37. The court held that a claim of misinterpretation is distinct from a claim challenging the validity of the condition of approval and the two types of claims accrue at different times. View "Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Xenia v. Greene County Board of Commissioners
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting the city of Xenia's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Greene County Board of Commissioners (the county) to approve the city's annexation petition, holding that the city's petition satisfied the conditions of Ohio Rev. Code 709.23(E).The proposed annexation in this case concerned approximately forty-five acres of land located between Central State University and Xenia. The county denied the petition, determining that the petition did not satisfy section 709.023(E)(1), (4), (5), or (7). Thereafter, the city filed an original action in the court of appeals requesting a writ of mandamus compelling the county to approve the petition. The court of appeals issued the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a writ of mandamus is a proper vehicle to compel the county to grant the petition; and (2) the city's petition satisfied the conditions specified in section 709.023(E). View "State ex rel. Xenia v. Greene County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law
Alford v. United States
Water levels in Eagle Lake, near Vicksburg, are controlled by the Muddy Bayou Control Structure, part of the Army Corps of Engineers’ Mississippi River flood control program. Eagle Lake's predictable water levels allowed the plaintiffs to build piers, boathouses, and docks. In 2010, the Corps determined that “sand boils” threatened the stability of the nearby Mississippi River Mainline Levee, a component of the same flood-control program. Unusually wet weather in 2011 exacerbated the problem. The Corps declared an emergency, finding that the rise in nearby water levels threatened the structural integrity of the levee and “that the likelihood of breach was over 95%.” The Corps decided to flood Eagle Lake to reduce pressures along the levee. Because of that action, the levee did not breach. A breach would have resulted in widespread flooding affecting “about a million acres and possibly between four thousand to six thousand homes and businesses.” The damage to the plaintiffs’ properties would have exceeded the damage caused by raising the lake level. The plaintiffs sued, seeking compensation. The Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court’s finding that the government was liable and award of $168,000 in compensatory damages. The relative benefits doctrine bars liability. The plaintiffs were better off as a result of the Corps’ actions. If the government had not raised the water level, the levee would almost certainly have breached, and the plaintiffs would have suffered more damage. View "Alford v. United States" on Justia Law
Stalowy v. Flathead Conservation District
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court upholding the declaratory ruling of the Flathead Conservation District asserting jurisdiction over David and Jacqueline Stalowy's dredging project, holding that the district court did not err.The Stalowys applied for permits with the District to conduct dredging activities on their Flathead County property. For the District to have jurisdiction under the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975 (Act), Title 75, chapter 7, Mont. Code Ann., the proposed dredging work must result in a "change in the state" of a "natural, perennial-flowing stream." At issue was whether North Bear Creek and other waterbodies on the Stalowys' property met the definition of a “stream." The District issued a declaratory ruling asserting jurisdiction over the Stalowys' property and projects. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District had jurisdiction over the project. View "Stalowy v. Flathead Conservation District" on Justia Law
In re Trenton Farms RE, LLC Permit No. MOGS10520
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the clean water commission approving Trenton Farms' permit to establish a twin concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO), holding that House Bill No. 1713 (HB 1713) does not violate the original purpose, single subject, or clear title requirements of the Missouri Constitution and that there was sufficient evidence regarding the CAFO's protection from a 100-year flood.The clean water commission affirmed the department of natural resource's issuance of a permit to Trenton Farms to establish a CAFO. Hickory Neighbors United, Inc. appealed, arguing (1) HB 1713, which amended Mo. Rev. Stat. 644.021.1 to change the criteria for members of the commission, violated Missouri Constitution article III's original purpose requirement and single subject and clear title requirements; and (2) there was insufficient evidence that CAFO's manure containment structures would be protected from inundation or damages in the event of a 100-year flood, a requirement of 10 C.S.R. 20-8.300. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) HB 1713 is constitutionally valid; and (2) there was sufficient evidence that CAFO structures met regulatory requirements. View "In re Trenton Farms RE, LLC Permit No. MOGS10520" on Justia Law
United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association
Atlantic sought to construct a 604-mile natural gas pipeline from West Virginia to North Carolina, crossing 16 miles of land within the George Washington National Forest. Atlantic secured a special use permit from the U.S. Forest Service, obtaining a right-of-way for a 0.1-mile segment of pipe 600 feet below a portion of the Appalachian National Scenic Trail, which also crosses the National Forest. The Fourth Circuit vacated the permit.The Supreme Court reversed. The Department of the Interior’s assignment of responsibility for the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the Trail land into land within the National Park System that is not eligible for a pipeline lease. The Forest Service had the authority to issue the special use permit.Under 16 U.S.C. 521, the Forest Service has jurisdiction over the National Forest. The National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 244(a), applies to the Appalachian Trail; the Secretary of the Interior has delegated to the National Park System the authority to enter into “rights-of-way” agreements for the Trail. The Leasing Act enables any “appropriate agency head” to grant “[r]ights-of-way through any Federal lands . . . for pipeline purposes,” 30 U.S.C. 185(a), except lands in the National Park System. The National Park System is administered by the Secretary of the Interior, through the National Park Service, 54 U.S.C. 100501. The Forest Service “right-of-way” agreements with the National Park Service for the Appalachian Trail did not convert National Forest “Federal lands” under the Leasing Act into “lands” within the “National Park System.” A right-of-way grant only nonpossessory rights of use. Although the federal government owns all lands involved, a right-of-way between two agencies grants only an easement, not jurisdiction over the land itself. View "United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association" on Justia Law
Caquelin v. United States
Caquelin's land was subject to a railroad easement. The Surface Transportation Board granted the railroad permission to abandon the line unless the process (16 U.S.C. 1247(d)) for considering the use of the easement for a public recreational trail was invoked. That process was invoked. The Board issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU), preventing effectuation of the abandonment approval and blocking the ending of the easement for 180 days, during which the railroad could try to reach an agreement with two entities that expressed interest in the easement for trail use. The NITU expired without such an agreement. The railroad completed its abandonment three months later.Caquelin sued, alleging that a taking occurred when the government, by issuing the NITU, prevented the termination of the easement during the 180-day period. Following a remand, the Claims Court again held that a taking had occurred. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting the contention that the multi-factor approach adopted for government-created flooding in the Supreme Court’s 2012 “Arkansas Game” decision displaced the categorical-taking analysis adopted in Federal Circuit precedents for a NITU that blocks termination of an easement. The categorical taking analysis is applicable even when that NITU expires without a trail-use agreement. A NITU does not effect a taking if, even without a NITU, the railroad would not have abandoned its line during the period of the NITU. Here, the evidence permits a finding that abandonment would have occurred during the NITU period if the NITU had not issued. View "Caquelin v. United States" on Justia Law
Fairfax Board of Supervisors v. Ratcliff
The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from a decision of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) holding that short-term rentals were not authorized by Fairfax County zoning ordinances, holding that this case was moot.The Ratcliffs owned a home in Fairfax County that they made available as a short-term rental. After the decisions of the BZA and circuit court, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County filed a petition for appeal with the Supreme Court. The Ratcliffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot because they had sold the home. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot because there was no live controversy. The Court then ordered that the circuit court's judgment be vacated, holding that vacatur of the lower court judgment was appropriate. View "Fairfax Board of Supervisors v. Ratcliff" on Justia Law