Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) and Board of Revision (BOR) to retain the county fiscal officer’s valuation of real property owned by Appellant. The subject property consisted of a single-family dwelling located on a half-acre parcel in the city of Beachwood. For tax year 2013, Appellant filed a complaint seeking to reduce the fiscal officer’s valuation from $1,429,100 to $850,000. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision, holding (1) Appellant’s value-related arguments and procedural arguments were unavailing; and (2) Appellant failed to show that the BTA acted unreasonably or unlawfully. View "Jakobovitch v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) determining that the subject property in this case should be valued in 2013 according to its 2012 sale price of $550,000. The property was retail property that was split from a larger parcel and sold to Appellee. For tax year 2013, the auditor valued the subject property at $2,199,700. Appellee filed a valuation complaint asking for a reduction to $850,000 - the same value attributed to the undivided parcel for tax year 2012. The Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the new parcel’s value to $1,282,740. The BTA rejected the BOR’s valuation and valued the property at $550,000, finding that the 2012 sale was a recent arm’s-length transaction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA’s decision was reasonable and lawful. View "Huber Heights City Schools Board of Education v. Montgomery County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversing the tax commissioner’s determination finding that certain apartment buildings did not qualify for an exemption under Ohio Rev. Code 5709.87. Appellee, the owner of the property in question, remediated the property and improved it with apartment buildings. The tax commissioner found that the apartment buildings did not qualify for a partial tax exemption under section 5709.87 - the “brownfield exemption” - for having undergone environmental cleanup. The BTA, however, concluded that Appellee was entitled to a tax exemption for the assessed value of the apartment buildings under section 5709.87. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax commissioner waived his main argument and one other issue by failing to raise them first before the BTA; and (2) the tax commissioner’s remaining arguments lacked merit. View "Kinnear Road Redevelopment, L.L.C. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining the Tax Department’s decision to rescind $4.9 million in land preservation tax credits it had previously awarded to the Woolford family on the grounds that the Woolfords’ appraiser was not a “qualified appraiser.” Specifically, the circuit court found that the Woolfords’ appraiser lacked the necessary education and experience, as required by applicable federal law incorporated by Va. Code 58.1-512(B), to offer a qualified appraisal. The Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the case, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that the Woolfords’ appraiser was not a “qualified appraiser”; and (2) the Department was not constrained from auditing the value of the tax credits claimed by the Woolfords after initially awarding them those tax credits. View "Woolford v. Virginia Department of Taxation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the district court to quiet title in certain property to Zinvest, LLC, holding that the Department of Revenue’s defective property tax assessment voided the tax lien sale that resulted in Zinvest acquiring the Gallatin County’s interest.Gunnersfield Enterprises Inc. purchased five condominium units and an adjoining vacant lot in 2008. The deed was properly recorded, and a realty transfer certificate was submitted to the Department of Revenue, but the Department did not correctly update its ownership records for the vacant lot. While Gunnersfield paid the tax assessments for the condominium units yearly, the County Treasurer continued to send the tax bills for the vacant lot to the previous owner. The Treasurer eventually sold the lot for delinquent taxes and assigned its tax lien interest in the property to Zinvest. After Zinvest acquired a tax deed on the property Gunnersfield objected. The district court granted summary judgment for Zinvest and issued a final judgment quieting title to Zinvest. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment quieting title in Gunnersfield, holding that the tax assessment on the vacant lot was void, and therefore, the subsequent tax lien sale and issuance of a tax deed were also void. View "Zinvest v. Gunnersfield" on Justia Law

Traill Rural Water District ("TRWD") appealed a judgment that granted damages for overdue rent to Daniel and Marlene Motter ("the Motters"). In 2006 Melba Motter, through her estate's conservator Alerus Financial, leased approximately forty acres of land in rural Steele County to TRWD at $250 per acre for ninety-nine years. Attorneys for both Melba's estate and TRWD negotiated the leases. In January 2011 Daniel Motter, grandson of Melba, and Daniel's wife Marlene acquired title to the land, including the leases. Daniel received offers from TRWD to renegotiate the leases during the period from 2006 to 2011, when he farmed the land but did not own it. Daniel reviewed the TRWD leases in 2014 and claimed back rent of $10,000 per year for the full forty acres from 2011 through 2014. TRWD offered $4,500 compared to Motter's initial calculation of $31,300. The district court acknowledged the mathematical error and adjusted to $51,500 for the five years from 2011 to 2015. The parties' different interpretations led to this lawsuit. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying reformation of two leases on the Motters' land and did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial. View "Motter v. Traill Rural Water District" on Justia Law

At issue was whether, prior to the use of affix and mail service of Notices of Violation (NOVs) issued by Department of Building inspectors who discover building code violations, the New York City Charter requires more than a single attempt to personally serve the NOV at the premises. The Environmental Control Board (ECB) sustained Petitioner’s code violations, rejecting Petitioner’s argument that the NOVs were not properly served because more than one attempt at personal service is required prior to the use of the alternative affix and mail procedure authorized in New York City Chapter 1049-a(d)(2)(a)(ii). The Appellate Division confirmed the determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the agency properly interpreted New York City Charter 1049-a(d)(2)(b) to require only one attempt at personal service of an NOV at the premises prior to resorting to the affix and mail procedure; and (2) thus, the seven NOVs that were reviewed in the administrative hearings were properly served. View "Mestecky v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals requiring the Supreme Court to interpret various provisions of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Rule (WVSCMRR), W.Va. CSR 38-2-1, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that the WVSCMRR does not require a coal company, in its application for modification of its mining permit, to demonstrate compliance with the Utility Protection Standard found at W.Va. 38-2-14.17; (2) did not err in ruling that the permit application sufficiently described how the coal operator would comply with the Utility Protection Standard; but (3) erred in finding that the WVSCMRR applied regardless of a coal operator’s common law property rights. View "Texas Eastern Transmission v. W. Va. Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

At issue was the Zoning Board of Appeals’ (ZBA) denial of Plaintiff’s application for a comprehensive permit to develop a mixed-income project. Plaintiff owned parcel of land in an area zoned for limited manufacturing use. The site was subject to a restrictive covenant owned by the city of Newton, and the city owned an abutting parcel with a deed restriction requiring that it be used only for conservation, parkland, or recreational use. Plaintiff sought to amend the deed restriction to allow a residential use at the site and to permit construction in the nonbuild zone. The ZBA denied Plaintiff’s permit application, concluding that it lacked authority to amend the deed restriction, an interest in land held by the city. The Department of Housing and Community Development (HAC) affirmed. Plaintiff sought judicial review. A land court judge granted Defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the HAC does not have authority to order the city to relinquish its property interest. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the negative easement is a property interest in land, and the ZBA does not have authority modify certain types of property interests in land; and (2) the restrictive covenant is not invalid where the restrictions provide valuable interests to the city. View "135 Wells Avenue, LLC v. Housing Appeals Committee" on Justia Law

In the underlying property tax appeal, the Tax Court rejected a request by the Department of Revenue and the county assessor to increase the real market value of taxpayer’s property, and the court later awarded taxpayer attorney fees against the department under ORS 305.490(4)(a). The department appealed the attorney fee award only. The Oregon Supreme Court determined that even though the Tax Court also rejected the taxpayer’s request for a reduction in real market value, the legal prerequisite for a discretionary attorney fee award under that statute was met. The Supreme Court also concluded that the Tax Court did not err in applying most of the factors on which it relied in making the fee award. However, the Court concluded that the lower court’s use of one factor was erroneous, thus bringing into question the court’s overall exercise of discretion. Accordingly, the fee award was vacated and the matter remanded for the court to exercise its discretion without considering that factor. View "Ellison v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law