Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Friends of the Motherhouse, a nonprofit corporation and two individuals (collectively, Friends) filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Portland City Council’s rezoning of a parcel owned by Sea Coast at Baxter Woods Associates, LLC and Motherhouse Associates LP (collectively, Sea Coast) was invalid. Sea Coast successfully moved to intervene and then moved for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Sea Coast. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its broad legislative authority, and therefore, the superior court did not err in finding that Sea Coast was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Friends of the Motherhouse v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dana Johno filed suit against Plaquemines Parish Government (“PPG”) and numerous other defendants alleging his house was unlawfully demolished by PPG and its agents after Hurricane Katrina. The plaintiff subsequently moved to have La. R.S. 9:2800.17, which provided retroactive statutory immunity to the government and its agents for certain actions taken in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, declared unconstitutional. The District Court granted the plaintiff’s motion. Significantly, the issue of immunity was never raised or argued by PPG. Only one of the defendants, Hard Rock Construction, LLC, one of the contractors for PPG, appealed the District Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed: "When a party acquires a right to assert a cause of action prior to a change in the law, that right is a vested property right which is protected by the guarantee of due process. Thus, a cause of action, once accrued, cannot be divested by subsequent legislation." Because the plaintiff’s causes of action accrued before effective date of the statute, the statute was unconstitutional as applied in this matter. View "Johno v. Doe" on Justia Law

BoDe Tower was an Oklahoma limited liability company which owned a tract of land in the Gooseneck Bend area of Muskogee County. In 2009, BoDe Tower began the process of securing authorization from state and federal officials for the construction of a telecommunications tower on the tract in an effort to fill a gap in cellular coverage. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the BoDe Tower asserting a nuisance claim. Plaintiffs' cause of action was predicated on the placement of a cellular telephone tower adjacent to their respective properties. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and directed BoDe Tower to disassemble the cellular tower. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and concluded the trial court's decision was against the clear weight of the evidence. "Considering the totality of the evidence presented in this case, BoDe's cellular tower cannot be deemed actionable nuisance. Our case law prohibits nuisance claims based entirely on aesthetic concerns. It would be wholly unreasonable to allow one individual's visual sensitivities to impede development of cellular phone service for the residents of Muskogee. BoDe Tower undertook significant investment and complied with all regulatory hurdles. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is vacated, and the trial court's judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs is reversed." View "Laubenstein v. BoDe Tower, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fryeburg Academy, a private secondary school, applied to the Town of Fryeburg Planning Board for permits authorizing changes in the use of two parcels of leased land. Following a hearing, the Planning Board approved the Academy’s applications for both parcels. Specifically, the Town allowed the Academy to use one parcel of land (the Land Lot) as an outdoor classroom and to use a building on the second parcel of land (the House Lot) to house administrative offices. The Fryeburg Trust, which owns property abutting both lots, appealed. The superior court affirmed the Planning Board’s decision to grant the Land Lot permit but vacated the Planning Board’s decision to grant the House Lot. The Trust, the Academy, and the Town all appealed, challenging the interpretation of the definition of secondary school in Fryeburg’s Land Use Ordinance. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Planning Board, holding (1) the Academy’s proposed use of the Land Lot fit within the definition of secondary school; and (2) the proposed use of the House Lot was permissible under the Ordinance. View "Fryeburg Trust v. Town of Fryeburg" on Justia Law

In 1949, the federal government deeded a large parcel to the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District (MWCD), the entity responsible for controlling flooding in eastern Ohio. The deed provided that the land would revert to the United States if MWCD alienated or attempted to alienate it, or if MWCD stopped using the land for recreation, conservation, or reservoir-development purposes. MWCD sold rights to conduct hydraulic fracturing (fracking) operations on the land. Fracking opponents discovered the deed restrictions and, arguing that MWCD’s sale of fracking rights triggered the reversion, filed a “qui tam” suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729. alleging that MWCD was knowingly withholding United States property from the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claim. The court noted recent legislative amendments that replace a fraudulent-intent requirement in two FCA provisions with a requirement that the defendant acted “knowingly,” but concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim even under the more lenient scienter requirement; they did not specify whether or how MWCD knew or should have known that it was in violation of the deed restrictions, such that it knew or should have known that title to the property reverted to the United States. View "Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Hardscrabble Ranch, L.L.C. appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. Hardscrabble sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act in connection with the Forest Service’s response to the Sand Gulch Fire, which damaged Hardscrabble’s land. On April 26, 2011, lightning ignited a wildfire in the Wet Mountains of Colorado, in a remote area of the San Carlos Ranger District in the Pike and San Isabel National Forests, and the Cimarron and Comanche National Grasslands. When the United States Forest Service (USFS) responded, the fire was still small and could have been extinguished then and there. The USFS instead instituted a partial suppression strategy, with the twin goals of allowing the fire to continue burning on Forest Service land while at the same time containing the fire from spreading onto private property, which bordered about half a mile to the east. High winds in advance of a snow storm caused the fire to jump the containment lines the USFS had created, and the fire grew from covering 25–30 acres to a size of more than 200 acres. The USFS changed to a full suppression strategy. That evening the predicted snow came and partially smothered the fire. By the time the fire was declared fully contained several days later, it had burned 496 acres, 154 of which were owned by Hardscrabble Ranch. Hardscrabble contends that the USFS failed to follow numerous policies, regulations, and protocols in its handling of the fire, and that as a result the government was responsible for the harm caused to the Ranch. The district court held that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA barred jurisdiction. Finding no error with that judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Hardscrabble Ranch v. United States" on Justia Law

CNW, LLC owned an office building in the Taylor’s Crossing business subdivision in Idaho Falls. In mid-June of 2012, a sinkhole developed under the parking lot of CNW’s building. It was later determined that the sinkhole was caused by water from Porter Canal infiltrating an abandoned sewer line and eroding the soil under the parking lot. Porter Canal was owned and operated by New Sweden Irrigation District (NSID); the abandoned sewer line was owned by the City of Idaho Falls (City). NSID denied responsibility for the sinkhole. CNW then served the City with a notice of tort claim. Shortly thereafter, NSID admitted that it had worked on the Porter Canal in the spring of 2012. Prior to that, NSID had repeatedly denied performing any work on the canal. CNW filed this lawsuit against NSID and the City on December 19, 2012. On January 25, 2013, CNW served NSID with an amended notice of tort claim. NSID moved for summary judgment on September 29, 2014. On December 31, 2014, the district court granted NSID’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found that CNW’s letter of October 18, 2012, was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA). The district court also found that the 180 day time limit expired before CNW served the amended notice of tort claim in January. CNW filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider the grant of summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. CNW timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings, finding that the district court erred in concluding one of the first notices of tort claim, delivered to NSID's secretary, satisfied the presentment requirement provided by the ITCA. View "CNW, LLC v. New Sweden Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of their request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the drilling of certain oil and gas wells in the Mancos Shale formation of the San Juan Basin in New Mexico. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to satisfy three of the four elements required to obtain a preliminary injunction: (1) Plaintiffs had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims; (2) the balance of harms weighed against Plaintiffs; and (3) Plaintiffs failed to show that the public interest favored an injunction. Finding no reversible error in the district court's denial, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Dine Citizens v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The State of Mississippi entered into a Public Trust Tidelands lease with the City of Bay St. Louis to build a municipal harbor on beachfront property. After the City began construction of the harbor, brothers Kenneth, Ray, and Audie Murphy filed an inverse condemnation action, claiming that the State and the City had taken and damaged their property without compensation. The case was tried and a jury ultimately found the State liable to the Murphys for $644,000 in damages. The State appealed. The State claimed true ownership of the property under the authority of the Tidelands Act, or alternatively, its sovereign power of eminent domain. There was no evidence in the record indicating that the City could have constructed the harbor without the State first exercising a claim of ownership over the property. Because the State’s claim of ownership ultimately converted private property to public use, the Supreme Court found that the jury acted reasonably in assessing the full amount of damages to the State. Therefore, finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict. View "Mississippi v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska and the owner of a car wash reached an agreement for the State to acquire the car wash site as part of a highway improvement project. After the State acquired the site, the owner elected not to relocate the car wash. The owner then brought an inverse condemnation suit against the State, claiming business damages resulting from the State’s acquisition. At the close of a jury trial the superior court denied the State’s motion for a directed verdict; awarded the owner $1.79 million in damages and the court awarded attorney’s fees and costs. The State appealed, arguing that the owner’s claimed damages were not compensable because it was feasible for the owner to relocate the car wash after the State acquired the original site. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the State that feasibility was the correct standard for analyzing the owner’s decision not to relocate when deciding whether he was entitled to business damages. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court’s denial of the State’s motion for directed verdict, vacated the attorney’s fee and costs awards, and remanded for reconsideration of prevailing party status, attorney’s fees, and costs. View "Dept. of Trans. & Public Facilities v. Alaska Laser Wash, Inc." on Justia Law