Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the proper valuation for the tax year 2010 of an undeveloped tract made up of three noncontiguous parcels that was purchased in 2007 for the development of ranch condominiums. The county auditor originally valued the entire tract using the 2007 sale price, with a portion of that price allocated to each of the individual parcels. The Delaware County Board of Revision ordered reductions based on a deputy auditor’s report that was not made part of the record until the case was appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) retained the reduced valuations. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding that the evidence in the record negates the validity of the 2007 sale price but does not clearly establish an alternative valuation for the property. Remanded with instructions that the BTA perform an independent valuation of the property based on the existing record and any additional evidence that may be heard or received. View "Olentangy Local Schools Board of Education v. Delaware County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William O. Jamison owned large parcels of land near Sierraville in Sierra County, commonly referred to as Alpers Ranch. Plaintiff grazed cattle on the land for about seven months each year. The trial court enjoined the state Department of Transportation (Caltrans) from removing an obstruction plaintiff placed against a ditch culvert within a state highway right-of-way without an encroachment permit. But after review of this matter, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court erred in granting the injunction, as no evidence supported an exception to the statutory bar prohibiting injunctions that prevent the execution of a public statute by public officers for public purposes. View "Jamison v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. (UMMP) appealed a trial court judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate, which challenged the City of San Diego's enactment of an ordinance adopting regulations for the establishment and location of medical marijuana consumer cooperatives in the City. UMMP argued that the City did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when enacting the ordinance. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinance did not constitute a "project" within the meaning of CEQA, and accordingly the City was not required to conduct an environmental analysis prior to enacting the ordinance. View "Union of Med. Marijuana Patients v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In Petrin v. Town of Scarborough, the Supreme Judicial Court, in considering challenges to increases in municipal property taxes for parcels located in neighborhoods in the Town of Scarborough, concluded that the Town’s practice of undervaluing separate but abutting lots held in common ownership resulted in discriminatory tax treatment. In this separate action, the Court addressed similar challenges brought by owners of residential waterfront properties located in an area of Scarborough not at issue in Petrin. Plaintiffs appealed a judgment determining that they did not have standing to pursue one of their challenges but otherwise affirming the Scarborough Board of Assessment Review’s denial of their tax abatement petitions. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their challenges; (2) the Board did not err in concluding that a partial revaluation conducted by the Town was proper; but (3) the Board erred by denying Plaintiffs’ requests for abatement based on the Town’s practice of undervaluing abutting lots, which resulted in discriminatory assessments. View "Angell Family 2012 Prouts Neck Trusts v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

The Court consolidated two cases in this opinion. Plaintiffs in both cases complained they were denied due process when the Board of County Commissioners of Elbert County (the Board) required them to rezone their properties before they could subdivide them. They argued that after the Board lost the documents reflecting the prior comprehensive zoning ordinance, it created new documents without following proper procedures for enacting an ordinance and covered up their misconduct. "Perhaps these allegations state a claim under Colorado law." After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that were not deprived of their right to due process under the United States Constitution. View "Onyx Properties v. Elbert Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Charles Breland, Jr., and Breland Corporation (collectively, "Breland") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Fairhope in Breland's declaratory action based on alleged negligent conduct by Fairhope in relation to real property owned by Breland. In 2000, Breland filed applications for permits and certifications from the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") in order to fill approximately 10.5 acres of wetlands on the property. Fairhope opposed the fill project. Breland purchased the mitigation credits required by the Corps permit, and hired engineers and consultants for the project sometime before he began actual filling activity. Eight years later, actual work on the fill project began, but the City issued a stop-work order that halted operations. Because his Corps permit would expire in late 2008, Breland sued Fairhope for declaratory relief and an injunction against the effects of multiple City ordinances passed in attempts to stop Breland's work. Fairhope moved to dismiss the complaint. Charles Breland testified that he dismissed his lawsuit against Fairhope when both his Corps permit had been extended (to 2013), and that "there [were] conversations that the city [initiated] about buying the property." According to Breland, by late 2011, he got the impression that Fairhope had been negotiating with him to buy the remainder of the property under false pretenses and that Fairhope actually was trying to delay Breland from resuming the fill project until the Corps permit expired. In early 2013, Breland sued again seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Fairhope's attempts to stop the fill project. The trial court dismissed Breland's case on statute of limitations grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that each time Fairhope enforced its ordinances to stop Breland from filling activity on his property, Fairhope committed a new act that served as a basis for a new claim. Fairhope's last stop-work order was issued in November 2011; Breland filed this action on August 7, 2013. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations did not bar a claim for damages stemming from the 2011 stop-work order. View "Breland v. City of Fairhope" on Justia Law

Kathy Torbert petitioned the Alabama Department of Public Health ("the Department") for a declaratory ruling with respect to a proposed garbage-transfer station to be built near Torbert's home. Among other relief requested, Torbert sought a declaratory ruling under Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-11(b), regarding the meaning of the administrative regulations defining the minimum required buffer zones around a solid-waste-transfer station. Pertinent here was the starting point for measuring the required buffer zones. The Department rejected Torbert's proposed interpretation of the buffer-zone regulations. Torbert appealed the ruling to the Circuit Court. The circuit court remanded the case to the Department for additional factual findings, including the preparation of a revised land survey. On remand, the survey was prepared and the Department made the necessary findings and reaffirmed its previous ruling. The circuit court subsequently affirmed the Department's decision. Torbert appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment, without an opinion. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review, and found that the Department's interpretation of its regulations was arbitrary and unreasonable, and accordingly, reversed and remanded. "The Department could have adopted regulations specifically defining the area of transfer activities as the tipping floor or regulations measuring the buffer zones from the tipping floor. It did neither but, instead, attempted to circumvent the regulations in this case by using an unreasonable definition of the phrase 'area of transfer activities.'" View "Ex parte Kathy Torbert" on Justia Law

In 2013, the IRS seized $32,820.56 from Carole Hinders’s business bank account based on allegations that Hinders had unlawfully “structured” deposits to avoid federal currency reporting requirements. The government then filed a civil forfeiture complaint against the seized currency, and Hinders filed claims to the seized property. The district court eventually dismissed the action without prejudice. The district court then denied Hinder's motion for fees under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), 28 U.S.C. 2465(b)(1), and declined to reconsider its prior dismissal without prejudice. The court concluded, however, that Hinders has not “substantially prevailed” in this action where the district court’s dismissal without prejudice did not materially alter the legal relationship of the parties. Therefore, Hinders is not eligible for an award of attorney fees, costs, or interest under CAFRA. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case without prejudice rather than with prejudice. In this case, the district court considered each of the relevant factors in deciding to grant the government’s motion and Hinders had not shown that she would be prejudiced by a dismissal without prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hinders" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation petitioned to acquire property owned by Amerco Real Estate Co. and occupied by U-Haul Co. by eminent domain, asserting that the property in question was necessary for a highway expansion project. U-Haul opposed the petition, asserting that the Department lacked authority to condemn its land on grounds that the statutory perquisites for acquiring land in the manner the Department used, were not met. The district court declined to dismiss the petition and instead granted the Department's motion for immediate possession. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the transportation commission's enabling legislation, to the extent that it purported to delegate to the Department the choice of particular properties to be taken for highway projects and the manner of their taking, was an unlawful delegation of the commission's statutorily imposed obligation. The case was remanded back to the district court for dismissal of the Department's original petition. View "Colorado Dept. of Transportation v. Amerco Real Estate" on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute was a piece of real estate, called Long Wharf, that juts into Boston Harbor. The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) wished to develop the Long Wharf pavilion, which stands at the northern side of the Wharf, for commercial purposes, but the National Park Service (NPS) refused to grant the BRA permission to do so on the ground that the land remain open for recreational use. The BRA sued NPS and the Secretary of the Interior under the Land and Water Conservation Funds Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the decision of the NPS was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "Boston Redevelopment Auth. v. Nat'l Park Serv." on Justia Law