Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this dispute was a piece of real estate, called Long Wharf, that juts into Boston Harbor. The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) wished to develop the Long Wharf pavilion, which stands at the northern side of the Wharf, for commercial purposes, but the National Park Service (NPS) refused to grant the BRA permission to do so on the ground that the land remain open for recreational use. The BRA sued NPS and the Secretary of the Interior under the Land and Water Conservation Funds Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the decision of the NPS was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "Boston Redevelopment Auth. v. Nat'l Park Serv." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on the scope of the New Mexico State Engineer’s regulatory authority over use of surface water in New Mexico when it has been diverted from the Animas River into an acequia in Colorado and accessed from that ditch by Petitioners and others in New Mexico. After review, the Court rejected petitioners’ arguments that the State Engineer lacked statutory authority over waters initially diverted outside of New Mexico and had no jurisdiction to enjoin petitioners from irrigating an area of farmland not subject to an existing adjudicated water right or a permit from the State Engineer. The Court held that the State Engineer was authorized by New Mexico law to require a permit for new, expanded, or modified use of this water and to enjoin any unlawful diversion. View "State Engineer v. Diamond K Bar Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority (NHHFA), appealed a superior court decision to grant summary judgment in favor of respondent Pinewood Estates Condominium Association (Pinewood), and to award attorney’s fees to Pinewood. The trial court ruled that, pursuant to Pinewood’s condominium declaration, NHHFA was responsible for paying condominium assessments that were accrued by the previous owner of a unit NHHFA purchased at a foreclosure sale, and that Pinewood was not obligated to provide common services to the unit until all assessments were paid. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Condominium Act, RSA chapter 356-B (2009 & Supp. 2015), operated to bar Pinewood’s claim for unpaid pre-foreclosure condominium assessments, it reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority v. Pinewood Estates Condominium Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (landlords), challenged San Francisco Planning Code 317(e)(4) as conflicting with the Ellis Act of 1985, Government Code section 7060, which protects property owners’ right to exit the residential rental business. The ordinance was enacted in 2013 in response to a growing concern by the Board of Supervisors (and others) about the shortage of affordable local housing and rental properties. Under section 317(e)(4), certain residential property owners (those undertaking no-fault evictions) including “Ellis Act evictions” were subject to a 10-year waiting period after withdrawing a rental unit from the market before qualifying to apply for approval to merge the withdrawn unit into one or more other units. The trial court found that the ordinance impermissibly penalized property owners for exercising their rights under the Ellis Act and was facially void on preemption grounds. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Section 317(e)(4) is preempted by the Ellis Act to the extent it requires a landlord effectuating a no-fault eviction to wait 10 years before applying for a permit to undertake a residential merger on the property. View "San Francisco Apartment Ass'n v. City & Cnty.. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on a timber harvest by landowner Plum Creek Maine Timberlands, LLC in forestland enrolled in the current-use, tax-incentive program. The Vermont Department of Forests, Parks and Recreation (FPR) issued an adverse inspection report, concluding that Plum Creek violated its forest-management plan and failed to comply with minimum acceptable standards during the harvest. Consequently, the Department of Taxes removed the land from the current-use program and levied a tax assessment. Plum Creek appealed, and the superior court reversed those administrative decisions. FPR then appealed, arguing that the superior court failed to give appropriate deference to FPR’s determination of the proper methodology for measuring compliance with the forest-management plan. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the court’s decision, reinstating the adverse-inspection report as upheld by the FPR Commissioner. The case was remanded back to the superior court to consider the questions raised in Plum Creek’s appeal of the PVR Director’s decision removing land from the UVA program and leveling a tax assessment. View "Plum Creek Maine Timberlands, LLC v. Vermont Dept. of Forests, Parks & Rec." on Justia Law

Habitat for Humanity of the Mid-Willamette Valley was a nonprofit corporation. Part of Habitat's mission (as reflected in its articles of incorporation) is that it acquires vacant lots and builds affordable housing on those lots. In this direct appeal from the Regular Division of the Tax Court (Tax Court), the issue was whether Habitat was entitled to an exemption from property taxes assessed on a vacant lot that it owned. During the relevant time, Habitat intended to build a home on the lot but had not yet started construction. The Marion County Assessor (the county) denied Habitat’s application for a tax exemption under ORS 307.130(2)(a), which provided nonprofit institutions with a tax exemption on “such real or personal property, or proportion thereof, as is actually and exclusively occupied or used in the literary, benevolent, charitable or scientific work carried on by such institutions.” The Tax Court affirmed, holding that Habitat was not using the vacant lot to carry out its charitable work at the time of the assessment. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that it was "apparent" that the real property at issue was actually and exclusively "used in the literary, benevolent, charitable or scientific work carried on" by Habitat. As a result, at the time of the assessment, Habitat was entitled to receive the exemption that the county denied. View "Habitat for Humanity v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Richard and Ann Cayer filed a petition to secede from the Town of Madawaska. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted and the Governor approved a bill changing the Legislature’s practice for receiving and considering secession petitions. The Town determined that the amended statute governing legislature consideration applied to the Cayers’ petition, and the Madawaska Board of Select People declined the Cayers’ requests to schedule an advisory referendum on the Cayers’ petition. The Cayers sought review of the Town’s denial of their request to schedule an advisory referendum and sought a declaratory judgment that the repealed version of the secession statute applied to their petition. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Town and found the Cayers’ challenge to the Town’s explicit refusal to take any action untimely. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in determining that the appeal was untimely; (2) the Town’s actions provided no basis for a civil rights claim or a declaratory judgment action; and (3) an action for a writ of mandamus provided no alternative cause of action. View "Cayer v. Town of Madawaska" on Justia Law

The Water Use Act permits certain groundwater appropriations to be exempt from the permitting process. An exception to one exemption is when a “combined appropriation” from the same source by two or more wells or springs exceeds a certain amount per year. At issue in this case was the definition of the term “combined appropriation.” After an adverse ruling from the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) hearing examiner, a group of senior water users (the Coalition) challenged the validity of Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(13), which states that the term “combined appropriation” means “groundwater developments that are physically manifold into the same system.” The district court invalidated Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(13), reinstated Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(7), which provided that “[g]roundwater developments need not be physically connected nor have a common distribution system to be considered a ‘combined appropriation’” and directed the DNRC to formulate a new administrative rule consistent with the court’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, with the exception of the requirement that the DNRC initiate rulemaking, holding (1) the district court did not err by invalidating the newer administrative rule and reinstating the older rule; and (2) it was the DNRC’s decision whether to initiate rulemaking to change the reinstated rule. View "Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana Well Drillers Ass’n" on Justia Law

Neighbor Mary Bourassa appealed the Environmental Division’s affirmance of a zoning permit application by Philip and Barbara Wagner and Christopher Guay, who wanted to build a single family residence and detached garage on two merged lots of a six-lot subdivision in Grand Isle. Bourassa, an owner of another lot in the subdivision, opposed development, chiefly on the ground that the proposed house would not be constructed within the “tree line” on the property, as required by the subdivision plat plan. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Wagner & Guay Permit" on Justia Law

In August 2014, the First Western Bank and Trust (Bank) applied for two variances from City of Minot zoning regulations for off-street parking after incorrectly calculating the size of an addition to its bank building. The Bank's application sought to reduce the required number of off-street parking spaces for its building from 131 to 110 and to reduce the required width of each parking space from 10 to 9 feet. After notice to the Bank's neighbors, the Minot Planning Commission met to consider the application, and several neighbors appeared to oppose the application. The Planning Commission approved the application, finding the existence of an exceptional topographical hardship and the variances could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without impairing the general purpose and intent of Minot's comprehensive zoning plan. The Planning Commission affirmed its earlier decision approving the application. The City Council later affirmed the Planning Commission's decision. Sixteen Minot residents living near the Bank appealed a judgment dismissing their appeal of the City Council’s decision to grant the Bank's application for zoning variances. The residents argued the district court erred in ruling they lacked standing under N.D.C.C. 40-47-12 to appeal the City Council's decision granting the variances. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in applying N.D.C.C. 40-47-12 as grounds for its standing decision. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded the residents were not aggrieved applicants authorized to appeal a variance decision under N.D.C.C. 40-47-11. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment dismissing their appeal. View "Schmidt v. City of Minot" on Justia Law