Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs granted Eastern Savings Bank, FSB (Eastern) a mortgage on property as security for a loan. Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, and Eastern filed an action to foreclose the mortgage. The circuit court foreclosed on the mortgage, and a public auction was held to sell the property. Eastern purchased the property and filed a motion for confirmation of sale. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint in the U.S. district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the promissory note and mortgage had been timely cancelled pursuant to the federal Trust-in-Lending Act (TILA). The circuit court took judicial notice of Plaintiffs' pending federal case but declined to stay confirmation of the foreclosure sale in the meantime. Thereafter, the circuit court concluded Plaintiffs' pending TILA case did not bar confirmation of the sale of the property, confirmed the sale of the property to Eastern, and entered a deficiency judgment against Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that res judicata principles prohibit a debtor from asserting TILA rescission rights after a foreclosure judgment has become final, despite the rescission attempt being held within the time limit provided by TILA. View "E. Savings Bank, FSB v. Esteban" on Justia Law

In June 2004, Petitioners-Appellants Hui O Na Wai 'Eha and Maui Tomorrow Foundation, Inc. (Hui/MTF), through Earthjustice, petitioned Appellee Commission on Water Resource Management to amend the Interim Instream Flow Standards (IIFS) for Na Wai 'Eha, which had been in place since 1988. Around the same time, several parties, including Appellee Maui County Department of Water Supply (MDWS), and Appellees Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company (HC&S) and Wailuku Water Company (WWC), filed Water Use Permit Applications (WUPA) for the same area. The Commission held a combined case hearing to resolve the IIFS and WUPA; in addition to the petitioner and applicants, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) applied to participate in the hearing. The appeal before the Supreme Court sought review of the Commission's resulting Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (FOF/COL), and Decision and Order (D&O), in which the Commission amended the IIFS for two of the four streams, and substantially retained the existing IIFS for the two remaining streams as measured above diversions. The FOF/COL and D&O also resolved several WUPA. Hui/MTF and OHA appealed on related grounds: their primary complaint was that the Commission erred in balancing instream and noninstream uses, and therefore the IIFS does not properly protect traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights, appurtenant water rights, or the public trust. Both parties also contested the Commission’s treatment of diversions, including an alternative source on HC&S’s plantation that could have been used to irrigate HC&S’s cane fields. The parties contested the Commission’s determination that HC&S would not be required to pump the alternate source to its full capacity, a decision that resulted in a higher estimated allowable diversion for HC&S, and lower IIFS for the streams. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. First, in considering the effect of the IIFS on native Hawaiian practices in Na Wai 'Eha, the Commission failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the effect of the amended IIFS on traditional and customary native Hawaiian practices regarding the feasibility of protecting any affected practices. Second, the Commission’s analysis of instream uses was incomplete. Third, the Commission erred in its consideration of alternative water sources and in its calculation of diverting parties’ acreage and reasonable system losses. View "In re 'Iao Ground Water Management Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit Applications" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the political question doctrine barred Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA) beneficiaries from using the Hawaiian Constitution's "sufficient sums" provision to demand more legislative funding of the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL) when that provision provided no guidance as to how quickly homesteads must be developed. The Supreme Court held (1) judicial determination of "sufficient sums" as to the purpose of DHHL's administrative and operating expenses is not barred as a nonjusticiable political question, and the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) did not err in so holding; but (2) the political question bars judicial determination of what would constitute "sufficient sums" for the purposes of (a) development of home, agriculture, farm and ranch lots, (b) home, agriculture, aquaculture, farm and ranch loans, and (c) rehabilitation projects, and the ICA erred in concluding otherwise.

Landowners brought this lawsuit against their neighbor, seeking compensation for property damage caused by the neighbor, and seeking a determination of access and water rights. The application before the Supreme Court, however, raised questions concerning procedural aspects of the hearings before the trial court and of the appeal to the intermediate court of appeals (ICA). The first question concerned pleading standards of appellate briefs, and the remaining questions addressed the trial court's determination of which parties must participate in a lawsuit, and the procedure an appellate court should follow when reviewing that determination. The Court reversed the decision of the ICA and reinstated the trial court's order, holding (1) the ICA did not err in reviewing the defendants' points of error on appeal; but (2) the ICA erred in vacating the trial court's final judgment.

Charles and Lisa Hart filed a complaint against TICOR Title Insurance Company for breach of contract after TICOR refused to defend the Harts under their title insurance policy against an escheat claim asserted by the State. The district court entered judgment in favor of TICOR and awarded TICOR attorneys' fees and costs. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of TICOR and vacated the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs to TICOR, holding that TICOR owed a duty to defend the Harts under the policy against the State's claim and prayer for affirmative relief. Remanded to the district court with instructions (1) to enter judgment in favor of the Harts, and (2) to determine an award of attorneys fees and costs to the Harts.

Tara Thomas filed a lawsuit against her former attorney, Grant Kidani. Kidani represented Thomas in a real estate dispute wherein the jury decided the case against Thomas. Following that trial, Thomas sued Kidani, alleging legal malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Kidani, and the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the ICA applied an incorrect standard of review on appeal where it invoked the clearly erroneous standard rather than a de novo review of Kidani's motion for summary judgment; but (2) Kidani was entitled to summary judgment in this case because Thomas did not meet her burden of proving that she would have prevailed at trial.

The instant action arose from an ejectment proceeding involving a dispute as to whether Respondent Wayne Peelua alleged a cognizable claim to the title of certain real property. Petitioner Deutsche Bank filed a complaint alleging that it was entitled to possession of the property. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The court held for Petitioner. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the district court order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA and affirmed the district court, holding that Respondent's affidavit did not meet the requirements of Dist. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12.1, and therefore, the district court had jurisdiction over Petitioner's ejectment action.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Corboy and a number of real property owners and taxpayers brought claims against various state and county Defendants-Appellants to get an exemption from property taxes equal to an exemption granted to Hawaiian homestead lessees under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA). Plaintiffs are not native Hawaiians, but argued that the tax exemptions for homestead lessees involve race-based discrimination in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Federal civil rights laws because only native Hawaiians are eligible to become homestead lessees under the HHCA. Accordingly, they sought a refund of real property taxes paid in excess of what they would have been assessed had each of them been granted an exemption. The State filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the disputed exemptions did not violate the equal protection clause because the exemptions were not based upon whether a taxpayer was a native Hawaiian, but instead they were based on whether the taxpayer was a homestead lessee of HHCA land. The tax appeal court granted the Stateâs motion, and on appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the courtâs awarding of the summary judgment. The Supreme Court found that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their challenges to the constitutionality of the tax exemption and the HHCA. The record reflected that the Plaintiffs were not interested in participating in the homestead lease program and therefore they could not establish an injury sufficient to give them standing to challenge the exemption. The Court vacated the tax appeal courtâs judgment, and ordered the lower court to dismiss Plaintiffsâ cases for lack of jurisdiction.