Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Elanore Vaughan purchased a ticket and signed an online liability waiver to go tubing at Eagle Island State Park, operated by Gateway Parks, LLC. The next day, Vaughan was injured when her tube went over an embankment and crashed into a flatbed trailer housing snowmaking equipment. Vaughan sued Gateway, alleging negligence and premises liability, claiming Gateway failed to maintain the tubing hill safely and created a hazard by placing the trailer at the end of the tubing run.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho denied Gateway's motion to dismiss Vaughan's complaint. Gateway argued that Vaughan's claims were barred by the liability waiver she signed and the Responsibilities and Liabilities of Skiers and Ski Area Operators Act. The district court found that while the Act applied, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the placement of the snowmaking equipment. The court also concluded that the liability waiver did not preclude Vaughan's claims. Gateway then sought and was granted permission to appeal the denial of its motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the electronic liability waiver Vaughan signed precluded her claims against Gateway. The waiver explicitly acknowledged the risks of tubing, including collisions with manmade obstacles such as snowmaking equipment. The court determined that the waiver's language was broad enough to encompass Vaughan's accident and injuries. Consequently, the court directed the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of Gateway and dismiss Vaughan's complaint. The court also denied Gateway's request for attorney fees on appeal, as the gravamen of Vaughan's lawsuit was a tort, not a commercial transaction. View "Vaughan v. Gateway Park, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought to validate a portion of West Fork Pine Creek Road in Shoshone County, Idaho, which runs across private property and into public land managed by the Bureau of Land Management. The road is used by recreationalists to access an area known as "the Roller Coaster." Following disputes between local landowners and recreationalists, a petition was filed with the Shoshone County Board of Commissioners to validate the road. The Board denied the petition, citing concerns about environmental impacts, safety, and costs to taxpayers.The petitioners then sought judicial review in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, arguing that the Board erred in its decision. The district court affirmed the Board's decision, concluding that the Board's findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, arguing that the district court erred in affirming the Board's conclusions.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and determined that the Board erred in concluding that the 1909 meeting minutes did not establish the road as a public highway. However, the Court found no error in the Board's determination that validating the road was not in the public interest. The Court noted that the Board had considered various factors, including the availability of alternative access routes, the costs of surveying and maintaining the road, and the concerns of private property owners.Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision, holding that while the road was established as a public highway in 1909, the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that validation was not in the public interest. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Jutila v. County of Shoshone" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Lava Hot Springs, which regulates short-term rentals based on whether they are occupied by an owner or manager. Non-owner-occupied short-term rentals are prohibited in residential zones and only allowed in commercial zones. John and Michelle Taylor applied for a business license to operate a non-owner-occupied short-term rental in a residential zone, but the City denied their application. The Taylors, along with the Idaho Association of Realtors, sued the City, claiming that its regulations violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act, which limits municipal regulations on short-term rentals.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that the City's regulations did not have the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals and were permissible under the health, safety, and welfare exception in the Act. The court concluded that because at least one type of short-term rental (owner-occupied) was allowed in residential zones, the City had not violated the Act. The Taylors and the Realtors appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Court held that the City's ordinance, which prohibited non-owner-occupied short-term rentals in residential zones, violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act. The Act prohibits any city ordinance that has the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals. The Court found that the City's ordinance amounted to a prohibition rather than a regulation and thus invalidated the ordinance. The Court awarded costs on appeal to the Petitioners but did not grant attorney fees to either party. View "Idaho Association of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Lava Hot Springs" on Justia Law

Saul Arellano, a roofer, was injured while working on a construction project for Sunrise Homes, Inc. He fell from a roof without fall protection equipment and sustained multiple injuries. Arellano received worker’s compensation benefits through Sunrise Homes after it was discovered that his direct employer did not carry worker’s compensation insurance. Subsequently, Arellano filed negligence and negligence per se claims against Sunrise Homes, arguing that his injuries fell under the “unprovoked physical aggression” exception to Idaho’s worker’s compensation exclusive remedy rule.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Madison County, granted summary judgment in favor of Sunrise Homes. The court concluded that Arellano failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that his claims fell within the statutory exception to the exclusive remedy rule. Specifically, the court found no genuine issues of material fact that Sunrise Homes knew injury or death was substantially likely to occur due to the lack of fall protection equipment.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in applying the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard at the summary judgment stage. However, upon de novo review, the Supreme Court found that Arellano did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding Sunrise Homes’ knowledge that injury was substantially likely to occur. The court also rejected Arellano’s arguments that the 2020 amendments to Idaho Code section 72-209(3) codified a more lenient standard or reduced the burden of proof for plaintiffs. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Sunrise Homes and awarded costs on appeal to Sunrise Homes. View "Arellano v. Sunrise Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Sentry Dynamics, Inc. (Sentry) requested a list of all property owners' names and addresses in Ada County from the Ada County Assessor’s Office. Ada County denied the request, suspecting Sentry intended to sell the data for use as a mailing or telephone list, which is prohibited under Idaho Code section 74-120(1). Sentry filed a complaint in district court seeking access to the records. The district court ordered Ada County to release the records in an electronic format of its choosing. Ada County appealed, and Sentry cross-appealed, requesting the records in the shapefile format used by the County.The district court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho ruled that the information Sentry sought was a public record and constituted a "list of persons" under Idaho Code section 74-120(1). The court held that Sentry was entitled to the records because it agreed not to use them as a mailing list. However, the court allowed Ada County to choose the electronic format for providing the records. Ada County appealed, arguing that Sentry did not assure the data would not be used for mailing list purposes by third parties. Sentry cross-appealed, seeking the records in their original shapefile format.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the records requested by Sentry constituted a "list of persons" and that Ada County could require Sentry to assure that the data would not be used for mailing purposes by its clients and customers. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of Ada County’s "Acknowledgment and Agreement" form went beyond the permissible inquiry under Idaho Code section 74-102(5)(b). However, the court reversed the district court's order requiring Ada County to provide the records in an electronic format, stating that the PRA does not mandate delivery in any specific format. The court concluded that Ada County was not required to produce the records because Sentry refused to certify that neither it nor its clients would use the records as a mailing list. View "Sentry Dynamics, Inc. v. Ada County" on Justia Law

James and David Hart were involved in a real estate transaction with Millennial Development Partners, LLC, from 2016 to 2022. The Harts filed a complaint in September 2021 seeking a declaratory judgment that future purchases would be unenforceable. The district court set a trial date for July 12, 2022, with a backup date of October 11, 2022, and required discovery to be completed sixty days before trial. Millennial answered the complaint on June 7, 2022, asserting eleven affirmative defenses and counterclaimed for declaratory relief. The Harts' counsel requested a trial continuance due to an undisclosed conflict of interest with previous counsel. The district court continued the trial to October and ordered the Harts to file a motion and brief establishing good cause to amend the scheduling order. The Harts failed to comply with this order.The district court of the Sixth Judicial District of Idaho struck the Harts' pleadings and dismissed the case without prejudice as a sanction for failing to follow the court’s scheduling order. Millennial moved for attorney fees, which the district court awarded on two grounds: as a sanction for disobeying the scheduling order and under Idaho Code section 12-121, finding the Harts pursued the case unreasonably. The district court calculated the award considering Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) factors and awarded Millennial $9,592.46 in attorney fees and costs. The Harts moved to reconsider, arguing the district court incorrectly applied Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d)(3) and prematurely applied Idaho Code section 12-121. The district court clarified its sanction under Rule 16(e) and upheld the award.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning the Harts under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e) and awarding attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. The court also affirmed the calculation of attorney fees and awarded Millennial attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). View "Petersen v. Millennial Development Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Interfaith Sanctuary Housing Services, Inc. (IFS) applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a large-scale low-barrier shelter home in Northwest Boise. The Planning and Zoning Commission (PZC) initially denied the application, citing concerns about compatibility with the neighborhood, undue burden on public facilities, adverse effects on nearby properties, and insufficient information on mitigating adverse impacts. IFS appealed to the Boise City Council, which reversed the PZC’s decision and granted the CUP, imposing 30 conditions of approval. The Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. (VPNA) sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned the district court for judicial review.The district court upheld the City Council’s decision, finding no error in the Council’s actions. VPNA appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, based on unlawful procedure, and that the Council’s reasoned statement was inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA).The Idaho Supreme Court found that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on unlawful procedure because the PZC’s determination that the CUP could not be conditioned into compliance with the CUP criteria was not an error. The Court also found that the City Council’s reasoned statement was conclusory and failed to adequately resolve pertinent factual disputes, thus violating LLUPA and depriving VPNA of due process. The Court concluded that VPNA demonstrated a prejudice to its substantial rights.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to invalidate the City Council’s approval of the CUP. VPNA was awarded costs but not attorney fees on appeal. View "Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

Manuel and Melissa Rose purchased property from the F & M Martino Family Trust, with Fred and Michelle Martino acting as trustees. The warranty deed did not reference a previously recorded Boundary Line Agreement (BLA) that established a barbed wire fence as the boundary between the Roses' property and the neighboring property owned by Donald and Marylee Meliza. The Melizas later obtained a survey showing the fence was on the Roses' property and filed a quiet title action for the disputed strip of land. The Roses sought defense from the Martinos, who refused, leading the Roses to file a third-party action for breach of warranty of title and breach of the covenant of seisin.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Martinos, finding that the BLA was a "matter of record" and thus excluded from the warranty deed. The court also denied the Martinos' request for attorney fees. The Roses appealed the summary judgment decision, and the Martinos cross-appealed the denial of attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court's summary judgment decision, holding that the warranty deed's language was clear and unambiguous and did not exclude the BLA. The court found that the Martinos breached the covenant of seisin by not owning the entire property described in the deed and breached the warranty of title by failing to defend the Roses in the quiet title action. The court affirmed the district court's decision to deny attorney fees to the Martinos, as the case did not involve a commercial transaction and the warranty deed did not contain an attorney fee provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. The Roses were awarded costs on appeal. View "Rose v. Martino" on Justia Law

In 2014, Casey Moyer entered into an agreement with Doug Lasher Construction, Inc. for the construction and purchase of a new home, which was substantially completed in November 2014. Over the next six-and-a-half years, Moyer repeatedly informed Lasher Construction about issues with the home, particularly water leakage, and received assurances that the issues would be fixed. However, the problems persisted, and Moyer and Caitlin Bower filed suit against Lasher Construction in November 2021, alleging breach of contract and violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Lasher Construction, ruling that all claims were time-barred under Idaho Code sections 5-241(b) and 5-216, which require that claims arising out of a contract for the construction of real property be brought within five years of the final completion of construction. The court also found that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act claims were time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations provided by Idaho Code section 48-619. The court rejected the homeowners' arguments for equitable estoppel and the repair doctrine, concluding that they failed to show that Lasher Construction prevented them from pursuing their claims within the statutory period.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision. The court reaffirmed that the repair doctrine is not available in Idaho and upheld the district court's conclusion that the homeowners failed to establish the elements of equitable estoppel. The court also agreed that the text messages and the July 2, 2021, response to the NORA demand did not constitute enforceable independent contracts. Lasher Construction was awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal as the prevailing party. View "Moyer v. Lasher Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Tony Heath and Melissa Lish, neighbors in Chubbuck, Idaho, had a dispute after Heath parked two vehicles near Lish’s driveway. Lish, after Heath refused to move the vehicles, obtained a no parking sign from Denny’s Wrecker and had the vehicles towed. Denny’s refused to release the vehicles without payment. Heath sued Lish and Denny’s for civil trespass and conversion. The magistrate court granted summary judgment in favor of Lish and Denny’s and awarded attorney fees to Denny’s. Heath appealed, and the district court affirmed the magistrate court’s decisions.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding Denny’s summary judgment, holding that Denny’s actions were lawful under Idaho Code section 49-1806(1) and that Denny’s reasonably relied on Lish’s representations. The court found that Denny’s had no duty to verify the property line beyond Lish’s information and that Heath’s vehicles were towed lawfully. The court also affirmed the district court’s decision to reduce Denny’s attorney fee award, finding that the magistrate court did not need to address every factor in writing.However, the court reversed the district court’s decision regarding Lish’s summary judgment. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether there was boundary by acquiescence or boundary by agreement. The court noted that the declarations from previous property owners and the removal of part of the driveway by Lish’s husband raised questions about the boundary’s location and whether there was an agreement or acquiescence. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Heath’s trespass and conversion claims against Lish.The court declined to award attorney fees on appeal to any party, noting that the issues raised were not pursued frivolously or without foundation. View "Heath v. Denny's Wrecker Service, Inc." on Justia Law