Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Black Diamond Compost, LLC (“Black Diamond”), filed a “Claim of Ownership” with the Ada County, Idaho Recorder’s Office to notify the public of its ownership of compost and humus located on real property in Ada County. Black Diamond disputed the ownership of the land and deemed it necessary to notify the public that the compost and humus located on the real property belonged to it. Ford Elsaesser, personal representative of the Estate of Victoria Smith, attempted to sell the real property but could not secure “clear title” in a preliminary title report and claimed this was due to Black Diamond’s Claim of Ownership. Elsaesser filed an action against Black Diamond, alleging the Claim of Ownership was a nonconsensual common law lien prohibited under Idaho Code section 45-811. The court agreed and ordered the release and discharge of the recorded Claim of Ownership. It also awarded Elsaesser a $5,000 civil penalty and granted his request for costs and attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding it did not err in: (1) determining the Claim of Ownership to be a prohibited nonconsensual common law lien; (2) ordering the lien to be released and discharged; (3) imposing a $5,000 civil penalty against Black Diamond; and (4) awarding attorney fees to the Personal Representative pursuant to Idaho Code section 45-811(4). View "Elsaesser v. Black Diamond Compost, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action in which the personal representative of the Estate of Victoria Smith (the “Personal Representative”) sought to eject Riverside Farms, LLC, (“Riverside”) from its real property, referred to by the parties as the “Chinden Property,” after the term of Riverside’s lease expired. Riverside argued that the Personal Representative lacked standing to bring the ejectment action because it was not the true owner of the land. The Personal Representative was earlier granted ownership of the “Chinden Property” pursuant to a Rule 70(b) judgment issued during the probate proceedings following Victoria’s death. Riverside argued that the Rule 70(b) judgment was barred by res judicata because a prior action, which concerned removal of trees along an easement on the property, had already confirmed that the Personal Representative was not the true owner of the Chinden Property. The district court determined that ejectment of Riverside was proper because the dismissal of the prior case did not preclude the Rule 70(b) judgment issued in the probate case. Riverside filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider its decision, but the district court declined to do so. Riverside appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the denial of its motion to reconsider was in error and renewing its argument that the personal representative lacked standing to seek removal of Riverside from the property because the Rule 70(b) judgment was barred by res judicata. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Elsaesser v. Riverside Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2017, Appellant Shoshone County assessed properties owned by Respondents S&W OPS, LLC; POWDER, LLC; H2O, LLC; GOLF, LLC; APARTMENT, LLC; F&B, LLC; and VILLAGE MANAGEMENT, LLC (collectively “Taxpayers”). Taxpayers disputed the valuation and sought review by the Board of Equalization, and subsequently the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”). The BTA reduced the assessed value, and the County appealed to the district court. After a four-day bench trial, the district court upheld the BTA decision, determining that the County’s appraisal evidence was more credible than Taxpayers’ evidence; however, the district court ultimately held the County had not satisfied its burden of showing how the BTA decision was erroneous by a preponderance of the evidence. The County appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the district court applied the wrong standard of review by requiring the County to prove “how or why” the BTA decision was erroneous instead of simply concluding that the market value of the property was different than what was found by the BTA. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the County’s position. The district court’s decision was reversed, the judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded with instructions for the district court to consider whether the BTA’s decision on valuation was erroneous given the evidence submitted during the de novo trial. If that decision on valuation was erroneous, the district court, as the fact-finder, had to set the valuation. View "Shoshone County v. S&W OPS, LLC" on Justia Law

S Bar Ranch owned approximately 3000 acres of land in rural Elmore County, Idaho. S Bar purchased the land in 2015. There were very few structures on S Bar’s property, save for an airplane hangar that included a five-hundred square-foot apartment. S Bar’s address was listed in Sun Valley, Idaho, and its principal, Chris Stephens, used the property for recreational purposes. Cat Creek Energy, LLC, an Idaho company managed by John Faulkner, owned and managed more than 23,000 acres of land in Elmore County near Anderson Ranch reservoir. Faulkner, on behalf of his other companies, leased land to Cat Creek to develop the project at issue in this dispute. In late 2014 and early 2015, Cat Creek began the process of obtaining conditional use permits (“CUPs”) for a proposed alternative energy development (“the project”) in Elmore County. As initially proposed, the project had five components: a 50,000 acre-foot reservoir with hydroelectric turbines, up to 39 wind turbines, approximately 174,000 photovoltaic solar panels, electrical transmission lines, and an onsite power substation. Cat Creek sought to build the project on approximately 23,000 acres of land that it had leased near Anderson Ranch Reservoir. In 2019, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order, affirming the Board’s decisions with respect to the CUPs. The district court found that S Bar only had standing to challenge the CUPs relating to wind turbines, electric transmission lines, and the on-site substation. The district court also reiterated its prior oral ruling that a 2017 CUP Order was a final agency action and that S Bar’s petition for judicial review of that order was untimely. With regard to the development agreement and a 2018 CUP Amendment, the district court concluded that the Board did not err in a manner specified by Idaho Code section 67-5279 and that S Bar had not shown that its substantial rights had been prejudiced. S Bar appealed, but finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of Cat Creek. View "S Bar Ranch v. Elmore County" on Justia Law

Miguel and Janice Aizpitarte sued their neighbors Michael and Laura Minear to quiet title to what they contended was an established easement for an access driveway, and sought a declaratory judgment to recognize their right to an implied easement by prior use. The Aizpitartes also sought injunctive relief enjoining the Minears from blocking access to the drive(10) Wilkins (way. The Aizpitartes moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court concluded the Aizpitartes had an implied easement by prior use of the driveway crossing the Minear property to the Aizpitarte property. The Minears appealed, arguing the district court erred in granting summary judgment against them because there were genuine issues of material fact in the record. They also argue the scope of the easement recognized by the district court was too broad. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Aizpitarte v. Minear" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review concerned whether a prescriptive easement existed on a road accessing property owned by Shelley and Roger Cook near the Bingham and Bonneville County line. The Cooks’ property was originally owned by Shelley’s grandfather, John Harker, and stayed in the Harker family ever since. The Harker family (including the Cooks) claimed to have used what the parties called “Tower Road” to access their property for as long as the family can remember. Tower Road connected the Cook Property to a county road and ran through property owned by Jay and Shelli Van Orden. The Cooks filed suit against the Van Ordens claiming a prescriptive easement across the Van Ordens’ property via Tower Road. The district court ruled in the Van Ordens’ favor, holding that because the Cooks’ longstanding use of the land was not adverse, it did not have to address the remaining elements of a prescriptive easement. The Cooks appealed to the Supreme Court, contending the district court erred in finding their family’s use of Tower Road was with implied permission and in not addressing the remaining elements. The Supreme Court found the district court erred in granting judgment to the Van Ordens without determining the relevant statutory period for determining adverse use. Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a determination of the relevant statutory period for the claimed prescriptive easement and whether the evidence established adverse use during that time. View "Cook v. Van Orden" on Justia Law

Stephan Byrd and Erika Mullins jointly filed an application for an encroachment permit with the Idaho Department of Lands to add boat lifts to their existing two-family dock on Priest Lake. Neighbors Cal Larson and Steven Coffey objected the application, arguing that Coffey owned a strip of land between the ordinary high water mark of Priest Lake and the waterward boundary lines of the Appellants’ properties. Following an administrative hearing, the Department of Lands denied the encroachment permit upon concluding that the record failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Byrd and Mullins were littoral property owners with corresponding littoral rights (a key requirement to build or enlarge encroachments on the lake under Idaho’s Lake Protection Act). Finding no reversible error in that finding, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the Department's order. View "Byrd v. Idaho State Brd. of Land Commissioners" on Justia Law

Jared and Katherine Sommer brought a declaratory judgment claim against Misty Valley, LLC, after receiving written notice that the real estate developer planned to use an express easement across the Sommers’ land for access to a recently platted residential subdivision. The Sommers contended the planned use constituted an impermissible expansion of the scope of the easement, and brought a claim to terminate the easement. After a bench trial, the district court limited the use of the easement to the dominant parcel, which only included part of Misty Valley’s planned subdivision, and declined to terminate it. Misty Valley appealed the district court’s judgment, and the Sommers cross-appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Sommer v. Misty Valley, LLC" on Justia Law

Edward and Janice Easterling owned three contiguous parcels of real property in Ammon, Idaho. The Easterlings brought suit against Hal Pacific Properties, L.P. (“HAL”), claiming an easement by necessity over and upon HAL’s property in order to access their three merged parcels. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, a motion for reconsideration, and a short bench trial, the district court largely ruled in the Easterlings’ favor. The district court denied HAL’s affirmative defense that the Easterlings’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The district court further held that the Easterlings were entitled to an easement by necessity over and upon the HAL Parcel to allow access to all three of the Easterlings’ merged parcels. The district court placed the easement at the western border of the HAL Parcel and set its width at twenty-six feet. HAL appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, contending the district court erred by denying its statute of limitations affirmative defense, granting the Easterlings’ claim for an easement by necessity for all three of their parcels, and improperly determining the location and width of the easement. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision at summary judgment rejecting HAL’s statute of limitations defense under Idaho Code section 5-224. Because of this, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment and reversed its decisions that the Northern Parcel was entitled to an easement by necessity over the HAL Parcel; and that the width of the easement was set at twenty-six feet. The Supreme Court further reversed the district court’s decisions setting the location of the easement and granting an easement by necessity as to the Southern and Eastern Parcels over the HAL Parcel. The matte was remanded for further proceedings. View "Easterling v. Hal Pacific Properties, L.P." on Justia Law

Dennis and Sherrilyn Munden (the Mundens) and their limited liability company, Coyote Creek Ranch, LLC, purchased property in Bannock County, Idaho in 2012 (the Upper Property), and acquired adjoining property (the Lower Property) in 2014. The Mundens’ ranch was accessible by a gravel road (the Road) which left a paved public road before crossing the Lower Property. It then traversed a neighbor’s parcel to the Upper Property, before exiting to the north. The Mundens began ranching on the Lower Property in 2013 and started construction of a barn and living quarters on the Upper Property in 2015 after obtaining a three-year building permit. In 2017, the Mundens were informed by the Bannock County Commissioners that, pursuant to a 2006 county ordinance, the Road had been designated by the Commissioners for “snowmobile use only” between December 15 and April 15. All other vehicular use was prohibited during this timeframe. In January 2019, Bannock County passed an ordinance which gave discretion to the Bannock County Public Works Director (the Director) to determine when snowmobile trails would be closed to all but snowmobile use. Subsequently, the Director decided to close the Road for the 2018–19 winter season. The Mundens filed a complaint in district court against Bannock County, bringing several claims involving the Road, and obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) to prohibit enforcement of the 2019 ordinance. The County moved to dissolve the TRO, which the district court granted. The district court then awarded attorney fees to the County. The Mundens amended their complaint to add their ranching operation, Coyote Creek Ranch, LLC, as a plaintiff, to which the County responded with an answer and counterclaim, alleging that the Road was a public right-of-way with no winter maintenance that had been designated as a snowmobile trail by the 2006 ordinance. The County then moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted this motion, concluding that because the claims turned on a legal determination of the Road’s status, the Mundens were required by Idaho Code section 40-208(7) to first petition for validation or abandonment proceedings with the Board of County Commissioners before they could bring a lawsuit. The district court accordingly entered a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ amended complaint in its entirety. Ultimately, the district court entered a judgment certified under IRCP 54(b)(1) authorizing an immediate appeal, and the Mundens timely appealed. The only error the Idaho Supreme Court found in review of this case was that the district court erred in issuing a writ of execution before there was a final appealable judgment. Judgement was affirmed in all other respects. View "Munden v. Bannock County" on Justia Law