Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a transfer of real property located in Cassia County. Appellants-buyers Robert and Becky Humphries accused Respondents-sellers Eileen Becker, her son, Allen Becker, and daughter-in-law, Jane Becker of: (1) fraud though misrepresenting, concealing, and/or failing to disclose material information with regards to (a) the sources of water to the Property and (b) the Property’s sprinkler/irrigation system; and (2) violating the Idaho Condition Disclosure Act. The district court entered an order granting the Beckers' motion for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) The Humphries had pled fraud with sufficient particularity with regards to statements in the MLS Listing and Disclosure Form; (2) the Beckers did not make any false representations in either the MLS Listing or the Disclosure Form; (3) any duty that the Beckers may have had to disclose the existence of a Farm Well was satisfied by the Joint Well Use Agreement; (3) the representation in the MLS Listing that the sprinkler system was automatic could not serve as the basis for fraud; and (4) the Disclosure Form did not violate the Disclosure Act. The Humphries unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Eileen Becker, and upheld summary judgment granted in favor of Allen and Jane. The Court upheld the grant of attorney's fees and costs to Allen and Jane, and granted them fees on appeal. The Court vacated the grant of fees as to Eileen, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Humphries v. Becker" on Justia Law

This appeal centered the competing security interests of appellant Liberty Bankers Life Insurance Company and respondent Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport, & Toole, P.S. in real and personal property located in Post Falls, “Post Falls Landing” and the “Marina.” These properties were formerly owned by the Point at Post Falls, LLC and Post Falls Landing Marina, LLC (collectively, “The Point”). Witherspoon provided legal representation to The Point during the purchase. In 2005, The Point granted Witherspoon a promissory note, secured by a deed of trust to Post Falls Landing. Liberty and The Point entered into an agreement by which Liberty would loan The Point money in exchange for a promissory note in the amount of the loan, which was secured by a deed of trust to Post Falls Landing. As a condition to the Original Loan Agreement, Witherspoon entered into an agreement subordinating its Original Deed of Trust to Liberty’s Original Deed of Trust. Later on, Liberty agreed to extend additional funds to The Point. These funds were used to construct the Marina. By 2010, Witherspoon entered into the last of multiple amended subordination agreements with The Point. Unlike the prior subordination agreements, the Final Subordination Agreement did not include the “and any renewals or extensions thereof” language. The Final Subordination Agreement was recorded on September 3, 2010. Liberty foreclosed on The Point in August 2011 after The Point defaulted on one of the many loans. The trustee’s sale took place in November 2012, which resulted in the conveyance of the real property of Post Falls Landing to Liberty in exchange for a credit bid of $3,404,000.00. A few months later, Liberty filed an action against Witherspoon seeking a judicial declaration that the Marina was a fixture on Post Falls Landing real property, a judicial declaration that the trustee’s deed conveyed to Liberty all interest in the Marina, and entry of a decree quieting title to the Marina in Liberty’s name. Liberty’s appeal challenged five rulings by the district court: one at the summary judgment stage and four after the bench trial. The single issue from the summary judgment stage was whether the district court properly invoked judicial estoppel against Liberty. Of the four bench trial issues, three involved Liberty’s and Witherspoon’s competing security interests in Post Falls Landing and the effect of the Eighth LMA on those interests. The fifth issue was whether the Marina was personal property or a real property fixture to Post Falls Landing. Ultimately, the judgments of the district court were vacated by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon, Kelley, etc." on Justia Law

Charles and Gail Houpt appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank and First American Title Company (FATCO). In March 1993, the Houpts executed a promissory note to the American Bank of Commerce (Note). As security on the Note, the Houpts granted a deed of trust in the Property to American Bank of Commerce, as beneficiary, and FATCO, as Trustee (Deed of Trust). Over a period of time spanning from 1994 to 2004, American Bank of Commerce went through a series of mergers and transactions that resulted in Wells Fargo Bank obtaining the obligation owing under the Note and secured by the Deed of Trust. However, a written assignment of the Note and Deed of Trust designating Wells Fargo Bank as the beneficiary of such was not filed during this time. Starting in November 2007, the Houpts failed to make numerous payments on the Note and ceased all payments by the end of 2009. Consequently, Wells Fargo Bank directed FATCO to foreclose on the Property and on October 18, 2010, FATCO filed a Notice of Trustee’s Sale listing American Bank of Commerce as the current beneficiary and setting the date of the sale for February 17, 2011. The day before the scheduled trustee’s sale, the Houpts filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A year later Wells Fargo Bank was granted stay relief by the bankruptcy court and resumed foreclosure on the Property. The Houpts filed a Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction stating that: (1) Wells Fargo Bank was not the beneficiary or other real party in interest of the Deed of Trust, and as such, Wells Fargo improperly initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure; (2) the district court should grant a preliminary injunction to stop the foreclosure sale; and (3) Wells Fargo’s actions constituted wrongful foreclosure. Wells Fargo denied all claims made and argued that Wells Fargo Bank was the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust through merger and consolidation and, therefore, was exempted from having to record a written assignment of the Deed of Trust prior to exercising its power of sale. Notwithstanding this argument, Wells Fargo Bank obtained a written assignment of the Note and Deed of Trust from Wells Fargo Northwest on August 24, 2012, and recorded the assignment in 2012. The district court, noting that Wells Fargo had recorded its assignment of the Deed of Trust, denied the Houpts’ motion for preliminary injunction but left open the possibility that Wells Fargo had committed a wrongful foreclosure. Ultimately, the district court found that because no foreclosure sale had occurred, Wells Fargo was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. After denying Houpts’ request for reconsideration, the district court entered judgment in favor of Wells Fargo and awarded attorney fees and costs. The Houpts appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo, but remanded for a determination of what effect, if any, a SBA payment and the date of default had on the interest and balance due under the Note. Further, the Court vacated the district court’s grant of attorney fees and costs and remanded for a determination of costs and fees with specific instruction to exclude all costs and fees incurred by Wells Fargo before September 4, 2012. View "Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA" on Justia Law

This dispute related to a strip of land that was part of a cell tower site located in the City of Coeur d’Alene. Sherman Storage, LLC sued Global Signal Acquisitions II, LLC seeking to eject Global from that strip of land, and seeking contract damages and mesne profits. Sherman appealed the district court’s judgment in Global’s favor and its order that Sherman pay a substantial sum for Global’s attorney fees. Finding no reversible error after a review of the district court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sherman Storage v. Global Signal Acq." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court stemmed from a district court decision affirming the approval of a subdivision by the Board of County Commissioners of Clearwater County. In approving the subdivision, the Board approved three variances granted by the Clearwater County Planning and Zoning Commission with respect to the road providing access to the subdivision. A portion of the access road crossed over land owned by Edward and Donilee Shinn, who opposed the variances and petitioned the district court for judicial review. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Board erred when it failed to make the approval of the variance application expressly contingent upon judicial resolution of the access issue. The Court remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether the Shinns' substantial rights were prejudiced by the Board's decision. View "Shinn v. Bd of Co Comm Clearwater Co" on Justia Law

In 2005, John Block purchased property in Lewiston from Jack Streibick to develop. Block submitted an application to resubdivide the property into three residential lots, which Lewiston approved. Prior to Block's purchase of the property, Lewiston issued two separate permits to Streibick allowing him to place and grade fill in the area of those lots. In 2006, Block received permits from Lewiston to construct homes on each of the three lots. During construction of the homes, Block hired engineering firms to test compaction of the finished grade for the footings on the lots. Following the construction of the homes, Lewiston issued Block certificates of occupancy for each of the homes after conducting inspections that found the homes to be constructed in accordance with applicable building codes and standards. In April 2007, Block sold the home and property at 159 Marine View Drive. In November of that year, the owner reported a crack in the home's basement. Around that same time, settling was observed at the other two properties. In early December 2007, Block repurchased 159 from the owners. He also consulted with engineers regarding options for immediate repair to the homes. As early as February 2009, further settling problems were reported at the properties. After Lewiston inspected the properties in May following a gas leak at 153, it posted notice that the residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. Block ultimately filed a Notice of Claim for Damages with Lewiston that also named City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw as a defendant, but did not effectuate process on Lewiston and Cutshaw until ninety days had elapsed from the date he had filed the Notice of Claim. The City defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Block's claims should be dismissed because he failed to timely file a Notice of Claim with Lewiston. This first motion for summary judgment was denied because a question of material fact existed concerning whether Block reasonably should have discovered his claim against Lewiston prior to 2009. The City defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of Block's claims against them, arguing that they were immune from liability for all of these claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and that Block could not establish that he was owed a duty. The district court granted this second summary judgment motion dismissing Block's claims based on the application of the economic loss rule. The court also held that immunity under the ITCA and failure to establish a duty provided alternate grounds for dismissal of Block's claims. Block appealed on the issue of immunity. Finding no reversible error as to that issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Block v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

In January 2007, the Bank of Idaho made two construction loans to developers who planned to construct a fourplex on each of two adjoining lots in Idaho Falls. The bank loaned one sum of money to build a fourplex on Lot 1 and another sum for a fourplex on Lot 2. The bank secured a separate policy of title insurance for each lot that was issued by the predecessor of First American Title Insurance Company. Each policy included an endorsement that the parties understood would insure against loss or damage that the bank might sustain by reason of a multifamily residence not being constructed on the lot. After discussion with representatives of the city, the developers changed their original plans and built both fourplexes on Lot 2 and built a parking lot with storm water retention and landscaping on Lot 1. The developers later defaulted on their loans, and the bank foreclosed on both deeds of trust. At the foreclosure sale, the bank acquired each lot by making a full credit bid on all amounts due and owing on the note secured by the deed of trust. In 2010, the bank submitted a claim under the title policy issue with respect to Lot 1 to recover under the endorsement. The insurance company rejected the claim and the bank filed suit to recover under the policy. The district court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed this action. The bank then appealed. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the district court erred in holding that the title insurance company had no liability under the policy. The endorsement provided that "[t]he Company hereby insures the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage against loss or damage which the insured shall sustain by reason of the failure of [a multifamily residence to be built on Lot 1]." The endorsement insured against "loss or damage" that the bank argued was the failure of the multifamily residence to be constructed on the lot. It did not define what constituted "loss or damage." Subsections of the pertinent indemnity clause stated limits on the insurance company's liability, but it did not define loss or damage. Accordingly, the district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Bank of Idaho v. First American Title" on Justia Law

In 2009, Joseph Pierce filed suit against Steven McMullen and Highland Financial, LLC, seeking damages for various violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and for breach of contract, all based upon an alleged scam in which the Defendants represented that they could protect Pierce from losing his equity in real property that was facing foreclosure. Pierce alleged that the Defendants obtained title to his real property pursuant to a promise to assume the loans secured by the property, to market and sell the property, and to pay him at least $50,000 or more from the sale proceeds, depending upon the sale price. He claimed that he deeded the property to the Defendants, that they failed to make the payments on the loans, and that the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The complaint also alleged that Highland Financial was the alter ego of McMullen. Defendants did not appear, and on August 6, 2010, the court entered default against them. Mr. Pierce filed his amended complaint on May 11, 2011. The complaint simply added allegations to support an award of punitive damages. On June 13, 2011, Mr. McMullen filed a notice of appearance on behalf of himself and on behalf of Highland Financial. McMullen filed an answer to the amended complaint in his behalf and on the behalf of Highland Financial. McMullen was not licensed to practice law in Idaho, therefore his appearance on behalf of Highland Financial and the answer he filed on its behalf were nullities. In his answer, McMullen only denied the allegations regarding punitive damages. The case was scheduled for trial to commence on June 18, 2012. Plaintiff appeared with counsel, but the Defendants again did not appear. After discussion with Pierce’s counsel, the district court stated that McMullen "is defaulted, his answer is stricken, and the plaintiff prevails on their [sic] claims," then asked Pierce to present evidence as to damages. Pierce testified as did another alleged victim of. McMullen. At the conclusion of the testimony, Pierce’s counsel filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and a trial brief. The district court then issued its memorandum decision holding that. Pierce failed to prove any of his claims and ordered that his amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Pierce timely appealed. Largely because Defendants failed to appear and failed to answer the complaint and the facts of this case were therefore undisputed, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in holding that Pierce did not prove his case. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Pierce v. McMullen" on Justia Law

Ada County Highway District (ACHD) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Terrie Rowley. This case arose from a dispute in the ownership of a ten-foot-wide walkway in a Boise subdivision and arose after Rowley sought an injunction to remove a shed her neighbor placed on that walkway. The district court held that: (1) the subdivision plats showed the original developers clearly and unequivocally dedicated the walkway to the public; and (2) ACHD owned the walkway. ACHD appealed, arguing no evidence in the record showed the original developers clearly and unequivocally intended a public dedication and no statutory provision authorized ACHD to own the walkway. Rowley contended that the original developers clearly intended a public dedication as the walkway was a public street’s corridor extension. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court agreed with ACHD's argument, finding that the district court erred in holding the subdivision's original owners demonstrated clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the walkway to the public. The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of ACHD. View "Rowley v. ACHD" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the failure of Tamarack Resort, which was owned, developed, and operated by Tamarack Resort, LLC. The Resort was slated as a year-round community, complete with cross-country and downhill skiing, a championship golf course, hotel and conference facilities, retail shopping, restaurants, and lounges. Tamarack planned to offer a panoply of real estate options, including custom homes, condominiums, townhomes, chalets, and cottages. Construction at the Resort began in 2003. Housing units were built and sold, hotel facilities were developed, and by 2006, the ski areas, golf course, retail shops, and restaurants were up and running. In 2004, Tamarack hired Teufel Nursery as its landscape developer. Teufel provided landscaping services at the Resort from 2004 until early 2008. This appeal centered the priority of liens as between Teufel Nursery's mechanics lien and Credit Suisse's mortgages. The district court held that while Teufel had a valid and enforceable lien, it was inferior to Credit Suisse’s mortgages. On appeal, Teufel argues that such holding was in error and that the district court also erred in calculating Teufel's lien amount, interest, and attorney fees. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Credit Suisse v. Teufel Nursery" on Justia Law