Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Joseph Pierce filed suit against Steven McMullen and Highland Financial, LLC, seeking damages for various violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and for breach of contract, all based upon an alleged scam in which the Defendants represented that they could protect Pierce from losing his equity in real property that was facing foreclosure. Pierce alleged that the Defendants obtained title to his real property pursuant to a promise to assume the loans secured by the property, to market and sell the property, and to pay him at least $50,000 or more from the sale proceeds, depending upon the sale price. He claimed that he deeded the property to the Defendants, that they failed to make the payments on the loans, and that the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The complaint also alleged that Highland Financial was the alter ego of McMullen. Defendants did not appear, and on August 6, 2010, the court entered default against them. Mr. Pierce filed his amended complaint on May 11, 2011. The complaint simply added allegations to support an award of punitive damages. On June 13, 2011, Mr. McMullen filed a notice of appearance on behalf of himself and on behalf of Highland Financial. McMullen filed an answer to the amended complaint in his behalf and on the behalf of Highland Financial. McMullen was not licensed to practice law in Idaho, therefore his appearance on behalf of Highland Financial and the answer he filed on its behalf were nullities. In his answer, McMullen only denied the allegations regarding punitive damages. The case was scheduled for trial to commence on June 18, 2012. Plaintiff appeared with counsel, but the Defendants again did not appear. After discussion with Pierce’s counsel, the district court stated that McMullen "is defaulted, his answer is stricken, and the plaintiff prevails on their [sic] claims," then asked Pierce to present evidence as to damages. Pierce testified as did another alleged victim of. McMullen. At the conclusion of the testimony, Pierce’s counsel filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and a trial brief. The district court then issued its memorandum decision holding that. Pierce failed to prove any of his claims and ordered that his amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Pierce timely appealed. Largely because Defendants failed to appear and failed to answer the complaint and the facts of this case were therefore undisputed, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in holding that Pierce did not prove his case. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Pierce v. McMullen" on Justia Law

Ada County Highway District (ACHD) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Terrie Rowley. This case arose from a dispute in the ownership of a ten-foot-wide walkway in a Boise subdivision and arose after Rowley sought an injunction to remove a shed her neighbor placed on that walkway. The district court held that: (1) the subdivision plats showed the original developers clearly and unequivocally dedicated the walkway to the public; and (2) ACHD owned the walkway. ACHD appealed, arguing no evidence in the record showed the original developers clearly and unequivocally intended a public dedication and no statutory provision authorized ACHD to own the walkway. Rowley contended that the original developers clearly intended a public dedication as the walkway was a public street’s corridor extension. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court agreed with ACHD's argument, finding that the district court erred in holding the subdivision's original owners demonstrated clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the walkway to the public. The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of ACHD. View "Rowley v. ACHD" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the failure of Tamarack Resort, which was owned, developed, and operated by Tamarack Resort, LLC. The Resort was slated as a year-round community, complete with cross-country and downhill skiing, a championship golf course, hotel and conference facilities, retail shopping, restaurants, and lounges. Tamarack planned to offer a panoply of real estate options, including custom homes, condominiums, townhomes, chalets, and cottages. Construction at the Resort began in 2003. Housing units were built and sold, hotel facilities were developed, and by 2006, the ski areas, golf course, retail shops, and restaurants were up and running. In 2004, Tamarack hired Teufel Nursery as its landscape developer. Teufel provided landscaping services at the Resort from 2004 until early 2008. This appeal centered the priority of liens as between Teufel Nursery's mechanics lien and Credit Suisse's mortgages. The district court held that while Teufel had a valid and enforceable lien, it was inferior to Credit Suisse’s mortgages. On appeal, Teufel argues that such holding was in error and that the district court also erred in calculating Teufel's lien amount, interest, and attorney fees. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Credit Suisse v. Teufel Nursery" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent New Sweden Irrigation District mowed canal banks on plaintiff-appellant Bradley Morgan's property. Plaintiff claimed New Sweden negligently damaged his property. New Sweden counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment as to its easement's existence and scope, and then moved for summary judgment. The district court granted partial summary judgment, holding that New Sweden's easement was sixteen feet wide and New Sweden was not liable for damaged items within its easement. The district court denied summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim for damaged items outside the easement. Plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded this case back to the district court for that court to enter a judgment that described the precise location where the easement's sixteen-foot width measurement began. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Morgan v. New Sweden Irrigation" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the grant of a summary judgment that dismissed his claim seeking to enforce a vendee’s lien in real property. Because the appellant only addressed on appeal one of two possible grounds upon which the district court granted summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Cuevas v. Barraza" on Justia Law

In 2007, Steven and Valerie Hruza sought to obtain a loan from Clearwater Mortgage (Clearwater). Clearwater requested Defendant-Respondent Wade Massey to perform an appraisal of their real property located in Caldwell. Massey owned co-defendant Capitol West Appraisals and is a professional appraiser licensed to practice in Idaho. Massey performed the appraisal and sent a Summary Appraisal Report to Clearwater indicating that market value of the property was $1,150,000. Clearwater decided to deny the Hruzas' loan application before considering the appraisal. Massey admitted that both he and Clearwater were aware that the appraisal contained errors. Clearwater's president and Massey agreed that Massey would not fix the errors and Clearwater would not pay Massey for the appraisal. The Hruzas submitted a subsequent loan application to Idahy Federal Credit Union (now known as Icon). Icon approved the loan, secured by a deed of trust on the Hruzas' property. Icon sent a check to Capitol, and Capitol accepted payment. Plaintiff-Appellant CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. was the fidelity bond insurer for Icon. It paid Icon as a result of the Hruzas' default on their loan. As Icon's subrogee, CUMIS filed suit against Massey and Capitol, alleging professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract based on Massey's conduct in preparing the appraisal. A central point of dispute between the parties was how Icon obtained the appraisal. CUMIS alleged that the Hruzas included the appraisal with their loan application, thus prompting Icon to pay Capitol for the appraisal. Massey suggested that Icon improperly obtained the appraisal, pointing to Icon's admission that it did not know how it obtained it and that Icon did not request a letter of assignment from Clearwater to use or rely on the appraisal. The district court concluded that CUMIS could not establish that Massey owed a legal duty to Icon, that Idaho does not recognize a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against appraisers, and that CUMIS had no breach of contract claim. Therefore, the district court granted Massey’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims asserted by CUMIS, with prejudice. Finding that there remained issues of material fact, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing CUMIS's complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey" on Justia Law

The dominant owners of an easement appealed an adverse grant of summary judgment dismissing all of their claims, which were premised on the servient owner’s construction of a permanent sign within the easement. The sign effectively reduced the width of the easement from twenty-five feet to nineteen feet at one point along its length. On appeal, the dominant owners argued that the district court erred in granting the servient owner’s motion for summary judgment and contended that any reduction in the width of their easement was per se unlawful. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court held that the erection of a permanent structure within an easement of definite location and dimension was per se unreasonable. The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Respondent Highway 101 Investments, LLC, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Highway 101 Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

Dale Piercy appealed the district court’s dismissal of his amended action for declaratory relief, which challenged the validity of a herd district ordinance enacted in 1982 by the Canyon County Commissioners. The district court dismissed Piercy’s claim on the basis that it was barred by a seven-year statute of limitations or, in the alternative, a four-year statute of limitations. Piercy challenged the application of both statutes, and argued that Respondents Jennifer Sutton, Luis Guzman, and Canyon County waived any statute of limitations defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the district court. View "Guzman v. Piercy" on Justia Law

Marti Mortensen appealed the district court’s judgment regarding the scope and location of the Mortensen’s easement across Dennis and Sherrie Akers’ property. Mortensen also appealed the district court’s award of punitive damages, arguing she should not have been liable for the punitive damages assessed against her former husband, Vernon. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's location of the prescriptive easement and the award of punitive damages against the Mortensens. The Court vacated the district court's judgment to the extent that it awarded attorney fees to the Akers because the district court failed to apportion the fee award. The case was remanded for the sole purposed of apportioning attorney fees. View "Akers v. Mortensen" on Justia Law

David and Michelle White, and D.L. White Construction, Inc. appealed the district court’s judgment regarding the scope and location of the Whites’ easement across Dennis and Sherrie Akers’ property and the district court’s award of compensatory and punitive damages for trespass and emotional distress. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment locating the easement and awarding damages, but remanded the case for apportionment of attorney fees. View "Akers v. D.L. White Construction, Inc." on Justia Law