Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-respondent New Sweden Irrigation District mowed canal banks on plaintiff-appellant Bradley Morgan's property. Plaintiff claimed New Sweden negligently damaged his property. New Sweden counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment as to its easement's existence and scope, and then moved for summary judgment. The district court granted partial summary judgment, holding that New Sweden's easement was sixteen feet wide and New Sweden was not liable for damaged items within its easement. The district court denied summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim for damaged items outside the easement. Plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded this case back to the district court for that court to enter a judgment that described the precise location where the easement's sixteen-foot width measurement began. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Morgan v. New Sweden Irrigation" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the grant of a summary judgment that dismissed his claim seeking to enforce a vendee’s lien in real property. Because the appellant only addressed on appeal one of two possible grounds upon which the district court granted summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Cuevas v. Barraza" on Justia Law

In 2007, Steven and Valerie Hruza sought to obtain a loan from Clearwater Mortgage (Clearwater). Clearwater requested Defendant-Respondent Wade Massey to perform an appraisal of their real property located in Caldwell. Massey owned co-defendant Capitol West Appraisals and is a professional appraiser licensed to practice in Idaho. Massey performed the appraisal and sent a Summary Appraisal Report to Clearwater indicating that market value of the property was $1,150,000. Clearwater decided to deny the Hruzas' loan application before considering the appraisal. Massey admitted that both he and Clearwater were aware that the appraisal contained errors. Clearwater's president and Massey agreed that Massey would not fix the errors and Clearwater would not pay Massey for the appraisal. The Hruzas submitted a subsequent loan application to Idahy Federal Credit Union (now known as Icon). Icon approved the loan, secured by a deed of trust on the Hruzas' property. Icon sent a check to Capitol, and Capitol accepted payment. Plaintiff-Appellant CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. was the fidelity bond insurer for Icon. It paid Icon as a result of the Hruzas' default on their loan. As Icon's subrogee, CUMIS filed suit against Massey and Capitol, alleging professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract based on Massey's conduct in preparing the appraisal. A central point of dispute between the parties was how Icon obtained the appraisal. CUMIS alleged that the Hruzas included the appraisal with their loan application, thus prompting Icon to pay Capitol for the appraisal. Massey suggested that Icon improperly obtained the appraisal, pointing to Icon's admission that it did not know how it obtained it and that Icon did not request a letter of assignment from Clearwater to use or rely on the appraisal. The district court concluded that CUMIS could not establish that Massey owed a legal duty to Icon, that Idaho does not recognize a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against appraisers, and that CUMIS had no breach of contract claim. Therefore, the district court granted Massey’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims asserted by CUMIS, with prejudice. Finding that there remained issues of material fact, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing CUMIS's complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey" on Justia Law

The dominant owners of an easement appealed an adverse grant of summary judgment dismissing all of their claims, which were premised on the servient owner’s construction of a permanent sign within the easement. The sign effectively reduced the width of the easement from twenty-five feet to nineteen feet at one point along its length. On appeal, the dominant owners argued that the district court erred in granting the servient owner’s motion for summary judgment and contended that any reduction in the width of their easement was per se unlawful. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court held that the erection of a permanent structure within an easement of definite location and dimension was per se unreasonable. The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Respondent Highway 101 Investments, LLC, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Highway 101 Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

Dale Piercy appealed the district court’s dismissal of his amended action for declaratory relief, which challenged the validity of a herd district ordinance enacted in 1982 by the Canyon County Commissioners. The district court dismissed Piercy’s claim on the basis that it was barred by a seven-year statute of limitations or, in the alternative, a four-year statute of limitations. Piercy challenged the application of both statutes, and argued that Respondents Jennifer Sutton, Luis Guzman, and Canyon County waived any statute of limitations defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the district court. View "Guzman v. Piercy" on Justia Law

Marti Mortensen appealed the district court’s judgment regarding the scope and location of the Mortensen’s easement across Dennis and Sherrie Akers’ property. Mortensen also appealed the district court’s award of punitive damages, arguing she should not have been liable for the punitive damages assessed against her former husband, Vernon. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's location of the prescriptive easement and the award of punitive damages against the Mortensens. The Court vacated the district court's judgment to the extent that it awarded attorney fees to the Akers because the district court failed to apportion the fee award. The case was remanded for the sole purposed of apportioning attorney fees. View "Akers v. Mortensen" on Justia Law

David and Michelle White, and D.L. White Construction, Inc. appealed the district court’s judgment regarding the scope and location of the Whites’ easement across Dennis and Sherrie Akers’ property and the district court’s award of compensatory and punitive damages for trespass and emotional distress. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment locating the easement and awarding damages, but remanded the case for apportionment of attorney fees. View "Akers v. D.L. White Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Campbells appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of their neighbors The Kvammes. The parties disputed whether a fence between their respective properties constituted the true boundary of their land. The district court found that a land survey submitted by the Campbells lacked adequate foundation to be admissible, and therefore awarded the Kvammes summary judgment. On appeal, the Campbells argued that the district court abused its discretion when it disregarded the affidavit of their land surveyor in their motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court found that because the district court granted summary judgment on two independent grounds. The Campbells challenged only one of those grounds on appeal. By law, an appellant must challenge all grounds to prevail. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Campbell v. Kvamme" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Christensens began construction of a fabric building adjacent to the property line shared with the McVicarses. After its completion, the McVicarses filed a nuisance action alleging that increased noise, traffic, and dust diminished the value of their property and interfered with the enjoyment of their property. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor ofMcVicarses, finding the Christensens’ course of conduct unreasonably interfered with the McVicarses’ enjoyment of their property and was therefore a private nuisance. Furthermore, the court found that there was no evidence to support the McVicarses’ claim of public nuisance or the Christensens’ unclean hands defense. The Christensens appealed. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred to the extent that it considered the building’s size and proximity to the McVicarses’ property to constitute a nuisance. Because the building’s size and proximity do not in and of themselves constitute a nuisance, the district court erred in requiring the McVicarses to move the building from its current location. Therefore, the case was remanded for analysis of whether the cumulative effects of the activities on the property constituted a nuisance in fact. View "McVicars v. Christensen" on Justia Law

Borrower Gregory Renshaw refinanced the mortgage on his home in 2007. Borrower did not make the payments due under the promissory note, and in 2010, the trustee under the deed of trust commenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Borrower filed this action against the mortgage broker, the lender, MERS, and the trustee. Ultimately, summary judgment was granted in favor of MERS and a partial judgment was entered dismissing this action as to it. Borrower appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Renshaw v. MERS" on Justia Law